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ABSTRACT
This dissertation constitutes an economic history of
the aluminum industry of the United States during the years
from 1940 to 1947*

The study was undertaken to discover what

Important industrial changes had been made in the industry
during that period, and to relate these changes to the field
o f economics.

Purposes which were outlined for the study

were as followst
1*

To continue the study of the aluminum industry

of the United States from the year 1940 to the present time,
In order to show what has taken place during the "defense,1*
’•war,** and "postwar” periods of the past seven yearsj
2*

To present, both in terms of economic history

and economic theory, the major economic aspects of the vast
aluminum industry as it developed during the years from 1940
to 1947f and
3*

To show the postwar economics of the industry,

as the field today is influenced by the extensive productive
capacities developed during World War II and by the entry
into the field of production of competitors of the Aluminum
Company of America, which for many years held the outright
monopoly of ingot aluminum production in the United States.
The material has been presented in five chapters.
An historical background of the industry prior to 1940 has
been presented in Chapter I.

Various phases of the history

of the aluminum Industry have been discussed, such as (a) the
period of discovery and experimentation; (b) early commercial
manufacture of aluminum; (c) the status of the industry near
the turn of the century; (d) the role played by the Aluminum
Company of America in World War I and in the interim between
the two world wars; (e) court litigation concerning monopoly
control in the industry; and (f) the position of the aluminum
Industry in 1940# when the United States embarked upon its
defense program*
Changing conditions in the aluminum Industry after
the beginning of the defense program of the United States
are described in Chapter XI*

The various stages in aluminum

production which were affected by the program of expansion
were*

(a) mining of bauxite and other ores; (b) production

of alumina (reduction of the ores); (c) production of pig
aluminum (reduction of alumina to the virgin metal); (d) the
fabrication of ingot aluminum; and (e) production of finished
aluminum products*

The expansion program which was inaugu

rated by the Aluminum Company of America in 1940 is described*
A brief history of the entry of the Reynolds Metals Company
into the field of primary aluminum production is given*

The

beginning of competition of Reynolds Metal© Company with the
Aluminum Company of America was financed throtAgh the Recon
struction Finance Corporation and its subsidiary, the Defense
Plant Corporation*

Activities of the Defense Plant Corporation

in the building of ^Important alumina, aluminum, and fabri
cation plants during the emergency are an Integral part of
this chapter*
In Chapter III the history of the aluminum industry
in World War XX is presented under nine headings, as follows:
(a) expansion of plant facilities to supply adequate amounts
of aluminum for the war effort; (b) dispersal of the industry
throughout the United States; (e) creation of potential post
war competition; (d) development of new alloys and processes
in aluminum reduction; (e) integration of aluminum processes
in one plant, as exemplified by the Eeynolds plant at Listerhill, Alabama; (f) success of additional private companies in
the aluminum industry during the war; (g) extension of the
industry in the Southern and La stern portions of the United
States; (hi development of the new aluminum industry of the
Pacific Northwest; and (i) a summary analysis of the total
contributions of the aluminum industry to the war effort*
These factors were instrumental in the breaking down of the
great monopoly in primary aluminum which had existed prior to
World War XX*
The postwar aspects of the aluminum industry are
presented in Chapter IV, which deals with such factors as the
following: (a) surplus productive capacity resulting from
aluminum industry expansion during the defense and war periods;
(b) disposal of alumina, aluminum, and fabrication plants owned

by the Government; (e) analysis of administration policies in
regard to disposal of aluminum facilities; (d) the partial
settlement of the problems of disposal; and (e) the developmeat of potential competitive enterprise for the postwar
aluminum Industry of the United States.
The postwar economics of the aluminum industry is the
subject matter of Chapter V*

Various interpretations of the

events which occurred in the industry during the years from
1940 to 1947 have been made in the light of economic theory*
It has been found that the postwar economics of the industry
differs greatly from the prewar situation*

The enormous

expansion of the industry during the emergency gave rise to
surplus capacity which has not been utilised to its fullest
extent in the brief period which has elapsed since the end
o f World War II*

The presence of active competitors of the

Aluminum Company of America in the field of primary aluminum
gives promise of a great expansion of production and con
sumption of the metal in the years to come*

Present day

conditions point to the continuance of both Reynolds Metals
Company and the Kaiser interests in the various phases of
production and fabrication of the metal, but the long run
analysis of the situation will depend upon developments after
the periods of leases of government-built facilities run their
course*

Potential competition of Canadian producers of alumin u » with American interests is considered as a definite
possibility* particularly in the absence of postwar cartels
in the industry.

Consideration is given to the philosophy

of cartelisation of the postwar aluminum industry*

fhe

establishment of a philosophy of abundance in the aluminum
industry appears as the best solution to afford a maximum
amount of aluminum products in postwar markets*

Scarcity

production and high prices in the field have militated against
extension of uses of aluminum in the past*

A flexible price

program* accompanying abundant production of the metal* will
result in the maxi mi.sat ion of consumer satisfaction in the
use of aluminum*

Producers may find It to their advantage

to make their profits on the basis of volume production, with
low profit per unit* rather than restricted production and
high profit per unit*

CHAPTER X
INTRGBUCTION~HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The history and economic development of aluminum
show a rapid growth hardly equaled by that of any other
industry♦

Students of the aluminum industry have had a

most fertile field for study.

The literature describing

the industry is considerable and in a variety of forms.
Technical studies describing the industrial processes
involving aluminum production have been presented in
various books and periodicals*

Economic studies covering

more than half a century have described the unique aspects
of monopoly or monopolistic competition.

In some treatises

writers have sought to show the economic and historical
development of the aluminum industry from the standpoints
of both practice and theoryt particularly in the light of
the elements of monopolistic competition.

In this study

an attempt is made to trace the economic development of
a great industry* and, also, to apply some of the facts In
the field of economic theory to the interpretation of the
aluminum Industry as it exists at the present time.
Certain major purposes may be set forth in regard
to the present study of the aluminum industry of the United

1

a
States during the years from 1940 to 1947*

These purposes

as outlined below will serve as the main guide for the
present descriptive analysis and interpretations which the
study of the aluminum industry encompasses*

Three main

purposes are presented* as follows:
(1) To continue

the study of the aluminum industry

of the United States from the year 1940 to the present time,
in order to show what has taken place during the

ndefense,w

■war,* and “postwar* periods of the past seven years;
(2) To present,
and economic theory, the

both in terms of economic history
major economic aspects of the vast

aluminum industry as it developed during the years from 1940
to 1947; and
(3) To show the

postwar economics of the industry,

as the field today is influenced by the extensive productive
capacities developed during World War II and by the entry
into the field of production of competitors of the Aluminum
Company of America, which for many years held the outright
monopoly of ingot aluminum production in the United States*
These purposes, as outlined here, will be carried
out as a program to build upon previous work done by the
writer in presentation of the development of the aluminum
1
industry of the United States prior to 1940*
That previous

Paul T. Headershot, "Develppment of the Aluminum
Industry of the United States,* {Unpublished Master’s thesis,
Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, 1941)*

3
study o£ the history and economic implications of the aluminum
Industry served to enhance the writer1s interest in aluminum,
as well as to show the possibilities of further studies of
this important industry*

The present study appeal's to be of

even greater significance, because of the rapid expansion of
the aluminum industry during the past seven years*
Many facts appear in the history of the aluminum in
dustry of the United States, but the recent wartime expansion
of the industry, with the shifting of a great part of the
industry from one location to another, constitutes an economic
phenomenon needful of description*

Some of the most important

*

features which serve to show the greatness of the industry are
presented in a publication by three University of Washington
2
professors, whose work was published in 1944*
Four reasons
given by Professors Engle, Gregory, and Mosse for the

^Nathanael H* Engle, Homer E. Gregory, and Robert
Mosse, Aluminum (Chicago: Richard D* Irwin, Inc*, 1944)* This
book was published as one of the "Industrial Series" of the
Bureau of Business Research of the College of Economics and
Business, University of Washington, Seattle# It is one of
the most recent published surveys of the aluminum industry.
Its chief interest in aluminum appears to be from the stand-*
point of the metalfs market appeal, because the sub~title
of the book reads, "An Industrial Marketing Appraisal*"
However, it should be noted that this book does make very
significant contributions to the entire field of study of
the aluminum industry* Although it was published during the
war, it served an interesting purpose, inasmuch as the authors
themselves stated that it was written to give a picture of
the aluminum industry as it would be when the war ended, and
to serve as a guide both to businessmen and the officials of
the national government in their decisions on future policies
in regard to the aluminum industry of the United States.

4
publication of their book, entitled Aluminum,
(1)

are as follows*

the enorsous expansion of aluminum producing capacity

during the defense and wartime periods; (2)

the depletion of

the limited bauxite reserves of the United States; (3)

the

shifting of the center of gravity of the aluminum industry
from the hast and Southeast to the Pacific Northwest; and
(4)

the beginning of competition in the field of primary

aluminum production, an area which historically has been
monopolised by only one producer in the United States*

Many

additional specific facts connected with the aluminum industry
in toe years from 1940 to 1947 will be presented*

Various

economic Interpretations of the facts will be given in the
presentation of material throughout the study*
It is felt that in the first chapter of the present
study a brief resume of the history of the aluminum industry
will serve as an introduction to the more detailed discussions
of recent wartime aluminum industrial and commercial develop**
3
ments*
An understanding of the past is most essential in

2As the title of this first chapter indicates, its
chief purpose is to acquaint the reader with the facts in the
case in terms of the pertinent historical background necessary
to the understanding of the aluminum industry of the United
states after 1940* This summary can in no way substitute for
a more careful analysis of the industry for those years from
13&6 to 1940, but will merely serve to place the present
study on a sound historical foundation* A wide variety of
publications are available to the rea iexi concei'ning prewar
conditions in the industry* Many of the references are
cited in this study*

5
order to understand and interpret the present.

This back

ground is perhaps more vitally applicable in the aluminum
industry than in any other type of business enterprise,
mainly because of the violent upheavals that have occurred
in the industry in a very short period of years.
Discovery and Experimentation in Aluminum Productions
At one time aluminum was more precious than silver
and gold*

Its rarity even in the nineteenth century may be

shown by the fact that at the time of Emperor Napoleon III
o f France a set of aluminum knives, forks and spoons was
used for state occasions, while the gold and silver ones
4
were used for everyday purposes.
Less than 100 years ago
(in 1352), the price of aluminum was &545 per pound, but
extensive scientific research within a few years had caused
increased production and a consequent decline in price. Within
ten years, in 1362, the metal sold for $12 per pound, but not
5
In large or commercial quantities.
It remained for many
years simply an oddity in chemical laboratories, until Charles
Martin Hall, in the United States, and Paul Heroult, in France
both discovered the electrolytic process of aluminum reduction.

4"Aluminum Marks 50th Birthday,,f Newsweek. Vol. XII,
(November 21, 193#)» P* 42.
5An Outline of Aluminum (Pittsburgh:
Johnston Company, 19£5), P* 5.

William G.

6
The discoveries of these two men were made in the year 1$86,
while each was working independently of the other and knew
nothing of the work of the other chemist.
those strange coincidences in history:

It was one of

the invention was

perfected simultaneously by two men who had not known any
thing of the work of the other inventor*

Charles M. Hall

obtained the patents in the United States for his invention,
and gave the impetus to the vast American aluminum industry*
X n the same manner, Paul Heroult obtained the European
patents, and the great aluminum industry of Europe is the

6
fruit of his invention*

Economic historians of the aluminum industry have
noted the strange coincidence that gave exactly the same type
of invention to two widely separated inventors in the very
same year* Such a coincidence is not a great rarity in the
field of industry, but it adds interest to the study of the
aluminum industry* A parallel instance in the field of study
of economic theory was the discovery of marginal utility
analysis* Economists, will recall the fact that three men
were mainly responsible for the early development of the
marginal utility school of thought in economics* Jevons,
Menger, and Walras were the founders of the Austrian School
of thought* These three men arrived at their own basic con
clusions independently of each other, and in different
nations of Europe, at approximately the same time* Each of
these men had expounded his own philosophy of economic
theory concerning marginal utility before he knew of the
work of the other two economists*
The lives of Charles M. Hall and Paul Heroult were
most interesting from the standpoint of their similar biogra
phies, and are of particular interest to the historian of the
aluminum industry* For a more detailed analysis of the period
o f discovery and experimentation, plus intimate details on the
lives of these two men, the reader is referred to the writer’s
previously cited work, in which Chapter II is entirely devoted
to this period of discovery and experimentation in aluminum
reduction*

7
It must not be felt by the reader, however, that
Gharles Martin Hall and Paul Heroult were the only Important
men In the history or aluminum research and experimentation*
Many other sen had preceded them in the field, and had made
valuable and lasting contributions.

A list of these men

would include the names of such distinguished scientists as
Lavoisier, Davy, Oersted, Wohler, Ross, Berzelius, Bunson,
7
Deville and Gastner.
Particularly it must be noted that
both Deville and Gastner had produced aluminum on a large
scale for their day, although neither had been able to set
up commercial production of the new metal.

Hamilton y, Gastner,

an American, had succeeded in producing aluminum at the rate
o f about 500 pounds a day in l££9, but its cost at that time

&

was about £4 per pound.
^This list does not exhaust the complete roster of men
who contributed to the scientific discovery in the field of
aluminum through the ages. However, it does include those men
whose contributions have been most outstanding, and to whom
the great majority of credit for pioneering in the field has
been given*
a
At least two writers have given enormous credit to
Hamilton Young Castner for his great work in the aluminum
field in the United States even before Charles M. Hall,o re
volutionizing discovery of the electrolytic reduction process
for aluminum. It is impracticable at this point to recount
the facts they have presented, but the reader is referred to
the two following articles about Castner: V. H. Lord, Hamilton
Young Gastner (185&-99); a Forgotten Pioneer in the Aluminum
Industry," Journal of Chemical Education. Vol. XIX, (August,
1942), pp. 353-^6; and John M Gskison, "The American Creator
o f the Aluminum Age," World1s Work. Vol. XXVIII, (August, 1914),
p • 439*

la the discovery of the electrolytic process in 1&&6,
Charles Martin Hall actually laid the cornerstone for the
great aluminum industry of the United States*

He opened up

a wide field for the expansion of this new metal into the
railroad, automobile, airplane, and other types of industries
which use aluminum in such huge quantities at the present time*
Extension of the uses of the raetal has been rapid since Hallvs
day*

Aluminum is employed today in such a variety of ways
9
that a list of its uses covers several pages*
Later chapters
in the present study will show the particular adaptations

of aluminum to industrial usage, mainly in terms of demand
and supply, the possibility of expansion of its industrial
and commercial uses, and possible substitutes for aluminum*
Early Commercial Manufacture of Aluminum:
Commercial manufacture of aluminum was developed
slowly, mainly because Charles M* Hall found difficulty in
convincing industrialists of the importance of the new metal*
The early history of his attempts to secure the interest of
capitalists constitutes an important chapter in itself, but

^See Engle and others, o p * clt*. "Appendix 3,”
pp.
A complete alphabetical list of the many uses
of aluminum is given in this reference* It is difficult
to imagine all the varied uses of aluminum, until confronted
with such a complete list, which extends from "accessories”
to "xylophones•" The technical ancl chemical qualities of
the metal have made it a versatile light metal.

9
his later successes tend to make the early trials of a young

10
inventor appear less significant.

After many failures to

attract capital, Hall made contact with a Pittsburgh concern,
the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories, Inc,

As soon as Hall

had convinced Captain Alfred E* Hunt of the importance of
his invention, a reorganisation of the Pittsburgh Testing
Laboratories, Inc*, was accomplished, and the Pittsburgh
Reduction Company was founded*

The history of this company

is relatively short, but it is most important to the history
of the aluminum industry of the Uhited States*

This new

company took over Hallfs process and operated it, with a

11
beginning capital of $20,000*

From this rather meager be

ginning, the industry grew into the industrial giant which
is known today as the Aluminum Company of America*

The

company had been reorganised with a capital of $1,000,000

^*Three references which tell the history of Charles
M* Hall and his attempts to master aluminum reduction tech
niques are as follows: M* K* Wisehart, "The Wonder Story of
Aluminum,” American Magazine* Vol* XCIII, (May, 1922), p* 62;
Harry H* Holmes, "A Great £upil and a Great Disco very— Both
Supported by a Great Teacher*" Science* Vol* LXXXIII,
(February 21, 1936), p* 173; and Karl F. Geiser, "Charles
Martin Hall,** Ration* Vol* C, (February 25 , 1915), p* 22*
^ " T h e Aluminum Company of America," Fortune* Vol* X,
{September, 1934), P* 49* This article gives one of the most
Interesting accounts of the early history of the industry* The
human side of the story is well presented, along with many of
the important facts concerning capitalization of the Pitts
burgh Reduction Company*

10
in 1B&9, and was still known as the Pittsburgh Reduction
Company until it became the Aluminum Company of America in

12
1907*
Two prominent families contributed to the success of
the early company when it needed both business acumen and real
financial assistance*

These two families, which remain today

as synonyms of power in the aluminum industry of .the United
States, were the Davis and Mellon families, represented in
the early years of the industry by Arthur Vining Davis and
13
Richard Beatty Mellon*
Great success attended the attempts
at commercializing the aluminum production which Hall had
initiated*

The net result was that millionaires were made in

the field of aluminum in the United States*

In this study, the Aluminum Company of America will
hereafter be referred to simply as Alcoa, since that is the
name which most writers have attached to it* One distinction
shosild be made, however* In Tennessee there is a city which
is known as Alcoa, but when this city is mentioned at any
place in the discussions, it will be designated as Alcoa,
Tennessee* Any future references to the company will simply
be to Alcoa*
^ A r t h u r V* Davis, together with Charles M. Hall,
officiated at the birth of the aluminum industry proper when,
on Thanksgiving Day, 138#, he and Hall worked a 24-hour stretch
to produce the first aluminum at the Pittsburgh plant* Davis
became a millionaire in the aluminum industry, and was the
president and chairman of the board of directors of Alcoa for
a period of many years*
Richard B. Mellon, who succeeded to the presidency of
the Pittsburgh Reduction Company in 1&99* represented the
famous Mellon company which later caused Alcoa to become
known as a ‘•Mellon company*” Apparently this family*s relation*ship with Alcoa was the cause of an amazing incident in

11
Fortunately Charles M. Hall had been shrewd and had
retained a 40 per cent interest in the company.

This fore

sight made him a millionaire along with the others.

The

great success story of Charles M. Hall has made him one of
the unusual inventors of the United States.

It gave him an

opportunity to become a prominent benefactor of Oberlin
College, in Ohio, where his experiments had reached a
14
successful conclusion.
Likewise, Berea College, In

American history in the early 1920*s. At that time both
Andrew W. Mellon, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Harlan
F. Stone, the Attorney General of the United States, were
in President Coolidgevs Cabinet. As the Attorney General,
Stone was interested in bringing monopoly suits against
Alcoa. But this prosecution, if continued, It had been
alleged, would have been embarrassing to Secretary Mellon.
It is interesting to note that at the time Harlan F. Stone
was kicked upstairs to the Supreme Court of the United
States. His successor, John J. Sargent, did nothing to
jeopardize the position of Alcoa or Secretary Mellon* In
fact, the Republican era following the First World War was
one of almost complete laxity in the matter of anti-trust
proceedings against monopolies after Stone assumed his
position as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States*.

.

^Holmes, o p cit., p. 176. The story of Hall1©
close association with Dr. Frank F. Jewett, his chemistry
teacher at Oberlin, is one of the stories which is almost
without parallel in the educational circles in the United
States. It is truly a great example of the influence of
teachers on young minds and of the power of both teacher
and pupil to work out difficult problems together. It was
this association which Influenced Hall to leave a huge
bequest of one—third of his $27*000,000 estate to Oberlin
in 1914*

12
Kentucky, has been a significant beneficiary of Hall’s
15
generous philanthropies*
Status of the Aluminum Industry Near the Turn of the Century:
Hear the end of the nineteenth century* aluminum had
been established as one of the important new metals for

use

in the twentieth century* The Pittsburgh Reduction Company
w as one of only three companies in the world which were pro
ducing aluminum at that time*

An interesting account written

by Samuel Rideal in 1396 gives production figures for several

16
years, as follows:
According to Richards* the world1s
production up to 1592 was only 2,586,000
pounds; but in 1593 about 1,474,000 pounds
were produced, and in 1694 a total of
2.244.000 pounds* Last year (1695) the
American output has been estimated at
830.000 pounds, and it is believed that
the production of the present year will
reach over 2,000,000 pounds, as the Pitts
burgh Reduction Company will have ready
by the first of June plant capable of
making 10,000 pounds per day*

^ G t h e r bequests made by Hall include a large sum
to the American Missionary Society and approximately onesixth of his estate for the advancement of education in
the Near and Far East* While not of too much significance
directly to the economist or economic historian, neverthe
less these facts concerned with Hall’s fortune serve to
extend one’s appreciation of the power of a great new
industry to be a boon to the world in both an educational
and religious way* Thus it may be seen that aluminum has
been of great value in many ways, and not only in terms of
its service to the economic system in which we live*
and

tJ

« P S £ ^ t u re
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It is remarkable that the closing years of the nine
teenth century saw such an astounding development of the new
Industry of aluminum manufacture*

It was truly the dawn of

the “Age of Aluminum," as many of the writers of the period
chose to call it*

Patent troubles resulted in some court

litigation, but in the settlement of the cases the Pitts
burgh Reduction Company did not lose too much in terms of
control over the new industry, although it did have to pay
damages to the complaining company over a period of years*
In reality, the court litigations may be said to have bene—
17
fited both the company and Hall in some ways*
Fortified
by adequate financial backing, the company looked to the
twentieth century full of hope for the future of the aluminum
industry*

As time has shown, the hope was not in vain*

17
'A brief history of the court litigations concerning
aluminum patents will show that infringement was charged
against the Pittsburgh Reduction Company by the Electric
Smelting and Aluminum Company, for whom Hall had worked in
lSS7—1&S&* The case arose out of the granting of patent
rights to C. S* Bradley for the reduction of aluminum com
pounds, in 1S92* Actually, it should be noted that the final
court decision was rendered against Hall and the company,
and that until the expiration of the Bradley patents in 190B1909, damages and royalties had to b© paid to the Cowles
company, which had taken over Bradley*s rights* When it is
stated that the court litigation benefited Hall and the com
pany, it is meant that, although payments had to be made, th©
net result was the strengthening of the company through the
courtfs permission for the continuation of the company*©
activity in the production of aluminum* See H* T* Warshow
led*}» Reoresentative Industries of the United States, (New
forks Henry Holt and Company, 192o), p* 8*

Rapid expansion of the aluminum industry of the
United States was made possible early in the twentieth century
b y a series of events which left their imprint upon its
structure*

These events weres

(1 )

the changing of the name

o f the Pittsburgh Reduction Company to the Aluminum Company
o f America; (2 )
Alcoa; (3)

the program of expansion inaugurated by

the early attempt of Alcoa to fix prices and

control the industry as a monopoly; and (4 )

the partly suc

cessful attempts of competitors to gain a foothold in the
industry, particularly in the fabrication of aluminum* The
recapitalisation of the Pittsburgh Reduction Company took
place in l£&9«

This move was followed in 190? by the chang

ing of the name of the company to the Aluminum Company of
America •

The new company immediately launched out upon a

vast program to gain control of the essential mines (bauxite
areas), most of the important reduction plants and fabri
cating facilities, and the greater part of the important
distributing agencies for the products of aluminum*

Even

early in the century an early and partly successful attempt
by Alcoa to fix prices and control the industry as a monopoly

Id

was made*
^Monopolies customarily find that price-fixing is
one of their stocks in trade, and the fact is that Alcoa must
have realised this from the beginning. With such extensive
control over bauxite deposits, fabricating plants, and the
marketing of aluminum ingots, sheet aluminum, wire, tubing,
and other products, Alcoa found that it could dictate terms
and prices to most of the companies with which it dealt* See
Report of tne Federal Trade Commission, House Furnishings In
dustry* Vol* III, (Washington: Government IPrinting Office, 1925

15
Later attempts of competitors to gain some control
in the industry were hindered, in large part, with the pos
sible exception being in the fabricating business*

Some

companies were attracted to this phase of the industry*

A

virtual monopoly in the production end of the aluminum indus
try existed until after the entry of the Reynolds Metals
Company and the Glin Corporation into the field of ingot
production after the United States embarked upon its defense
program just prior to World War XI*

The significant fact is

that Reynolds and Glin did not enter the field of primary
aluminum production until after 1940*

Even at that late date,

the entry of potential competitors to Alcoa was made possible
b y the United States Government, through the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and its subsidiary, the Defense Plant
Corporation, which financed enormous plant expansion during
19
defense and wartime periods*
^ T h e s e statements move us a little ahead of the
historical trend of our story, but they serve to show the
necessity of the historical background* Entry of the federal
government into the field of aluminum production in reality
was not such a surprising move, because it was a well-known
fact that the plant capacity of Alcoa at the time of the
beginning of the defense activities of the United States was
woefully inadequate to supply all of the needs of the nation*s
defense program* Reynolds Metals Company and the 01in Cor
poration both were in a favorable position to get federal
assistance In their moves into the field of ingot aluminum
production* The subsequent entry of the United States into
World War IX enhanced the position of these two companies
as it did all wartime industries* Later chapters will treat
adequately the story of the Reynolds Metals Company and the
011m Corporation in their influence on the aluminum Industry
after 1940*
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Early complaints against Alcoa were the order or
the day after 1907* with some of the companies themselves
charging Alcoa with price fixing and monopolistic control*
Many of the critic isms against the company t however, were
made by companies which previously had thought aluminum to
20
be entirely impracticable from a commercial viewpoint*
Since Alcoa had been the company to demonstrate the feasibillty of aluminum, it had gone ahead of the other companies
both as a producer and as a fabricator of aluminum*

Some of

the other companies which entered the field as fabricators
soon began to complain of the monopoly of Alcoa as a producer*
Nevertheless, the position of alcoa was so secure that In
190$ and 1909, when the Bradley patents ran out, no new com*
pany arose to challenge Alcoa* s supremacy in the field of

21
primary aluminum production*
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A case in point is the experience of Charles M* Hail
with the Electric Smelting and Aluminum Company, of lockport,
H*Y* He had been unable to convince the company of the prac
ticability of commercial production of aluminum, and his con
tract with them had been terminated at the end of one year*
However, this was the same company that later brought suit
against him for infringement of patents, and which also charged
Hall*s company with monopoly practices* The story of this
episode is given fully by John M* 0ski son, .op* cit*, p* 444 *
^ M a n y factors may aid an infant industry in its
opening drive for supremacy in an industrial field* In the
case of Alcoa, it apparently was a combination of many factors,
such as an early start, control of essential patent rights,
the domination of both production and fabrication fields in
the aluminum industry, and the advantage of a protective tar
iff* As la the case of other types of industries, however,
the aluminum industry continued its rise to power even after
. the essential patents had run out. The reason was that even
then other companies could not hope to compete faborably and
on equal basis with Alcoa*
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Many companies in the early decades of the century
continued their antagonism toward the Alcoa monopoly by
openly advocating the importation or foreign aluminum*

A

constantly increasing supply of scrap aluminum gave them a
great measure of relief*

These companies did not look upon

Alcoa as the "father of the aluminum industry*" but rather
as the "dog in the manger*" which was biting the hands of
other industries that gave it the extensive markets for the
sale of aluminum products*

The Ford Motor Company and

General Motors Corporation may be cited as examples of com
panies whose dependence on Alcoa placed them in a disadvan
tageous position in terms of bargaining for the essential
aluminum parts that went into automobiles produced by them*
These two companies employed two solutions to reduce their
dependence on Alcoa*a fabricated products*

Henry Ford simply

turned to other aluminum fabricators after he had been un
successful in his attempts to fabricate the metal for himself*
General Motors Corporation used a different method* that of
using smaller and smaller quantities of aluminum in its car 3 .
General Motors products* even in the modern era, contain
smaller amounts of the metal than those of other similar
companies*
The Ford Motor Company* the Bohn Aluminum and Brass
Corporation* and the Bausch Machine Tool Company were three p
examples of potential competition to Alcoa in the early years

lg
of the t w e n t i e s century*

It must be pointed out, however,

that Ford *8 attempt to become a fabricator was an unsuccessful
effort to rid himself of dependence on Alcoa for materials for
his cars*

After spending about $5,000,000 in setting up shop

equipment with which to make the necessary parts for his
automobiles, Ford was faced with rising prices of ingot alumi
num during World War X*

The net result of his attempt at

fabrication was the complete scrapping of the $ 5 ,000,000
worth of equipment*

His decision was to turn to steel as

the solution of his problems*

This decision has had an im

portant long-run effect upon the market for aluminum in the
automobile industry*

It accounts In great measure for the

difficulties faced in later years when producers of aluminum
sought re-entry into the automobile industry as a potential
22
market for the metal*
The stories of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation,
in its attempt to withstand pressure from Alcoa, constitute
another interesting phase in aluminum history, to which much
attention has been given by many writers*

22

The significant

Full particulars concerning this bold move on the
part of Henry Ford may be obtained from the following sources
"The Aluminum Company of America," Fortune* (September, 1934)»
op
clt** p* 100* The story shows the extent to which one
industrialist may be moved to change his entire plans when he
is subjected to pressure from another industrial group or from
the economic system. In this case, particularly, it was a
combination of both, because Ford had stood for two raises in
aluminum prices before he abandoned his whole plan for fabri
cation of aluminum*

*

19
feature about this company is the Tact that it still exists
a s a strong company in aluminum fabrication.

Additional in

formation is on record about a famous quarrel between Alcoa
and the Bausch Machine Tool Company*

The net result of the

trouble mas that Alcoa came out on top in a series of argumeats over United States Navy contracts and the new water23
power sites on the Saguenay River, in Quebec, Canada*
Many writers, including H* T. War show, have shown
that the history of the aluminum Industry of the United
States in the twentieth century, up to the time of World
War XI, had been mainly a history of Alcoa and its activi—
24
ties* As Warshow has stated:
Monopolisation of the bauxite deposits of
the United States by this company and its monopoly
on the domestic production of aluminum, which is
fortified by high import duties, make it impossi
ble to consider conditions In the aluminum industry
separately from the position of the Aluminum Company
of America*
Professor Donald H* Wallace, whose book, Market Control in
the Aluminum Industry* is a classic in discussions of the
aluminum industry of the United States, stated the case

^”The Aluminum Company of America,” Fortune.
(September, 1934), op* cit». pp. 100-02* This article gives
a full story not only about the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Cor
poration, but also about th© troubles that the Bausch Machine
Tool Company had with Alcoa through the years.

2/*h. t. Warshow, ££• cft*» pp. 44-45*
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briefly when he said that wfor the student of monopolistic
and competitive forces the aluminum industry presents an
25
unusually interesting specimen.”
The extent to whlch foreign competition had been
early eliminated from the American aluminum scene can be
shown with reference to the attempt to establish a French
company, known as L*Aluminum Francais, tried to get into
the production field in this country in 1913•

lb was or

ganised in the United States as the Southern Aluminum Company,
but was under the control of the French concern.

This poten

tial producer and competitor to Alcoa began a plant at Badin,
Horth Carolina in 1913» but partial completion was all that
was possible before the outbreak of World War I.

The French

company had been forced to withdraw, and the result was that
Alcoa was enabled to purchase the properties which had been
owned by the Southern Aluminum Company.

This move served

to eliminate the threat of foreign competition on American
soil, and since that time no foreign producer has had the
audacity to erect plants in the United States to compete with

26
Alcoa in ingot aluminum production.

25
•'Donald H* Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum
Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), P* ix.

26This incident appears to be adequate proof of the
supremacy of Alcoa in the United States in prewar years. In
a way* it might have been an unfortunate thing for the con
suming public in the United States when the French company
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Oae m s t not infer from the foregoing statement,
however, that foreign aluminum ingots have not found a
market in the United States.

The domestic fabricators of

aluminum in this country customarily have had three sources
of supply as far as aluminum ingots are concerned.

These

sources are to be noted as (1) Alcoa products; (2)

the

aluminum-scrap market; and (3)
num*

foreign producers of alumi

Alcoa products have been available to the domestic

market typically on a basis of high prices and restricted
productions.

A certain amount of scrap aluminum usually was

available to domestic fabricators, but the supply was uncer
tain and in many instances lacked the uniformity of quality
that was desired*

Foreign aluminum was imported into the

United States on a limited basis, because high tariff rates
on ingot aluminum made it difficult to send the metal into
this country to compete with Alcoafs product*

Both the

aluminum-scrap market and foreign ingot importations have
varied considerably through the years*

At times domestic

fabricators actually were able to obtain more metal from the
scrap market and from imports than was being made available
by Alcoa, but they could not always depend upon these
conditions.

was forced to retire from the field. It was more than 27 years
later when any semblance of competition appeared in the field,
at the time Reynolds and Olin Corporation began ingot aluminum
production in this country.

Alcoa Aluminum jU| World War I. and in the Interim Between
World War I and World War II:
Although the chief concern of this study is the
presentation of material facts and economic interpretations
connected with the aluminum industry of the United States
during World War II, it is of importance to recount some of
the pertinent information dealing with the aluminum situation
during World War I*

Few extensive or thorough analyses have

been made of the contributions of the aluminum industry
during World War I, but enough has been written to show how
Alcoa took up the new burden and responded rather well during
these years*

Production to satisfy the increased demands for

-new aluminum products made expansion of the aluminum industry
a necessity*

One of the outstanding and noticeable character

istics of the industry during the war years was the extension
of its field of usefulness*

Whereas before the war the auto

mobile industry had become the greatest purchaser of aluminum,
vast research projects on aluminum during the war years ex
tended the areas of demand for the metal, and new markets were
opened up for both aluminum and its alloys*

It is safe to say

that no other metal received more scientific attention during
27
World War I than did aluminum*
^ T h i s description appears to be an interesting case
of the fact that history repeats itself, because the same
thing happened in the aluminum indue try during World War II*
Scientific research was greatly expanded, particularly in
aluminum reduction processes and alloys*
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Of significance to an understanding of the aluminum
industry during World War I is the treatment given to the
subject by Bernard M. Baruch in his book, American Industry
in the War*

Briefly, this is the story of aluminum in the

war as told by the report of the War Industries Board, of

2$

which Baruch was chairmans
The chief war use for aluminum was in the
manufacture of ammonal, which is a mixture of
aluminum dust and ammonium nitrate, used in the
manufacture of munitions* Other military uses were
for fuses, flayers, castings for engines, personal
equipment, mess equipment, and as a deoxidizer in
steel manufacturing••••••»•
Not enough aluminum could be produced to supply
the war needs of ourselves and the Allies and at
the same time supply normal civilian requirements*
Hence the control to be exercised by the Board had
to be directed chiefly to two problems: Control of
distribution and control of prices. The Board also
assisted the Aluminum Co* of America in securing
power for increased production and encouraged the
recovery of secondary metal from scrap*
The normal prewar price of aluminum is about
2 0 cents per pound* When this country entered the
war, open-market prices were about 60 cents, while
contract prices rhnged around 3& cents*
The war requirements for aluminum were being
studied by the commissioner of raw materials of
the Council of National Defense in March, 1917,
and on April 23$ 1917, with the market at 60 cents,
Mr* Davis, president of the Aluminum Co. of Amer
ica, offered to provide the United States Government

^B e r n a r d M. Baruch, American Industry in the War.
(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1941), PP* 156-57* This
book is a report of the War Industries Board, for March, 1921*
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with whatever it wanted for its preparedness
campaign at whatever price the Government should
put upon it* This offer was accepted for 2,000,000
pounds of aluminum ingots at 2?i cents a pound, and
a few days later enlarged to 3,000,Q0G pounds, to
be delivered before August of that year* In Sep
tember, 1917, the company agreed with the War
Industries Board ttto accept direct and indirect
orders at the prevailing contract prices" (33 cents),
and to refund to the Government any difference which
might exist between this contract price and any
fixed price which might be decided upon at a later
date*

••••**•*32 cents per pound was recommended on
February 23 (1913), and approved by the President
on March 2*«***«**A compromise was (later) reached
at 33 cents, and this was continued until March 1,
1919#
A further history of aluminum production during
World War I, and in

the period immediately thereafter, shows

a rapid increase in the metal from 1914 to 1913, and then a
rapid slump in production from 1913 to 1921*

Production had

been so great during the war that a large "surplus" existed
in the market during the years following*

The disposal of

this so-called surplus was made possible only after the
company had reduced prices from a level of 32*9 cents per
29
pound to a level of 19 cents per pound in November, 1921*

^Technically, economists are cautious in designating
quantities of goods an "surplus” when in reality the price
situation is such that consumers will not take them off the
market* In this case, it is noticeable that as soon as the
price was made flexible, instead of rigid, the aluminum was
disposed of in normal ways to the consuming public* Most
economists would agree that in strict economic theory there
is no surplus "until supply exceeds demand at a x>rice of zero.”
See Harlan L* McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles
(New fork: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1936), p. 201*
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However, changing conditions in the aluminum industry meant
that this price reduction was not to last long, because by

1926 the price had been raised to a level of 2& cents per
_
30
pound for primary 93-99/6 metal.

This ability of the

company to meet varied circumstances in the economic system
is unique*

In later years Alcoa fell into line with other

companies in the industrial field and used the familiar
technique of reducing production rather than using flexible
prices to meet the economic depression in the early 1930fs*

31

In the years immediately following World War I, the
interest shown by Alcoa in foreign buildings was very
noticeable*

The company began a program of expansion both

in international and domestic spheres*

Norway became the

object of Alcoa's attention in 1921, mainly in terms of the
expansion of the company's control over adequate and cheap
hydroelectric power for greater operations in that country.
The company soon had extended its control over some out
standing waterpower sites, and had gained control of two
of the Norwegian companies, Det Norske Nitrid and Norsk
Aluminum Company*

Both of the Norwegian companies had been

30h . T. Warshow, op. cit.. p. 29*
^ High, rigid and sticky prices have characterized
many fields of industry, and aluminum is no exception. More
will be said in later chapters about such prices and their
effects on the economic system.

eagaged in aluminum reduction in Norway before Alcoa appeared
32
a n the scene*
Alcoa extended its control in the domestic
sphere in 1924 by acquiring important fluorspar mines
both Kentucky and Illinois*

in

Acquisition of these mines made

the company's manufacture of artificial cryolite (for elec~
t roly tic reduction of aluminum from bauxite) easier and more
certain in terms of its control over the natural resources
involved in production of ingot aluminum*
The extent to which Alcoa had actually extended its
►

control over the various fields of aluminum activity can
best be illustrated by the statement that In 1926 the hold**
lags of the company could be grouped under eleven different
headings* as followss

(1) mining properties; (2) bauatlte;

(3) magnesium; (4) carbon electrodes; (5) alumina; (6) aluminum; (7) aluminum manufactured goods; (6) sales; (9) railroads
(10) power and public utilities holdings; and (11) miscel
laneous holdings* which included brass* paper* iron* tar
33
products* and fluorspar companies*
Xn terms of these
widespread holdings* Alcoa was one of the world1s outstanding
examples of integrated domination in any kind of industrial
field*

32H . T. Warshow,

tit». p* 29 ff-

33?or a complete picture of the domination of the
company in these respects* consult Warshow* o p . cit*. p* 53*
or Hendershot* op * cit*. p . 69*
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The account, given above is not a picture of the
control exercised by the company in 1940* however, because
several significant changes had been made in that interim
between 1926 and 1940.

Changing conditions in the aluminum

Industry had resulted in Alcoa*a disposal of a great many
e f Its foreign properties and subsidiaries prior to the
latter date*

The number of companies controlled and doml~

mated by Alcoa had been reduced from a total of about 75
(as shown by Warshow in 1926) to the number of 26 companies
34
in 194Q» according to Moody*s Industrials for that year.
Eighteen of these 26 companies, owned entirely by Alcoa at
that time, were to be found in the United States, Canada and
Dutch Guiana*

The other eight companies, most of which were

owned by Alcoa to an extent greater than 25%, and mostly
more than 50%, likewise were scattered through the three
35
countries named above.
Court Litigation Concerning Monopoly Control in Aluminum?
A history of the aluminum industry prior to 1940
would not be complete without some mention of the many cases
that case into the courts as a result of the charges of
monopoly and unfair trade practices against the Alcoa

3i*noodr,B Industrials. 1940 (New fork: Moody*a In
vestor* s Service, Inc., Annual Publication), p. 365*
35Ibid.

2&
system*

Active prosecution of the Alcoa monopoly in primary

aluminum began in 1912, and since that time many cases in
volving such charges have come before the various courts of
the United States*
One of the famous consent decrees in the aluminum
Industry litigations was handed down by Judge James M* Young
36
as a result of the prosecution of the company in 1912*
Many important subjects were covered in Section 7 of this
consent decree*

The prohibition of the following types of

discrimination and unfair trade practices was specifically

a rationed:
(1) Combining with other companies to restrict out
put and control prices of aluminum;
(2) Delaying shipments of material or furnishing
known defective material to its customers;
(3} Charging higher prices for crude or semi
finished aluminum to competitors than to subsidiaries;
(4)

Refusing to sell crude or semifinished aluminum

to competitors in the field of aluminum fabrication;
(3) Requiring competitors to divulge Information
concerning the expected usage of aluminum sold to them;

complete text of this consent decree is to be
found in a Report of the Feder il Trade Commission, House
Furnishings Industry. Vol. Ill, 0£. clt.» pp. 237-91*
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Requiring the making of agreements not to
compete with the Alcoa system in certain lines;
(7) Intimating that the failure to enter into such
agreements would deprive competitors of raetal; and
(3) faking the position that enlargement of com
petitors 1 plants would be a signal for cutting off the supply
of aluminum materials to them*
This decree in 1912, covering all of the above phases
o f the abuse of other companies by Alcoa, served a very good
purpose, bat it did not prevent other cases in the courts*
There are five cases that deserve mention in the history of
aluminum prior to the time of the administration of Franklin
D. Roosevelt as President*

These five cases dealt with the

SawyervAustin Lumber Company, the Southern Aluminum Company,
the Norsk Aluminum Company, the Aluminum Rolling Mill Company,
37
and Aluminum Manufacturers, Inc*
The prosecution of Alcoa
In these cases was not successful, however, and the Govern
ment and the companies were unable to break up the monopoly
held by Alcoa in primary aluminum production*

Laxity on

the part of the Department of Justice in vigorous and out
right prosecution of Alcoa at other times in the 1920*s led
3#
one writer to exclaim:
When is a monopoly not a monopoly? 'When
it belongs to the Secretary of the Treasury, and
37,or a complete description of these cases, the
reader is referred to Hendershot, op. cit.. pp. 85-121.
3^0.-G* Villard, Editorial, Nation. Vol. GXXX,
(April 16, 1930), p. 437.
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when an Inconvenient Attorney General is promoted
to the Supreme Court* If you don,t believe it,
ask the Federal Trade Commission, which on April 4
dismissed all monopoly complaints against the
Aluminum Company of America*«.»«••.When Mr* Stone
left the cabinet for the Supreme Court, his great
successor John J. Sargent forgot all about aluminum,
and William D. Mitchell has not happened to think
about it*
A case involving the Bausch Machine Tool Company w*$s
brought into the courts in 1932, but after two years of fight39
ing* Alcoa emerged victorious*
The Roosevelt Administration,
at least in Its earlier years, appeared as a formidable
opponent of Alcoa, and in April, 1937, brought suit against
the company on the specific complaints of price control and
antitrust violations*

This case was still in the courts in

1940? at the time when the United States launched its defense
program*

It was one of the longest case 3 in the history of

American jurisprudence*

Settlement of the case was not made

until after the United States had become involved in World
40
War II*
The wartime disposition of the case will be dis
cussed in later chapters.

Political considerations and

industrial expediency have been the guiding principles in
all of these long series of litigations against the aluminum
monopoly, according to many observers in recent years.

39**Aluminum Victory,f* Business Week. Nos. 227-2 ^2 ,
(January 6 , 1934), P* 34*
p. 49 .

40n^aj_xvay Mark," Time. Vol. iXIV, (July 3, 1939),
This inference gives the early history of the case.
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Status of the Alumi m m Industry in 1940?
Careful analysis or the aluminum Industry of the
United States reveals that this country was placed in a
disadvantageous position when the defense program was begun
after war broke out in Europe in September, 1939 •

Adequate

aluminum supplies to fill the needs of the defense program
of this country could not be furnished by Alcoa, although
company officials at first indicated that Alcoa*s productive
capacity would be sufficient*

One of the most caustic com

ments ever to be made about Alcoa and its response to the
new defense program is the following statement made by Mew
41
Republic as late as February, 1941 •
Alcoa's response to the defense program
was typical of a monopolistic industry* Alcoa
went to the NDAC (National Defense Advisory
Commission) and offered to cooperate— if the
Commission would bring pressure on the Justice
Department to call off Its two-year old anti
trust prosecution* This was too much even for
the MDAC*
As a further indication of its desire to
cooperate in the defense program, Alcoa, as
soon as the anti-trust hearings were concluded,
cut the supplies of raw aluminum to the Reynolds
Metals Company by 40 per cent* The Reynolds
Metals Company, a potential competitor of Alcoa 1s,
was, and is today, engaged in defense orders. Its
deliveries are incomplete because it lacks aluminum.

W ^ W h y Vie Are Falling Behind,” Mew Republic- Vol. CIV,
(February 17, 1941, Fart Two), p* 233*
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This statement is typical of the attitudes which
were expressed in many circles about Alcoa and its strangle
hold on the aluminum industry of the United States by 1940.
It will be possible in the next chapter to carry this analysis
still further*

Our discussions will revolve around the vari

ous aspects of the aluminum industry in the defense program*
The gigantic expansion of the aluminum industry under the
supervision of the United States Government constitutes an
entirely different pattern from that followed by Alcoa in
prewar years*

CHAPTER II
<*
ALUMINUM AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM; ThE BEGINNING
OF THE MODERN ERA OF ALUMINUM INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
The foundation was laid in Chapter I for the further
discussion of the aluminum industry of the United States
during the years* 1940-1947*

In Chapter II the first phase

of this recent period of aluminum development will be pre
sented*

The whole period from 1940 to 1947 1®, in reality,

the most important and far-reaching period of aluminum
development in this country.

The importance of the period

should be considered in each of the three phases of "defense*
"war," and "postwar” activities.

The initial period of

defense activities covers about two years, 1940 and 1941*
During this time the aluminum industry of the United States
was girding itself to fulfill its many commitments to the
national defense program, and to the actual war program
after 1941*
Outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939, had
been a signal and a forewarning that the United States in
evitably would become involved in World War II.

Our time-

honored policy of isolationism, which had held sway in the
United States since World War I, was painfully being swept
away by the knowledge that Hitler had begun his program of
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world conquest;*

It was apparently natural that th© United

States should begin in 1940 a great program of defense, and
that the sympathies of this nation should be turned toward
the Allied cause*
Leaders in governmental circles and in high military
positions apparently felt that protection of the United States
necessitated an adequate air defense*

It was evident from

the beginning that aluminum would play an important role in
the preparedness program*

But air defense, as such, was

not the only reason why aluminum was destined to play such
a highly significant part in World War II*

It had been well

established in World War I that aluminum was valuable in
many ways in the waging of war*

The chief use of the metal

in that war was in the manufacture of explosives, although
aluminum was used In a variety of other ways*

Both technical

and engineering developments during the interim between the
two wars resulted in a wider variety of uses for aluminum*
It is true that the great demand for aluminum in the
defense program was for airplanes, which are made almost
entirely of aluminum*

However, the military uses for alumi

num extend to other types of equipment, such as equipment
used by individuals in the armed forces, pontoons, parts of
the fixtures and even the basic structures of torpedo boats
and large ships, parts of automobiles and truckls which are
essential for the mobility of fast^moving troops, radios and
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other types of communications equipment for both land and
sea operations, and a variety of other types of products
and military supplies which use the metal in lesser quan
tities*

Indeed, as has been said by other writers, the

modern god of war carried a shield of aluminum in World
W ar II.
This dependence upon aluminum during the period of
defease becomes more apparent when it is realized that World
War IX in Europe in late 1939 end early 1940 already had
shown the necessity for dependence upon warplanes as a means
of offensive actions as well as defensive measures*

It may

be pointed out that ninety per cent of the weight of the
average modern plane is made up of this light metal*

During

the war it was noticeable that an average warplane might have
as much as 7*000 pounds of the metal in it, while a modern

1
bomber at times used as much as 16,000 pounds of aluminum*
These figures by themselves may not appear to mean much,, but
when it is recalled that President Franklin D. Roosevelt
had spoken in 1940 of as many as 50,000 planes a year as a
goal of our defense program, the dependence upon aluminum
becomes of great significance*
The sympathy of the United States toward the Allied
cause turned into something akin to alarm early in 1940 when

^"Aluminum and the Emergency," Fortune« Vol* XXIII,
(May, 1941), p. 66 .
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the successes of Germany were making the headlines nearly
every day*

The United States became

quite concerned, es

pecially with respect to the shortages of aluminum and the
methods for providing adequate supplies of the metal.

This

task became more difficult than was at first expected, mainly
because Germany had not been negligent in the matter of alumi
num production*

In fact, a brief account of Germany1s success

in production of the metal will show that the Hitler program
had resulted in such progress in the production of the metal
that Germany as early as 1934 had actually outstripped the
United States*

This great German production of aluminum had

made possible the building up of the great scourge of Europe,
the German Luftwaffe*

When war came, the air ana of the

German military forces was well prepared for the works of
devastation that it accomplished in France, England and the
other smaller countries of Europe*

The German nation had

risen farm a position of only negligible importance to one
of the greatest of aluminum producers within a few short
2
years*
In reality, the American public must have been most
startled to read in the hew Republic for January 27, 1941,
that in 1939 Germany had outstripped the United States in

2
See Table I for a complete study of the production
of the world in regard to aluminum in 1933 and 1940*
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aluminum production, leading this country by a quantity of
73 1111101 pounds.

German production for that year amounted

to about 400 million pounds, and United States production
was only 327 million pounds#

But this fact was not the most

startling, because it was further pointed out that in the
year 1940, subsequent to the acquisition of French and other
aluminum production properties, the German program might hare
been able to extend production of the metal beyond the
3
billion-pounds-per-year mark#
Germany, apparently dedicated
to a program of air supremacy over Europe, was making good in
her efforts to put more and more warplanes into the 3ky.
In almost direct contrast to the pattern of production
shewn for Germany, Great Britain was not in such an enviable
position in regard to her own aluminum output.

Despite aid

which had been forthcoming from both Canada and the United
States, Great Britain could not approach Germanyfs great
productive capacity.

Even before France and her aluminum

facilities had fallen into the hands of Germany, the com
bined operations of England, Canada and the United States
were not favorable in comparison with the German output of
the metal#

Production in the United States will be seen to

have been Increasing gradually prior to 1940, but the real

^"Monopoly versus Defense,n Hew Republic. (January 27,
1941), PP» 104-05#

3S
aluminum situation was not much improved by that time-

It

was a significant fact that Inventories of aluminum were de
clining rapidly, and this condition left the defense program
in a more vulnerable position than it might otherwise have
been*

As a matter of fact, the dependence on day**to-day

production of the metal was imminent when several events
occurred to make the situation look somewhat better* These
events, together with outstanding facts concerning the major
features of the vast aluminum industry, will be presented in
the following discussions*
The big questions in the aluminum industry late in
1939 and early in 1940 revolved around the problems of
production, plus the entire industrial structure of the
industry as it was then constituted*

The problems of pro

duction of aluminum did not change overnight, but the
realisation of the greater impact of the defense program
made a new appraisal of the industry imperative*

Some of

the problems of the industry in the initial stages of the
defense program concerned!

(1 ) the various stages and

processes in the manufacture of aluminum; (2 ) the natural
resources which wbre available for production of the metal;
(3 ) the electrical energy for aluminum plants; (4 ) labor
resources; and (f>) tne capital and management in the industry
at the outset of the defense program*

Some of these problems

were of greater importance than the others*

Each of the
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problems had bo be met, however, in order bo obbain greater
production of* aluminum bo supply both Allied needs and those
of the United States in our own program of preparedness •

A

brief statement of each problem will suffice at this point
to show the difficulties involved at the beginning of this
new era of aluminum progress*.
While no extended exposition of the technical pro-*
cesses in aluminum manufacturing is contemplated here, it is
necessary to point out that throughout the history of the
aluminum industry, and especially in 1939» it was Impossible
to speak of only one integrated aluminum industry, in the
sense that all the stages and processes of production were
carried out in one place*

In fact, the field of aluminum

consisted of a series of* industries, Integrated more or less
Into a cohesive pattern which produced the familiar auto
mobile parts, aircraft metal, and kitchen utensils*

Analysis

of the industry based on this type of integration will show
five various stages through which aluminum passed to reach
the ultimate consumers.

These five stages, each one of

which posed a different problem in the matter of national
defense, are as followss
1*

Mining of the raw materials or ores;

2*

Production of alumina (reduction of the ores);

3*

Production of pig aluminum (aluminum ingots);

4*

Fabrication of aluminum ingots; and

kO
5*

Production of the finished aluminum products •

Bauxite is the chief ore of aluminum, and is to be
found in the United States in the State of Arkansas in great
quantities, and in high quality ores.

It is found, also, in

other states, hut in the form of lower* grade ores.

In Ark

ansas, where the "Grade A" bauxite is obtained principally by
the ©pen—pit mining method, two counties, Saline and Pulaski,
have been the chief sources of supply.

The finest ores of

the United States are found to contain usually more than 25$
alumina and not more than about 7$ silica.

Even before the

war, however, it had been customary for the aluminum industry
o f the United States to import bauxite from abroad, chiefly
from Surinam (Dutch Guiana} in South America.

Prior to the

defense program, about one-half of the ores processed in the
United States were imported, while the other half was mined in
this country, with Arkansas supplying about 90$ of the domestic
bauxite of the nation.

Other states which have produced smaller

Quantities of low-grade ores are Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Virginia.

The possibility of employing lower-

grade ores had been considered, but it was not until the
United States was actually in the war that pilot plants for
using such ores were established.

The Kaluadte Corporation

built a plant for the extraction of aluminum from alunlte in
Utah, near Salt Lake City, and three other companies later
erected similar plants to test certain types of clays*

With

the advent of the defense program in the United States, this
problem or obtaining adequate supplies of bauxite meant two
things!

first, the extension of mining operations in Arkan

sas; and, second, the further importation of additional ores
from South America*
Alumina is the end product which is necessary for the
reduction process that results in ingot aluminum.

It is ob

tained from the bauxite ores, or from ores of lesser quality,
through the use of either the Bayer or Bedersen processes,
both of which have been highly successful in alumina reduction.
One of the greatest problems connected with this stage of the
production of aluminum was to be confronted during the war
period, when it became necessary to use ores with a higher
Silica content*

Under normal conditions, the Bayer process

works best with ores of about three per cent silica, but
could process other ores with an high as seven per cent
silica*

However, under the press of wartime production

needs, the soda— lime-sinter process was devised*

This process

was capable of processing ores with as high a silica content
X

as fourteen or fifteen per cent*

Such problems had not faced

the aluminum industry before, and in 1939 and 1940 they were
still ahead of the reducers of bauxite ores.

Only one re

duction plant, at East St. Louis, Illinois, had been operated
before the war by Alcoa interests.

Introduction of new

reduction methods had been retarded, because this plant had

4Z
b w a using only the highest grade of ores*

Later alumina

reduction facilities were built to handle the low-grade
ores, and the soda-lime—sinter facilities were incorporated
into the new government plants which had to be built*
Production of aluminum ingots is the reduction of
alumina, carried out through the process of electrolysis*

The

process was invented by Hall and Heroult, and was the only
process employed commercially by Alcoa, although the other
processes of reduction by chemical action, such as the
Castner process, had been known for many years*

The elec

trolysis process is highly technical, and one of its chief
problems is sufficient electrical energy for the proper
reduction of alumina*

A brief glance at the ingredients

necessary for the production of one pound of virgin aluminum
metal will show the problems of materials involved in the
productive process*
4
as follows:

The various ingredients necessary are

2 pounds of alumina;
3 to 10 kilowatt hours of electricity;

♦05 pounds of cryolite;
•03 pounds of aluminum fluoride;
*53 to *65 pound© of carbon paste; and
*015 man-hours of labor*

4Engle and others, o p * cit>. p* 7*
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Necessarily* then, it must be considered that the great
problem in the reduction of alumina are concerned chiefly
with the production

of enough electrical energy to reduce

the alumina to virgin metal* and the provision

of adequate

amounts of skilled labor to work in the reduction plants*
This latter item of labor was one of the chief problems in
the aluminum industry in the initial stages of defense
activities*

It was particularly necessary in the years of

1939 and 1940 to train additional men to operate the various
facilities provided by Alcoa1s expansion, the entry of
Reynolds Metals Company into the field of aluminum production,
and the entry o f the Government into the field at a later date*
Both the reduction of alumina from bauxite and the
further reduction of pig aluminum from the alumina are the
two necessary processes which must take place before actual
fabrication of the virgin metal can be done*

Ingot aluminum,

as it comes from the aluminum reduction plant, Is a metal of
high purity, with a great portion of it being as much as
99*7% pure, or even more than that amount.

By the process

of alloying this light metal with such metals as copper,
silicon, magnesium and manganese, or even other metals such
as iron, zinc, nickel, etc*, aluminum is made stronger and
more adaptable to various industrial usages*

Fabrication of

the metal is done In huge aluminum rolling mills, such as
the ones now located at Alcoa, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois;
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a&d Spokane* Washington*

Prior to the w a r , however, the

rolling sill facilities were adequate only for the prewar
production of aluminum, so it became one of the major projects
of the defense program to provide more rolling mills to take
care of the increased production of the metal*

One of the

unique features of the aluminum rolling mill is the fact that
i t could he used for steel, but steel rolling mills could not
be used for aluminum, due to the greater sensitivity of
aluminum* in the process*
Xn the fifth, and last, stage in the production of
aluminum, the production of various shapes, forgings, cast*
lags, and extrusions is necessary from the aluminum sheet which
has been produced in the rolling mills*

This is the most de

tailed level of the entire industry, because of the various
usee to which the finished products are put*

Suffice it to

say that particular applications of aluminum in the various
fields of aluminum consumption number more than 2,500, and
that these many markets constituted one of the great problems
facing the industry in 1940*

The fact that one market, the

aircraft industry, was being built up to take over a great
majority of the entire output of the aluminum industry caused
grave concern to Alcoa and others*

This probably was because

Alcoa was looking to the post-defense era, when it again
would be necessary to consider all of the various markets
noted above*

Civilian demand continued steady even after the

defense program began, but the aluminum to fill this demand
was not forthcoming from the industry*

Diminution of the

supply for the civilian market was perhaps a natural result
of the defense program, but it still remained a peculiar
problem for Alcoa to solve*

This situation will be considered

in the discussion of the expansion of Alcoa to meet the grow*
ing demands being made on the aluminum industry for defense
purposes*
Since all of the five stages of production mentioned
above had their particular problems during the defense era,
it can be seen that their impact upon Alcoa and upon the
Government was of immense proportions*

The discussion of

the stages of production brought out some of the features
of the other problems which were listed before.

The problem

of natural resources is one which revolves around bauxite
and the other ores that may be used in the production of
altmina*

The problem of electrical energy posed even greater

difficulties for those in charge of the expansion of facili
ties, because it is much more difficult to provide for the
building of dams and hydroelectric facilities than it Is to
extend mining operations for bauxite*

Labor for the working

o f the expanded facilities constituted a problem at first,
but the training of additional personnel did not loom as
too difficult for the industry to handle.

Although unionism

in the industry did create some special difficulties with
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respect to jurisdictional disputes, production of aluminum
did not lag because or an acute labor shortage*

Men were

recruited and trained in the technical processes of aluminum
reduction and fabrication in time to take over the operation
o f the expanded facilities in the industry*
A resume of the problems of production in the indus
try would not be complete without reference to the problem of
eapital and management as it appeared in 1940*

The extent to

which this one problem Influenced the entire course of the
aluminum industry subsequent to the inauguration of the
defense program may be summarized in the statement that
prior to the second World War only one corporation in the
United States produced primary aluminum*

That corporation

was Alcoa* a company which was integrated to include all of
the phases of aluminum production mentioned in previous dis
cussions*

In the brief summary given by Professor Engle and
5
his collaborators, the following Is of significances
This corporation was— and still Is— an integrated
one which, by itself or through its subsidiaries,
owned and operated bauxite mines, sea and railroad
transportation facilities, power sites, dams, and
houses, alumina plants, reduction plants, rolling
mills, metallurgical works, and finished products
factories.

?Ibld.. p. 113

4?
A further analysis of Alcoa in terms of ownership
and management in the aluminum industry in 1939 is provided

6
in those additional stat w a n t s t
Mo picture of the Aluminum Company of
America would be complete without reference
to ownership and management* Recent inves
tigation made by the Temporary National Economic
Committee provides us with considerable infor-*
mat ion which thus far has been used very little
*•*••*••Some £,000 shareholdings are listed,
but the data show that more than three-fourths
of all stock is in the hands of approximately
100 shareholdings* The * small*9 shareholdings
of less than 1*000 shares possess less than
200,000 common shares out of a total of
1*473*000 or 13 per cent, and about 25 per
cent of the preferred stock* Changes in
ownership have been minor since 1939 and the
situation no doubt still remains that the
neb worth of about $250 million belongs
largely to 100 shareholdings* But the
analysis may be further narrowed* The data
show that the 20 largest holders had two*tbirds of the common stock and more than
one-half of the preferred stock*
Such data as these show that the aluminum industry
at the outset of -the defense program was so closely held by
Alcoa that the policies of that company were concurrently
the policies of the entire industrial structure of primary
aluminum, almost without exception*

The company*s own

policies apparently were the policies of the Federal Govern
ment, also, until it was found out that the real problems of
defense were interwoven into the bottleneck of aluminum
production*

6Ibld.. pp. 129-30.
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fhe Industrial structure of the aluminum Industry
in 1940# therefore, showed inadequate facilities to take
care

of the program of the United States, muck less the

extra program of foreign demands»

Fabrication and finished

products in the aluminum industry could not be expanded on
short notice to take care of the civilian consumer demand
and at the same time take care of the new defense program«
Costs of production in the industry apparently were net
along the pattern which had been operating in the Industry
for several years*

In retrospect, it appears that the

aluminum industry definitely was not in the proper position
to meet the expansion demanded of it by defense and war*
although at the time both Alcoa officials and government
officials were apparently content to say to the American
public that enough aluminum was available to meet every con
tingency*

The extent to which these statements were true

can be judged impartially by the history o f the industry
since 1940, to which we now turn for a study of the expansion
program which Alcoa itself launched In that year*

This pro

gram of expansion by Alcoa was only one of three important
events which took place in the'era of the defense program*
It could not be considered by Itself, because the other two
events are of great importance, also*

The two other events

which will become a part of the discussion In this chapter
are the entry of the Reynolds Metals Company into the field
of ingot aluminum production, and the entry of the Government

late the field through its plans for the erection of additional production facilities to aid the whole program of defense*
AH

three of these stories will become the subject matter for

our remaining discussions in this chapter*
Expansion Program of the Aluminum Company of Americas
It has been noted previously that some writers have
been most critical of the way in which Alcoa met the problem
of increasing demands for its aluminum products*

That par

ticular analysis of Alcoafs moves and motives was not at all
flattering to the company, and it may be said to have been a
bit harsh, even though it was probably true in its entirety*
The obvious attempt on the part of Alcoa to eliminate pres
sure of prosecution by the promise of more and more aluminum
for the defense effort was deplorable*

If the charges were

true (and they have not been denied, as far as the writer
knows), then Alcoa is to be censured for such practices,
despite its later efforts to make amends*
Other writers, perhaps with a more sympathetic turn
of mind toward Alcoa, have written interesting accounts of
the expansion program inaugurated by the company in 1940*
It is with these reports that we shall be primarily concerned
here*

Perhaps the most favorable review of the operations

of Alcoa during the year 1940 has been put into print by
I. W* Wilson, who was the company,s vice-president in charge

o f operatio&s at that time*

Writing a rather lengthy

article for The Commercial and Financial Chronicle in January*
1941* Mr* Wilson reviewed the aluminum situation as it had
existed during the previous year*

The result was that Alcoa

was made to appear as the hero in the stcry rather than as
the monopolistic industry that had been pictured in the New
Republic♦

Some of the passages are pertinent for a variety

of reasons*

One of the most forceful paragraphs which he
7
wrote is as follows s
Aluminum focused its efforts on National
Defense in 1940* Highlights of the develop
ments during the year of importance to Aluminum
Co* of America were: Its decision to carry out
now at a cost of more than $150*000,000, In the
interest of National Defense, a program of ex
pansion which would normally occur in the next
two decades;; the announcement by the National
Defense Advisory Commission that the program
of the Aluminum Co* of America, together with
that of others in the industry, makes present
and planned production adequate for all esti
mated defense needs; and continued price re
ductions by the Aluminum Company at a time
when the price trends of most commodities
were distinctly upward*
Obviously, this kind of writing makes Alcoa appear
to be a public-spirited company, particularly at the time
when the organization needed to make such an impression on
the American people*

If it could be made to appear that

^1* W. Wilson, "The Aluminum Industry,11 The Commercial
and Financial Chronicle* Vol* CLIII, (January 25* 19411* pp*53°31* While apparently written as a piece of institutional ad
vertising for Alcoa, this article contains some basic material
on the aluminum industry as it appeared at the end of 1940*
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Alcoa was rendering great public service in the interest

of

national defense, and without regard to its own pocketbook
or profit and loss statement, then the public desire for
more intensive action in the antitrust suit would be lessened*

B

The fact that the company did embark upon such a program of
expansion might also have been motivated by the fact that , in
spite of.the reduced price of aluminum, profits were still
to be made in the field*

At least that Is the conclusion

which one might draw from a survey of the industry at the
time*
An article in Fortune (May, 1941) brings the story
o f Alcoa*s expansion into a better focus by showing the
specific steps which had been taken in the matter of increasing production of ingot aluminum immediately*

Excerpts

from this article which have a bearing on the present dis—
9
cussion are as follows s
Meantime, what has Alcoa done about aluminum
capacity? In 1939 the company produced 327 million
pounds of raw aluminum, the then all-time high,
practically all of which went into commercial
products* Its actual capacity was around 335
million, and it would have produced more than
3^7 million had it not been for the drought and
consequent water power shortage ....... .The company

^A further discussion of this antitrust suit will
be given in a future account of the settlement of the suit
and the decision handed down by Judge Caffey in the New York
court* More court litigations followed Judge Caffey's decision.
Aluminum and the Emergency ,n Fortune. Vol. XXIXI,
(May, 1941)t PP* 66-6d*
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increased its capacity at the end of 1939 to about
435 million pounds a year by adding facilities at
Massena, New York* and Alcoa, Tennessee* Early
in 1940, while the war was still pursuing a lan
guid course, it announced #30,000,000 expenditures
on improvements that included, besides the Van
couver plant, additions to sheet capacity for air
craft, an extrusion plant near Los Angeles dedicated
mostly to shapes and rivets for planes, and by
April a further addition not only to finished alumi
num facilities at various plants, but to primary or
raw aluminum capacity. All this occurred before
President Roosevelt*s speech about 50,000 planes*
There can be little doubt, however, that the pressure
of cosaaitnients to Allied countries in Europe had much to do
with the expansion program, along with the extension of de
fense program activities at home*

Although it has been

charged that there was a tendency on the part of the Demo
cratic administration to forget about the preparedness program
during the election year of 1940, there was still the fact to
be considered that Roosevelt had spoken of $0,000 planes a
year, plus all of the other types of armaments that would use
aluminum*

Hence the necessity for a reappraisal of productive

capacity in the aluminum field, and the further decision on
the part of Alcoa to do even better in its program of expansion*
I n October, according to Fortune * the company launched its
whole program, urged on, perhaps, by the conditions described

10
In the following paragraph:
Came October, 1940, with passage of the excess
profits tax amortisation bill, and Alcoa promptly

10Ibl<U. p. 145
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Kade the headlines with an announcement that It was
going to spend $150#000,000 on expansion. Since
then the figure has been upped to $160,000,000-***
some #65,000,000 goes for primary capacity (in**
eluding #15,000,000 on a steamship line and
$16,000,000 on power) and $95,000,000 for finishing
capacity* Starting with a capacity of 435,000,000
pounds of the raw metal at the beginning of 1940,
Alcoa hopes to have 720,000,000 pound capacity by
July, 1942. If its request for Canadian power at
Massena, New fork, is granted, it will up the
figure by as aueh as 60,000,000 pounds. This means
that Alcoa may turn out some 575,000,000 pounds in
1941 and perhaps 700,000,000 pounds in 1942.
Such were the hopes of the company concerning the
uuccess of its expansion in terms of post-emergency profits
and demand for aluminum that Alcoa did not even bother to
solicit aid from the Government, through the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation or any other government agency.

All of

this expansion was to be financed out of cash and bank loans.
It apparently was one of the greatest financing ventures ever
attempted by the company.

This type of financing of defense

expansion was in direct contrast to what the Reynolds Metals
Company and the Olin Corporation did when they decided to
enter the field of ingot aluminum production in the United

U
States.

U $ e e the later discussions concerning both Reynolds
Metals Company and the Olin Corporation in their relations
with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Defense
Plant Corporation. Alcoa must be remenfbered as the company
which operated all but one of the later government plants.

The significance of all of 'these new and vast
preparations for greater production in the aluminum industry
to Alcoa may be shown by a further statement which was made

12
by I. W. Wilson*

This statement is as follows:

Following a schedule which calls for the
increase of its ingot production to something
in excess of 700*000,000 pounds by July, 1942,
as compared with the 1939 level of 327,000,000
pounds, Aluminum Co* of America will thus more
than double in three years a production built
up over more than half a century*
One may have occasion to wonder, in the light of the above
statement, whether or not the company had been missing a good
opportunity of expansion in the past*

If in the period of

fifty years the company had not expanded to its full capacity
in terms of satisfying the demand for aluminum products, it
may be imagined by some that Alcoa had not taken any too
much trouble to examine the shape or slope of its demand
curve for aluminum*

Since all of the contemporary accounts

of the company*s expansion Indicated that the hopes for the
future were for an expanding demand for the metal, it may
not be unfair to say that such a domestic demand for aluminum
might have been built up even before the preparedness program
began*

This type of analysis will be pursued further in the

3^1. W* Wilson, o p . c i t . . p. 531*
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chapter which deals with the economics

the present-day

aluminum industry of the United States*
Following only briefly at this time the line of
argument presented above, ,we may point out further statements
which show the impact of the defense program upon the industry
in 1940*

Attributable to I* W* Wilson, the analysis goes into

the problem of the obligation of Alcoa in the defense program
and the possibilities for the future as they were seen In the
14
early part of 1941* Excerpts of importance are as follows:
At the same time the company fully realized
the obligation of all industry, insofar as possible,
to keep men and plants at work, after there havd
disappeared the demands of a crisis forced upon
American industry by the warmakers of totalitarian
nations* The company is naturally concerned about
the future when the defense and emergency demands
come to an end* Therefore, it has started now to
develop new peacetime uses and wider peacetime
markets for aluminum, intensifying the peacetime
research which in the short space of 50 years has
raised aluminum from a brush-and-comb novelty to
one of the most useful of all metals*
Continuing its frequently reiterated policy
of passing along to the public the benefits of
research and economies of operations, the company
three times reduced Its price of aluminum ingot
during 1940* Its price was 20 cents a pound when

^ T h i s economic question of the elasticity of the
demand curve for aluminum Is one of the most important from
the viewpoint of the entire industry* Suffice it to say now
that the demand curve for aluminum has been generally regarded
as elastic* More detailed discussions of this point will be
forthcoming in later chapters*
w. Wilson, op* cit** p* 531*
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tire year started and is now 17 cents. It has been
the hope of the company that these reductions
would assist in meeting the country1s emergency
responsibilities* **.*•*.
In this connection It should be recalled that
Aluminum Co* of America does not as a rule make
consumer goods; but there are some JO large Indus**
trios which used Alcoa products in more than 2,500
applications during 1940* The company is confident
that these industries appreciate that the supply
ing of aluminum for the National Defense constitutes
a greater service to them than if they actually
received the metal to the full extent of their
normal industrial uses********
Defense comes first........When the emergency
is past, there will be more aluminum available than
ever before*••••••*
The companyfs new metal-producing plant at
Vancouvert Wash., originally Intended to produce
30,000,000 pounds of ingot yearly, went into
operation in 1940 with a capacity of 60,000,000
pounds, and is now being expanded to produce more
than 150,000,000 pounds annually* Although the
Aluminum Company is the largest industrial power
customer of both TVA and Bonneville, it has under
way two great hydroelectric projects in the South
east* New fabricating facilities are beings built
or planned for the companyts plants at Alcoa, Term.;
Lafayette, Ind.; Los Angeles, Calif*; New Kensing
ton, Pa*; Detroit, Mich.; Cleveland, Ohio; Edgewater,
N* 3.; and Massena, N. T* These additional fabricating
facilities will increase the company’s output of cast
ings, sheet, tubes, strew machine products, rivets,
extruded and rolled shapes, rods and bars, and forgings.
In

addition to the features pointed out In this summary

of the activities of the company during 1940* it Is to be
noted that

several laboratory research experiments had been

brought to a successful conclusion during the same year*
Alcoa’s research facilities, known as Aluminum Laboratories,
Inc*, have been notbd through the years as being

capable of
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technical research activities of a high caliber*

A descrip*

tlon of the work accomplished in research in 1940 is as
15
follows:
The most Important single development in the
research laboratories this year probably was the
placing In operation of the Templin universal
metal-working machine9 Most powerful device of
its kind in the world9 this scientific giant
permits the study of stresses and strains in
various forms of aluminum and competing materials
In their full size9 rather than in the scale
models to which the laboratories were formerly
limited* It is expected that valuable informa
tion about the properties of aluminum will be
f orthcoming*
Research during 1940 was also responsible
for important developments in brazing aluminum
alloy products; in increasing application of
anodic treatment finishing processes for alumi
num; improving the merits of aluminum house
paint; continuing to open up fields for the use
of aluminum in marine applications, and in many
further ways painting to expanding markets for
the metal in the years to come*
In keeping with this general trend of analysis of
the company*s activities of 1940* it is also interesting to
note the following portion of its annual report for that
year*

This statement is only a portion of the total report,

but it does serve to show the general analysis which the
company was making of its own expansion program of the year*

15lbld.

5&
Briefly quoted In Barron’s for ApriX 7, 1941, the statement
16
reads as follows:
The employment for national defense of a
large percentage of the present aluminum pro
duction necessarily reduces the amount of
aluminum available for civilian uses, creating
an important situation in civilian markets*
Every effort, however, is being made to
alleviate this situation* In order to insure
markets for the greatly increased production
for which outlets must be found following
the present emergency, the company is main
taining its research, development, and
advertising activities, and taking all other
steps permitted by present conditions*
Believing that the best interests of
the country, as well as those of the Aluminum
Go*, could be served by lowering prices as
improved economies and research permit, three
reductions, each of one cent per pound, were
made during the year 1940 in the basic price
of aluminum ingot, bringing the price to 17
cents per pound* Reductions in the prices of
fabricated products also were made*
Production in 1940, the highest In the
company’s history, exceeded by 25$ the pro
duction of 1939Evidently, this sort of information concerning alumi
num and the progress made by the great American producer,
Alcoa, was having its effect upon the Allied countries of
Europe*

In an effort to ©how Just what the prospects were,

as they appeared in England, one only has to check over some
of the contemporary issues of the Economist* one of England’s
popular economic journals.

This account, however, as given

nAluminum Company’s Plant Expansion,” Barron’s .
Vol. XXI, (April 7, 1941), p. 20.
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below* pointed not only to the growing American supply of
aluminum, but also to the fact that the entire situation
appeared all right to the English people*

Remembering that

this account was written in December, 1940, nearly six
months after the fall of France* it appears a bit amazing
that such great confidence could be expressed in the future
supply of this necessary metal*

Only excerpts of this re

port will be given at this point, but they will serve to show
how the aluminum situation was viewed from the other side of
17
the Atlantic Ocean* Some of the statements arei
.**•••*•meanwhile production of both
bauxite and finished aluminum in other
parts of the Empire is rapidly expanding*
In Canada, where the Aluminium Company of
Canada, Ltd*, had started a ^7,000,000
expansion programme shortly before the war
whleh included considerable extensions in
the reduction capacity of the Arvida and
Shawinigan Falls works, the potential
Cutout of finished aluminium has now been
raised to well ever 100,000 tons* Further
extensions with financial support of the
British Government are in progress and
should soon enable the Dominion to supply
the whole of our huge war requirements*••«
While the Allied territories are now
virtually self-sufficient both in bauxite and
finished aluminium, substantial quantities of
American aluminium were acquired by the Min
istry of Supply from the United States in
the first year of the war* Although con
sumption of aluminium in the United States,
which rose by 97 per cent to 167,600 short

^ " Growing Aluminium Supplies ,n Economist.
Vol. CXXXIX, (December 14, 1940), pp. 745-46.
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tons last year, is still growing at a rapid
rate, that country can still be regarded as
an efficient source to supplement British
supplies should this be necessary* Production
in the United States in 1939* at 14&*400 tons*
was some 20,000 tons smaller than consumption*
but last year the Aluminum Company of America
not only completed an expansion programme at a
cost of $26,000,000, but also started another
estimated to absorb $30*000*000* Works now
nearing completion will raise its potential
output to 215,000 tons early in 1941* Another,
with a capacity of 30,000 tons, is to start
in production in the middle of next year*
Adequate supplies for the huge United States
re-armament programmes are thus more than
assured* On the European continent*too*
production of aluminium has advanced sub
stantially this year* although figures are
unobtainable* The present war* therefore*
is proving of decisive influence on the
world aluminium supply* Last year world
production is estimated by the United States
Bureau of Mines to have reached 647»400
metric tons, against 47$,&00 tons a year
before and 259,600 tons five years ago* This
year an output of 750*000 tons seems assured*
and further increases are almost certain to
follow*
Perhaps a better analysis of the entire field of
world aluminum production in 1940 will serve to show the
importance of production of the metal in the various countries
involved in World War II*

This analysis is given in the form

of Table I, which shows the primary aluminum production by
continents and by countries, both in 1933 and 1940*

The com

parison with 1933 is given simply to show the changes that
defense and war programs had wrought in the world situation*
It will be noted that the relative figures for total pro
duction of aluminum in the world show that between 1933 and
1940 the output of the metal had been increased about six
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times*

Of much more significance to Alcoa and to the entire

United States is the relative decline in the position of the
TABLE I
PRIMARY ALUMINUM PRODUCTION BY CONTINENTS AND COUNTRIES \

1933 and 1940
Continents and Countries

Output in Metric

Tons
(Thousands)
1933

1940

1933

1940

142

803

100.0

100.0

Germany ••••••***••*
R u s s ia******** *****
France* ************
Italy* ...........
United Kingdom***•«
Switzerland*••••••*
N o r w a y * •*•••*«*•*•*
Other Countries*•**

19
4
14
12
11

240
55
50
40
35

15
3

15

8

13.3
3.1
10.1
8.5
7.8
5-3
10.9
2.3

29.9
6.9
6.2
4.9
4.4
3.5
1.9
0.9

Total Europe * * * * *

37

471

61.3

58.6

V o r l d Total*****,*.***.*

A*

B.

Europe

&

28

North America

3?

Canada* *••••*•••**•

16

187
110

27.2
11.4

23.3
13.7

Total North America

55

297

38.6

37.0

35

•**

4*4

United States***•••

C.

Percentage o f
World Output

Asia
Japan* *••*•••••••••

e •

S o u r c e : Minerals Yearbooks* U* 3* Bureau of Mines; and Engle
and others* o p * c l t * * pp* 134-35* Figures on the production
o f aluminum by countries are rounded off to nearest thousands*
T h e table Is for comparative purfjoses only, and specific data
should be consulted from the above references, If desired*

limited States In aluminum production for the period indi
cated*

Germanyfs output of the metal had increased from

about 19*000 metric tons in 1933 to about 240f000 metric
tons in 1940* and her percentage of the v/cr ldfs output of
aluminum was boosted from only 13*3$ to 29*9$ in that period

&£ seven years• On the other hand* the production of the
United States rose from 39*000 metric tons in 1933 to 471*000
metric tons in 1940* but there was a relative decline in the
percentage of her world output9 the figures being dropped
from

27*2$ to 23*3$ during the same seven years*

Even the

total relative output for the continent of North America
showed a decline from

to 37*0$ for the period* although

the European output also showed a slight total decline £n
terms of percentages*

The situation was changed somewhat

from that of 1933 by the entry of Japan into the field of
aluminum production* to the extent that the Japanese pro
duction in 1940 was 4*4$ of total world output of the metal*
Other figures on the table are of Importance in regard to
several of the countries* but the ones given above show the
relative positions of the dominant Allied and Axis countries
in terms of aluminum production in 1940*
These data show the apparent necessity not only for
the tremendous expansion of Alcoa facilities* but also for
the entry into the industry of Reynolds Metals Company during
the defense period of 1940 and 1941•

This story of the first
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real competitor to Alcoa In the field of ingot aluminum
production is significant in many respects, and will be
presented in the following section of this chapter*
Brief history of the Reynolds Metals Company and
H i sa£OL into Ingot Aluminum Production:
One of the interesting features of the Reynolds Metals
Company is the fact that its original entry into the field of
aluminum was merely in the capac£ty-of a consumer of the metal*
along with other types of metals*

The company was incorpora

ted in the state of Delaware* in the year 1923, and was for
many years engaged In the production of a variety of finished
products, such as thermostats, instruments for measuring
temperature and pressure, foils for packaging, insulation,
and the like*

During the first ten years, the company fol

lowed a program of expansion through the acquisition of
additional corporations which were engaged in similar busi
ness activities*

Later on, just on the eve of the outbi'eak

o f World War II, the company became Interested in aluminum,
first in the field of fabrication and then later in all of
the various activities needed to make'Reynolds Metals Com
pany, like Alcoa, a thoroughly integrated company in the
aluminum industry*
Reynolds Metals Company had been a customer of Alcoa
for several years, and had dealt in the production of some

6k
aluminum foil, powder and paste*

The company had even been

an Importer of ingot aluminum from France, and had been moot
successful in all of its business activities*

Richard 3amuel

Reynolds, president of the company, conceived the idea in
19A0 that the successful waging of the war would depend to a
large extent upon production of aluminum, because the metal
was essential in aircraft production*

With this idea in mind,

Mr* Reynolds contacted various officials of the Government,
and even had an interesting interview with Arthur Vining Davis,
president of Alcoa*

These conversations amounted to almost

complete failure at first, especially the one with Mr* Davis,
hut Mr* Reynolds was persistent in his efforts to convince
the officials In the Government that more aluminum capacity
was needed at that time*

His contacts with Senator Lister

Hill, of Alabama, bore fruit, even after Mr* Davis had re
fused to consider the idea of Alcoa expansion up to a billion*
id
pound capacity*
Government financing of the Reynolds program for
aluminum was forthcoming from the Reconstruction Finance Cor
poration, and at a later time through the Defense Plant Cor
poration*

The original application to the K* F* G* resulted

In the granting of a loan of $15,300,000 to the company to

Id

I* F* Stone, "Their Monopoly. Right or Wrong,"
Nation. Vol. CLII, (May 24, 1941), p. 603.
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build a plant for aluminum ingot production*

Later loans

made by the R* F* G* to Reynolds brought the total up to
$20,000,000*

Original plans for construction of facilities

at Listerhill, Alabama, and at Longview, Washington, were
made*

Both plants were to be ingot production plants, with

capacities of 40,000,000 and 60,000,000 pounds, respectively,
each year*

At the time, it was planned that the company

could use electrical energy from Bonneville dam for the Wash-*
ington plant, although interference on the part of Secretary
of the Interior Ickes became necessary at one point to assure
an adequate supply of power to Reynolds Metals Company*

19

It

was not expected that Reynolds could reach full production
until 1942, and, as it turned out, the United States actually
was engaged in World War II before the company reached the
full capacity which it set out to accomplish*

The rapidity

with which the expansion of Reynolds Metals Company had taken
place is shown in the following brief summary of their broad
20
activities in the period from 1940 to 1942:
In 1940 Reynolds went into bauxite mining
by the absorption of Bauxite Mining Company* In
1941 Reynolds Metals acquired Reynolds Alloys
Company which operates large aluminum sheet and
shape mills built by the Defense Plant Corpora
tion, and also Reynolds Ore Company which operates
a n alumina plant at Llsterhill, Alabama*

19ibld.
^ E n g l e and others, o p . clt.. pp. 131-32.
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At the same time a horizontal expansion took
place* An extrusion plant was built with Defense
Plant Corporation financing which has since operated
with a capacity of 46 million pounds yearly, pro
ducing extruded bars, tubing, and shapes* In 1942
the production of aircraft parts was be^un. On the
whole* Reynolds now owns or operates some 35 plants
located at such points as Louisville, Kentucky;
Chicago, Illinois; Richmond, Virginia, Harrison, New
Jersey; New fork City; St. louis, Missouri; Listerhill,
Alabama; and Longview, Washington. Like Alcoa, Rey
nolds is now an integrated concern from bauxite mining
to the fabrication of the most delicate precision in
struments. It operates on a smaller scale than Alcoa,
but because of its connections with other metals and
because of its production of highly elaborated
finished products, Reynolds may be said to have a
wider range of activities than Alcoa.
An examination of recent balance sheets of
Reynolds shows that its total'assets in 1942 were
about one-seventh of A l c o a . F i x e d assets,
property, plant and equipment after deducting
depreciation were valued at $7.6 million in 1936*
By 1942 these assets, including the so-called
"emergency facilities,” uad increased to $34 million*
In terms of the defense program, it must be admitted that the
entry of Reynolds Metals Company into the field of aluminum
created quite a stir in industrial circles.

In retrospect,

it will be futther admitted that the move was one of gr4at
importance in the building up of wartime supplies of this
strategic metal.
Testimony by Mr. Reynolds before the Truman Committee
during the defense period showed plainly what his opinion of
the Alcoa program had been.

In the brief period of only six

months, the Reynolds Metals Company had constructed one alumi
num plant and two raeta1-reduction plants, and Mr. Reynolds
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felt that Alcoa could have bettered that record.

In his

testimony, Mr. Reynolds stated further that no lack of alumi—
qua

production should be allowed to hold the defense program

back.

He stated that "aluminum Ingots can be increased and

multiplied as fast as aviation, automobiles, and other de~

21
fense contractors can expand their facilities."

It was

this unbounded faith in the entire aluminum production program
that kept the expansion program of the Reynolds Metals Company
la. high gear throughout the defense period and during the war
itself.

In one respect, it was much easier for this company

to maintain a high degree of faith, since most of its financing
had been done with public funds*

Alcoa*s expansion, as noted

before, was provided for by a small group of people and by
the process of "plowing back" their profits into the business*
Further expansion of Reynolds, beyond the $20,000,000
in loans previously mentioned, was made possible after the
United States entered World War II, but this phase of the
aluminum expansion program will be presented in the next
chapter*

The company had made a successful beginning In the

aluminum industry by the time of the ending of the defense
period, and was to emerge as a definite competitor to Alcoa
in the aluminum industry of the United States*

2^I« F* Stone, o p . cit*« p* 603

One of the

significant features of the contract of Reynolds Metals
Company with the Government was the inclusion of an "option
t o purchase” clause, which would permit the company to pur
chase the Louisville, Kentucky, extrusion plant from the
Defease Plant Corporation*

Reynolds had been operating this

plant for the Government*

Their option was a feature which
22
was not included in the contracts with Alcoa*
Such opera
tions of the Defense Plant Corporation in the field of finan
cing the aluminum industry in its expansion program make it
necessary to review the history of this agency breifly*
Activities of the Defense Plant Corporation:
Originally, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
had been the chief agency for extension of loans in industry
in the United States* 'Established by an act of Congress in
1932, the R. F* C. had been active throughout the period of
the 1930*s in aiding all types of American industry*

It was

only natural that in the beginning of the defense program
this corporation would lend money to such companies as the
Reynolds Metals Company*

However, It became apparent in

August, 1940, that a specialized defense agency should be
set up, and at that time the Defense Plant Corporation was
established as a subsidiary of tne K. F* C*, mainly to facili
tate the building of various types of defense pianos*

^ E n g l e and others, Ojj* cit ** p* 134*

The Defense Plant Corporation entered immediately
lato the aluminum industry, and operated mainly as a financial
holding company, controlling all facilities acquired by it,
with the exception of the options to Keynolds and to the Olin
23
Corporation*
With adequate financial resources, the cor
poration extended its investments in the aluminum field until
about #300 millions had been released*

Although its activities

during the defense period had not extended very far, the
tremendous expansion of its interests after the United States
entered World War II made the Defense Plant Corporation "by
24
far the largest single factor in the industry."
Evidently,
the entire program of its expansion was due to the fact that
officials in Washington filially began to realize that the
bottleneck in aluminum could cost the Allied nations the
victory in World War II*

Many suggestions aad been made by

various interested officials and individuals concerning the
Governments entry into the aluminum production field, with
at least one writer urging that the best way to provide alumi
num was "to begin construction of a chain of government alumi
num plants that will give us planes now and cheaper pots later*"

^Discussion of the Olin Corporation is given in the
next chapter, since this company began operations in 1942*
2^Engle and others, o p . cit*. p. 135*
2*I. F* btone, oj£)* bit«« p. 603*
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Xn mid-year, 1941, the news from Washington, D. G»,
was that the Government finally had decided to erect eight
new plants for the production of aluminum.

It came as a

distinct surprise to many Americans, because of the persistent
efforts on the part of Alcoa officials and even Commissioner
Edward Stettinius, of the National Defense Advisory Commission,
to impress upon the country the adequacy of the aluminum sup
ply*

It seems impossible that Mr. Stettinius could have

issued his famous statement of December 29, 1940, to the
effect that ■Investigations just completed disclosed nd
26
serious shortages•*
The events of 1941 proved him to be
incorrect in his analysis, and further established the necessity
for greatly expanded production of aluminum.
The years of 1940 and 1941 had begun the great revolu
tion in the aluminum industry of the United States, and the
next three years were to see the wartime activity in this
field exceed even the most hopeful dreams of expansion.

With

the active participation of the United States in World War II
after December 7, 1941, this country embarked upon its true

26 "Why We Are Falling Behind,fl New Republic» Vol. CIV,
(February 17, 1941, Part Two), p. 233. For additional comments
on this same subject of the actions of government officials
in the aluminum crisis, consult Time. (January 6 , 1941), P* 15,
and Time. (May 26 , 1941), P • 21 .

wartime program, the history of which will include an account
oi the success of the vast aluminum industry in its continu
ation of the program begun as a defense measure*

The next

chapter will be devoted to the history of the aluminum industry
from December, 1941* to September, 1943*

CHAPTER III
THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II
Entry of the United States into World War II in
December, 1941, gave a great impetus to the aluminum industry
of this country*

Following the events which had taken place

during the defense program era, the Industry engaged in still
further efforts to place the United States in a strategic
position to wage a successful war*

Germany had been gambling,

along with Japan, upon the possibility of being able to hold
the United States at arm9s length with its air forces, mainly
because of Its vastly superior prewar position in regard to

1
the primary supply of airplane metals*

This gamble on the

part of the Axis powers was quickly recognized as just a hope
o n their part, because the immediate response of both private
industry and the Government of the United States gave rise to
a phenomenal wartime production of the metal*
The vast expansion program of Alcoa, the entry of the
Reynolds Metals Company, and the Government*s decision to

iRal F* Lee, "America Turns *Pro,f" Barron*s (March 16,
1942), p. S. This article is typical of the early wartime
discussions of the problems faced in the light—metals field*
Lee points to the gamble that Germany and Japan were making,
and suggests that the United States might surprise the Axis
in regard to wartime aluminum production*
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erect; aluminum producing facilities were discussed in the
previous chapter.

The full story of the success of these

programs was to be told in terms of their wartime activities.
Early in 1942, at a time when the shock of Pearl Harbor and of
other events was still fresh in the minds of the American
public, the vast program of expansion in the aluminum in
dustry was continuing as rapidly as could have been expected.
The United States was beginning to be looked upon as the
2
"Aluminum arsenal of the democracies," with the result that
the Government's program was of particular interest.

The

entire history of the aluminum industry in wartime is closely
allied with the various problems as they are listed below:

1 . Expansion of plant facilities;
2.

Dispersal of the aluminum industry;

3. Creation of potential postwar competition;
4.

Development of new alloys and processes;

5*

Integration of aluminum processes in one plant;

6 . Success of additional private companies in
aluminum;
7.

Extension of the aluminum industry of the South

and East to meet expanded needs;
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Development or a new aluminum industry in the
Pacific Morthwest to aid in wartime productions; and
9*

Total contributions of the aluminum industry

in World War XI#
Governmental intervention, of course, was being felt
not only in the field of aluminum, but also in other fields,
because the situation in regard to some other raetals was
critical after our official entry into the war*

The whole

picture of the frantic search for metals was adequately pre
sented in March, 1942, in an article in Fortune* where the
3
facts were presented as follows:
The crisis is barely realized. Few people
are aware that one month after Pearl Harbor a
squad of top U » S. specialists, metallurgists,
and geologists packed themselves into a plane
for South America to set going an all-out metals
survey of Latin America. Few more realize that
for over two years a small army of U.3. experts,
state geologists, and engineers has been scouring
this country by pack horse and mud-spattered
automobile in a similar exploration of the
continental 0. 3. With this survey now broad
ening into hemispheric scope the greatest hunt
for metals in the history of the Western Hemis
phere is on# It is brute weight of metal that
must count in the next eighteen crucial months
of this war, and the speed with which the hemis
phere is made to disgorge new metal supplies may
well tip the balance# The Axis has indicated its
realistic grasp of the issue by making a beeline
for metal resources in every country it has
overrun. And the latest, smashing report of
the U. 3. Bureau of Mines is that the Axis by

^*Eaee For Metals," Fortune. Vol. XXV, (March, 1942),
pp. #5-36.
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conquest is now almost evenly balanced against
the Allies in vital metal supplies— -one grim
fact to underline the length of the contest
qhead.*••••**
This is another race against time and against •
dwindling stockpiles, which are now state secrets
but in no case big enough to be complacent about.
The reasons for haste must now be clear to even
the blind*....the U* S. must get as far toward selfsufficiency in metals as it can****.f
fhls may mean
radical changes in the economic structure of the
U. S* mining industry, cutting across patent ,
barriers, and even the disregarding of economics
itself*
The great extent to which this analysis and prophecy
came to be actual fact can be Judged by the activities which
surrounded the aluminum industry itself*

Adequate recourse

to 3outh American bauxite ores had aided the industry during
the prewar and the defense periods, but more and more emphasis
was placed during the war on the utilisation of domestic
ores, even to the extent of developing the lower-graae ores
and the erection of pilot plants for research activities.
The situation in early 1942 in regard to bauxite
ores and their importance to the aluminum picture has been
further stated as follows:

4

Important as are all the other strategic
metals, aluminum probably will go into history
as the metal of World War II. It is the metal
of air power. It is the metal in which the
Axis stole such a long march on the Allies,
building up to 4 & per cent of v/orld output,
that it will take us until the end of 1942 to

4 Ibld.. pp. 132-35
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pull ahead, It la the metal in which pressure
on production is now greater than in any other,
The most startling fact about aluminum to many
people is that the B. S, imports ovei’ £>0 per
cent of its needs in high-grade bauxite ore,
from which aluminum is made. The bulk of U.S.
supplies of this vital ore come from British
Guiana and Surinam, whose huge deposits can
fill our full import needs (total estimated
war needs: over three million tons a year)
as soon as the U. 3, triples the shipping
capacity now available, In the interim the
U, S, is drawing deeply on its domestic bauxite
reserves, which are precariously small. Known
deposits of high-grade bauxites, mostly in
Arkansas, total some nine million long tons;
below this, at extra cost for silica removal,
are usable submarginal reserves of another nine
million long tons. If all outside supplies were
to be cut off these reserves would make us selfsufficient--but at the price of exhausting them
in something under six years.
This Is a shaky backdrop for aluminum,,,,.
The broadest, most prolific, and untapped source
for alumina is high-alumina c l a y , , S o m e of the
wo rld 9a top researchers have been attacking this
problem for two decades, because in the long view
bauxite is limited and clay must eventually become
the world9s source for aluminum.,,,,The most dan
gerous notion that the U, S. may have is that it
has plenty of time, that extreme measures to
broaden U, 3. production of strategic metals need
not be taken quite yet. The initiative, it should
be noted must come from government, ••• .On their
side private capital and industry cannot too far
abrogate their traditional function of taking
risks without destroying their reasons for being.
There could have developed a substantial argument in
terms of economic theory as to whether or not the Government
should have been entering the field of production of aluminum,
but It will be readily seen by most economists that in this
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time of emergency private, enterprise simply was not in any

5

sort of* position to produce an adequate supply of the metal»

It had been apparent Tor many years that the classic analysis
of an "invisible hand" had not received much appreciation in
the field of aluminum, and no competition had developed#
Expansion of Plant Facilities:
Expansion of the various companies reached its highest
point in the period from 1942 to 1945•

Government-built

plants made the picture of the aluminum industry a more
satisfying one, in terms of production and priees*

The

Reynolds Metals Company, which had begun its building program
in 1940 and 1941, continued to expand, mainly with financial
aid from the Government#

It is not surprising, then, to find

that in 1943 the reduction capacity of this company had been
increased to approximately 170 million pounds in the Longview
and L i s t e r h i U plants*

The Reynolds company had little more

than one-fifth of the capacity which Alcoa could boast in
1943*

The extent of its capacity was about eight per cent

6

of the total capacity of the United States*

However, the

Reynolds Metals Company could boast of having a unique

^Private enterprise versus government intervention is
a point which will be discussed in the chapter dealing with
the economics of the aluminum industry*
^Engle and others,

o p

. cit** p. 134•
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record behind it, in terns or the pioneering in the field
o f modern aluminum production techniques*

Mr* James A* Lee,

in an article concerning this company, pointed to the many
**firsts* that had been achieved by Reynolds since its entry
into the field of aluminum production*

He described the

decision of Reynolds to go Into the field of virgin metal
7
production in the following statement:
This decision was quickly put into definite
form with the construction of the first aluminum
plant in the Western Hemisphere and probably in
the entire world to start with the bauxite ore,
process It to alumina, reduce the oxide to metal,
and roll sheets, rods, and bars, all in one
continuous straightline flow of materials over
a mile in length* Throughout this long line are
nmnerous evidences of pioneering spirit*
(1)

It is the first aluminum plant in which
low grade domestic ore was used ex*
clusively;

(2 )

This is the first commercial plant to
use closed circuit wet grinding of
bauxite;

(3)

The bedding down of bauxite was intro*
duced;

(4)

Most of the red mud is removed by
settling rather than by filtration;

(5 )

Rectangular Soderberg continuous eleo*
trodes are used in the cells; and

(6 )

Rolling doors are provided for the
furnaces*

7ja»es A* Lee, nThree Plants in One: Reynolds Metals
dompany Aluminum Plant," Chemical and Metallurgical Engijieerin g * Vol* L, (May, 1943), PP» 145-50*
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Another coatemporary report; on the growth or the Reynolds
Metals Company also is of great interest, mainly because of*
the fact that it pointed to the postwar future of the company
in terms of its competition with Alcoa*
£
the following is quoted:

From this article

The growth of Reynolds during the war
changes the picture of the aluminum industry*
A competitor with a capacity of one-fifth
that of Alcoa9s is not a negligible one,
especially since Reynolds 9 facilities arc of
the most modern* The Longview plant is on
tidewater and has very cheap power near at
hand* In the future it may have access to
locally produced alumina, either from im
ported bauxite or from local clays* Reynolds 9
Listerhill plant is the only one in the United
States where alumina refining, aluminum re
duction, and fabrication are integrated on the
same site* In the future, the success of
Reynolds may depend on its ability to take
over some of the government-owned plants now
operated by others and thereby extend its
share of total capacity and reduce Alcoa’s
lead* here again the policy of the govern
ment on the disposal of its holdings may be
decisive*
The analysis is not complete, however, when only the
expansion of Reynolds is treated in the discussion of the
wartime period*

The greatest single influence throughout

the entire period of the war was the Defense Plant Corpora
tion*

This government corporation carried through its

original plans to build alumina plants and aluminum reduction

^Bngle and others, op * cit*. p. 134

so
plants*

The rapid extension of its program of building

aided the war effort greatly*

The Defense Plant Corporation

made a total investment of approximately half a billion
dollars in the aluminum industry during the defense and war
periods*

The corporation eventually owned alumina plants to

the value of nearly $100 million; nine aluminum reduction
plants worth nearly $175 million; rolling mills valued at
more than $100 million; and an extrusion and fabricating
9
p l a n t which cost more than $30 million*

Additional facili

ties bfought the sum total of investments of Defense Plant
Corporation to the staggering sum of more than $633 million*
Some of the actions of this governmental agency were severely

criticized*

Its decision to purchase 1,300,000,000 pounds of

aluminum from the Aluminum Company of Canada, at a price of

15 cents per pound, was criticized by many people*

It must

be admitted that this action was caused by the dire necessities
of war, and some of the criticism was not justified*
v a n c e payment of

Corporation*

An ad

million was made by the Defense Plant

This money allegedly was used to construct a

dam on the Saguenay River, thus giving Canadian producers an
advantage in the postwar era through their low power costs. In
j 10

defense of this move, the following statement Is presented:
Such criticism overlooks the fact that the
people of the United States awoke belatedly to
9lbid*. pp* 135-37*

10lbld.. p. 137.
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toe realization that they must gird themselves
for war. Aluminum was needed in vast but un
der inable quantities* Frantic efforts were made
to increase capacity at home and in Canada*
Economic considerations both immediate and long
rim were ignored* The important consequence is
that we have insured an adequate supply of aluminuffl, to secure victory* Offsetting facts are
that we have subsidised a potential competitor
in Canada , and have built a number of poorly
located, high cost plants at home* We have also
established some new efficient and well located
plants* Only the test of time can reveal the
net benefits or losses flowing from policies
forged of necessity in the fire of war prepara
tion*
Government activity throughout the war in the aluminum
program may best be shown by presentation of facts concerning
the Defense Plant Corporation*s interest both in aluminum and
in magnesium, which is the chief competitor of aluminum among
the light metals*

Mr* Hans A* Klagsbrunn, of the Defense

Plant Corporation, published one of the most comprehensive
reviews of the aluminum and magnesium industries of this
country that appeared at the close of hostilities with Germany,
During the war, of course, it had been a matter of close cen
sorship, and figures on such production could not have been

11
published*

But with the end of war with Germany, conditions

were changed considerably, and various articles began to

^■For a typical example of wartime writing on the
aluminum industry, see F* C* Frary, "Aluminum in War," Chemical
and R n g j N e w s * Vol* XXI, (December 10, 1943)» P P * 2018—19*
For obvious reasons, it was much later than 1943 before it was
possible to draw a complete picture of the aluminum industry.
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appear, even before the cessation of war with Japan*
Mr* Klagsbrunn's article appeared in the July, 1945, issue
of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry*

This magazine was

one of the first periodicals to present an adequate summary
of events during the war years*

The article was accompanied

by a number of significant tables concerning various phases
o f the aluminum and magnesium industries during the war*
Significant among the opening remarks of Mr* Klagsbrunn is
the following statement:
bhen it became apparent that tremendous increases were necessary, Defense Plant Corporation,
at the request of War Production Board, construeted two alumina plants, nine aluminum re
duction plants, and thirteen magnesium metal
plants* These additions gave a total designed
capacity of 2236 million pounds of aluminum
(about seven times the 1939 Alcoa peak) and
536 million of magnesium (about eighty-seven
times the Dow high of 1939)* Actual production,
however, showed a larger capacity for all of
the aluminum plants and for nine of the mag
nesium* Even without full use, supplies came
so rapidly that cutbacks were ordered for
aluminum by December, 1943» and for magnesium
in May, 1944* During December, 1944, aluminum
had been cut back to only 43*5% of capacity,
magnesium to 16%* The problem of adequate
supply of these metals had, within a space of
four years, been completely overcome*
This description of American aluminum and magnesium
production is one of the most amazing stories of industrial
production ever known in the United States*

From a story of

^ H a n s A* Klagsbrunn, "Wartime Aluminum and Magnesium
Productions" Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Vol* XXXVII,
{July, 1945) , pp.' W - T 7 .

*3
•toe little" and almost; "too late,1* the development In the
aluminum industry had p m grossed so well that even before
the opening of the second front in Europe it was possible to
begin these cutbacks which Mr* Klagsbrunn mentions*

The

Defense Plant Corporation had made investments in both the
aluminum and the magnesium industries to the extent of about
$ 1 *059*957*000, more than half of which had gone into alumi
num production.

In a more detailed breakdown, it is shown

that $263*643*000 was spent for alumina and aluminum plants;
# 363*575*000 for aluminum fabricating plants; and $41 *435,000
for miscellaneous plants* including the sintering plants,
power, etc*

This made a total of $670*65$,000 that was spent

by Defense Plant Corporation on aluminum*

13

The rapid ex

pansion of facilities which had been made possible for the
industry by this outlay of money caused the United States
to be in a strategic position to turn the entire course of
the war in Europe*

The enormous production of warplanes and

equipment for the armed forces made an Allied victory possible.
Although the preceding discussions show the extent to
which the entire aluminum production program had been a huge
success, particularly after governmental intervention, there
i s one additional feature of the wartime activities that
improves the whole picture.

13Ibid.. p. 608

It is the story of the Olin
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Corporation, which was mentioned earlier in this study* It
is of significance to the complete discussion of aluminum
in war, mainly because it is typical of the interest of the
government in the development of aluminum from alunite,
rather than from the traditional ore, bauxite*

In reality,

it is a part of expansion in the entire industry, because
it opened up a wide field for research and experimentation
with the lower-grade ores for use in the postwar world*
One of the earlier reports on the activities of the
Olin Corporation in the field of aluminum production was
given by Professors Engle, Gregory and Mosse, as follows:
Little is known about the most recent entry
i n the aluminum field, the Olin Corporation*
Owners of Western Cartridge Company, a closely
held middle west corporation, the Olin family
undertook, in 1942 , to build and operate for the
Defense Plant Corporation an aluminum plant at
Tacoma, Washington, with capacity to produce
some 40 million pounds of pig aluminum annually*
The company has been granted an option to pur-*
chase this plant, which is believed to be the
only option to buy an aluminum reduction plant
thus far issued by the D* P. C
Recognizing the necessity for an independent
supply of alumina the Olin interests purchased
control of Kalunite, Incorporated, at Salt Lake
City, Utah, a company which had been formed to
promote a process for extracting alumina from
alunite* With $4,954,063 of Defense Plant Corporation funds a plant was constructed near Salt
Lake City with capacity to produce 72,000,000
pounds of alumina annually* Completed late in
1943 the plant is expected to be in production
early in 1944*
^►Engle and others, op* cit** pp* 134^*35*

14

3]>
No information is available on the intentions
of the Olin Company to take up their option on
the Tacoma plant and to become permanent competi
tors of Alcoa and Reynolds* Neither are facts to
be found on the capital strength of the company*
The excellent plant at Tacoma located close to
tidewater is turning out aluminum of very high
quality using alumina from southeastern plants*
This organisation may become a strong nucleus
for another effective factor in the aluminum
industry*
Actually, the last statement on the part of the
authors mentioned above did not evolve as they had indicated
it might, because the Olin Corporation did not remain in the
field of aluminum production, at least at the Tacoma plant*
This plant, according to Klagsbrunn, had cost a total of
#6,297,000 by December 11, 1944, end had two pot lines for
the reduction of alumina to the virgin metal*

Designed for

an annual capacity of 41*6 million pounds, the plant in.
actual operation bettered that mark, with an annual equi
valent, based on its best month of production, of 43 ,392,000
pounds*

This was not sustained production, however, and

actual figures for production of the plant in 1942, 1943,
and 1944, were approximately 5 million, 37 million, and

37 million pounds, respectively, for those three years*
Initial operations had begun in September, 1942, and full
scale operation was effected in March, 1943*

Costs, as given

by Klagsbrunn, amounted to 15*3& cents per pound of ingot
aluminum produced, which made the Tacoma plant one of the
highest cost facilities which were built dufing the wartime

£6
emergency•

Perhaps the higher costs of this plant might

hare contributed to the decision of Qlin Industries, Inc*,
to close the plant in 1945*
On December 11 , 1944, the Qlin Corporation had merged
with the Western Cartridge Company, with the result that the
n e w company had been named Olin Industries, Inc*

Its alumi

num plant at Tacoma, and an ordnance plant in St* Louis, had
been closed in 1945, but the company had retained Kalunite,
Inc*, of Salt Lake City, as a subsidiary*

The Olin Company

has ceased to be an important factor in the aluminum industry*
Even the alumina producing facilities of Kalunite, Inc*, had
proved to be quite disappointing, although they had paved the
way for greater research in alumina production from alunite*
Initial operation of the Salt Lake City plant had begun in
July, 1944, but the total production of alumina had reached
only 1,069,000 pounds in the last half of 1944*

By that time,

the plant had not been adequately tested, owing mainly to
difficulties with equipment*

The production of only slightly

more than one million pounds of alumina, in a plant designed

^Complete details on the Olin Corporation and its
successor, Olin Industries, Inc*, are still lacking, although
the story as given is fairly complete, as far as it can be
ascertained* These data have been assembled from Klagsbrunn,
o p * cit*. pp. 610-11; Moody*s Industrials* 1946, p. 2755;
and Standard Corporation Records. June* 1946* p. 3444*
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for a capacity of 72 million pounds, proved to be extremely
disappointing on many grounds.
At the same time that it extended financial aid to
Kalunite, Inc*, for the Salt Lake City plant, the Defense
Plant Corporation, in an attempt to augment aluminum facili
ties, built three additional small plants to develop processes
using materials other than bauxite ores.

These three plants,

like the one built by Kalunlte, Inc., (which was owned by Qlin
Corporation), were constimeted by private operators, as
follows:

Columbia Metals Company, Salem, Oregon; Monolith

Portland Midwest Company, Laramie, Wyoming; and the Ancor
Corporation, Harleyville, South Carolina*

All of these three

plants were mainly in the nature of experimental actions for
developing alumina from clays, which are in reality low grade

17
aluminum ores.
Dispersal of tne Aluminum Industry:
Wartime dispersal of the aluminum industry of the
United States has been a subject for much comment by various
writers who have noted the suddenness with which this scatter
ing of all types of plants was accomplished.

Most writers

have merely commented on the vast dispersion which has taken
place, without analyzing the entire situation to any great

^Klagsbrunn, o^. cit., p. 612 .
^ I b i d .. p. 611.

extent*

However, upon close examination, it will be found

that the expedient; things were done to assure hasty pro***
dnotion of aluminum with which to fight the war*

Prewar

descriptions of the industry, even after Reynolds Metals
Company entered the field of alumina and aluminum reduction,
were limited to a relatively small number of plants of both
types*

The privately-owned companies producing alumina were

Alcoa and the Reynolds Metals Company, with a total of three
plants engaged in the reduction of alumina*

Two of these

plants for alumina reduction, one at East St. Louis, Illinois,
and the other at Mobile, Alabama, were owned and operated by
Alcoa*

The other plant, at Listerhill, Alabama, was owned

and operated by Reynolds*

That company had been financed in

Its initial stages by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
and later received financial assistance from the Defense
Plant Corporation*

These three alumina plants were the total

alamina facilities early in 1942*

But this picture was to

be changed considerably, both in terms of dispersion and
quantity of alumina production, by the entry of the Defense
Plant Corporation into the building of additional alumina
facilities*
The Government had embarked upon the program of
alumina production as early as August, 1941*

A contract with

Alcoa for the construction of an alumina plant at Hurricane

#9
Arkansas* was executed at that time*

This plant* with

an annual rated capacity of 1 *555*000,000 pounds of alumina*
was situated six miles from the Saline county bauxite mines
in Arkansas.

It was

an attempt to locate the alumina re

duction plant close to the source of the raw ores.

Its

initial production was planned for a lower figure than that
given above* but the later agreements reached between Alcoa
and the Defense Plant Corporation boosted the capacity. 3 till
a second plant was planned and erected at Baton Rouge* Louisi
ana* with the expressed purpose of using Arkansas and South
American ores* provided conditions permitted the importation
of the latter raw materials.

The entire program which sur

rounded the building of the two extra alumina plants had been
set forth by the War

Production Board and its predecessors.

Alcoa was to operate

the two government-owned alumina plants.

Completion of these plants gave the dispersion of the alumina
plants* their rated annual capacities, their ownership and
operation, and the sources of their bauxite ores, as shown
on the following page.
Analysis of Table II will show that the Defense Plant
Corporation* through its ownership of the Hurricane Creek and
Baton Rouge plants* was the largest single owner of alumina
reduction capacity.

Total capacity of these two plants was

2 *555*000*000 pounds of alumina annually, or 52.2$ of the
capacity of the entire industry.

Alcoa plants ranked second
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ia importance in alumina production, with a total capacity
of 2,140,000,OCX) pounds annually,

The Reynolds Metals Com

pany, with the 200 ,000,000 pounds capacity, ranked third*
TABLE II
WARTIME ALUMINA FACILITIES

Plant

Ownership
Operation

Rated Annual
Capacity
(Million Pounds)

Source of
Bauxite

Hurricane Creek
(Arkansas)

DPG— Alcoa

1,555

Arkansas

Baton Rouge
(Louisiana)

DPC— Alcoa

1,000

Arkansas
Surinam

Mobile
(Alabama)

Alcoa

*,300

Arkansas
Surinam

East St. Louis
(Illinois)

Alcoa

S40

Arkansas
Surinam

200

Arkansas
Surinam
Alabama

L isterhill
(Alabama)

Reynolds

Total Capacity
Source:

4,395

Klagabrunn, op. clt ♦, p. 611*

Alcoa, with Its plants at East St# Louis, Illinois, and Mobile,
Alabama, had a total of 43 •7^ of the annual capacity for
alumina production, while Reynolds 1 total was 4»1^, from its
Listerhill, Alabama, plant.

In the two plants owned by the

Defense Plant Corporation, and In Alcoa*s two plants, it was
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arranged during the war to Install lime— soda-sin ter pro-*
cessing facilities,

the purposes behind this move were to

decrease losses of alumina in the Bayer process, to conserve
the limited resources of bauxite ores, and to utilize the

18
lower grade ores*
The dispersion among the alumina plants was more than
matched by the wartime dispersal of the various aluminum in
got facilities under both private and government ownership.
Dealing briefly with the privately owned facilities for the
reduction of the virgin metal from alumina, Alcoa had a total
o f five plants, scattered over the United States as follows:
Alcoa, Tennessee; Badin, North Carolina; Massena, New fork;
Niagara Falls, New fork; and Vancouver, Washington.

All

five of these plants had been in aluminum reduction business
in 1939, with the exception of the Vancouver plant, which
had produced nearly 10 million pounds of aluminum in 1940,
after which its production had steadily increased each year
until the 1943 cutbacks.

The same may be said for the other

four plants in regard to their wartime production of ingot
aluminum.

Production in all of them steadily increased in

the years 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943*

The Reynolds Metals

Company had two aluminum reduction plants, those located at
Listerhill, Alabama, and Longview, Washington.

Ibid.. pp. 611-13.

Production
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of ingot, aluminum did not begin in these two plants until
1941, but it was greatly expanded throughout the next three
years, and reached maximum figures in 1944*

Even without

the Tast expansion of the government-built ingot aluminum
plants, this phase of the activities of the industry was
well dispersed from coast to coast*

This dispersion was

effected mainly on the basis of adequate power supplies,
which is a necessary adjunct to ingot aluminum reduction*
The previous picture of the privately owned ingot
aluminum production facilities is complicated by the addi
tion of the nine government-built plants*^ The wide dispersal
of the industry achieved by this move on the part of the
government is one of the unique features of the history of
alumixnsa during the war*

Of these nine plants, eight were

operated during the war.by Alcoa, and the Olin Corporation
operated the ninth*

The Alcoa-operated plants were widely

scattered over the entire country, as follows:

Burlington,

Mew Jersey; Jones Mills, Arkansas; Maspeth, Mew fork;
Massena, Mew fork; Riverbank, California; Spokane, Washing
ton; Torrance, California; and Troutdale, Oregon*

The plant

operated by Olin Corporation was, as we have seen, in Tacoma,
Washington*

Briefly, the total dispersion of the ingot

aluminum plants, both privately owned and government owned,
shows that a total of 16 such plants w e r e operative in the
United States during the war.

Of this number, four were in
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Mew Iork, four were in Washington, two were in California,
and the remaining six were widely scattered, one each being
in the states of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Ala
bama, Oregon, and New Jersey*

This dispersion has been

criticised as being uneconomic in many ways, but it has been
upheld because of the expediency of fighting and winning
a war.
The eight aluminum ingot plants constructed by the
Defense Plant Corporation and operated by Alcoa during the
war added greatly to the supply of ingot aluminum, and may be
credited with full share in winning the war for the Allied
powers.

A total of 3$ pot lines for aluminum reduction had

been established by the construction of these facilities, and
Alcoa had control of 36 of them, the remaining two were
operated by Olin Corporation at its Tacoma, Washington, plant*
As in the case of the privately owned plants, the nine plants
owned by the Defense Plant Corporation increased total pro
duction for all aluminum facilities.

Six of the plants had

been In operation in 1942, and the remaining three were placed
into operation in 1943.

Total ingot aluminum production for

the year 1943, including both privately owned plants and
government owned plants, was 1,640,075,000 pounds, which was
more than sufficient to satisfy the war effort.

The follow

ing table shows the wartime production of the sixteen in ,ot
aluminum reduction plants, for the years 1942, 1943, and 1944•
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Xt is part;icularly significant to note the great superiority
of same of the producing plants over the others*

The reason

TABLE III
ALUMINUM INGOT PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATED BY GOVERNMENT
OWNED PLANTS AND PRIVATELY OWNED PLANTS, 1942-1944

Govemiaent Owned Plants
Location

Operator

Burlington, N. J* Alcoa
Jones Mills, Ark*
9
n
Maspeth, N. Y*
«t
Massena, N. Y*
n
Riverbank, Calif*
it
Spokano, Wash*
Tacoma, Wash*
Olin
Torrance, Calif* Alcoa
Troutdale, Wash*
9

Annual Production of Aluminum
(Thousand Pounds)
1942
1943
1944
46,549
22,454
134,096
20*704
133,665
£6,465
177,245
44^133
105,137
9,059
29,646
43,976
34,933
143,109
191,693
4,667
37,174
36,719
60,530
16,299
72,651
94.652
25.309
104*776

Totals (government; plants) 146,045

£50,329

701,714

347,932
106,606
160,453
40,669
172,609
96,456
62,221
969,746

272,919
65,049
143,492
AO,564
164,654
100,406
6.3.1.876

1,640,075

1,552,696

Privately Owned Plants
Alcoa, Tenn*
Alcoa
310,776
n
Badin, N* C*
96,247
n
Massena, N* Y*
152,069
Niagara Falls,N*Y* tf
36,670
n
Vancouver, Wash*
161,369
Listerhill,Ala* Reynolds
62,975
52.040
Longview, Wash*
"
696,146
Totals (private plants)
Grand Totals
(all plants)
1,042,193
Souree:

.

850,982

Adapted from Xlagsbrunn, o£. clt* » pp. 610-11*

for these differences is explained on the basis of the original
designed capacity of the various plants, the original costs
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Involvedt and the number or pot lines which each plant con
tained.

The government built plants in 1943 produced

350,329*000 pounds of virgin metal, almost as much as the
939*746,000 pounds which were produced by the privately owned
plants.

This record is unusual for the government owned

plants to attain, in view of the fact that the plants at
Riverbank and Torrance, California, never did attain maximum
capacity.

One pot line at Riverbank and two at Torrance were

never put into operation.
Peak production for all of the government owned plants
was reached in December, 1943* with a total of 104*500,000
pounds of ingot aluminum for that month*

At the end of that

month, the first cutbacks were made at two of the Defense
Plant Corporation plants, and in three plants operated by
Alcoa.

These cutbacks were definite signs that the vast pro

gram for aluminum production to meet the war emergencies had
served the purpose.

The whole problem of dispersal of the

industry to meet the immediate wartime needs of the country
in regard to adequate amounts of the metal was solved success
fully.

The postwar problem of the greatest economic usage of

these facilities was still to be faced*

Obviously, wartime

dispersal of the aluminum Industry had been made mainly on the
basis of adequate power supplies*

Postwar considerations would

give attention to other problems pf nearness to markers, trans
portation difficulties and adequate raw materials*
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& £ Potential Postwar Competition:
Much or the previous discussion has shown the lack
of competition in the aluminum industry prior to 1940*
Activities ox both Reynolds Metals Company and the national
Government in bringing about some competition in the era of
preparedness was shown in Chapter II*

But the all-out efforts

of the United States during the actual wartime period were
responsible for the real crystallization of the element of
competition in the industry*

The vast program of expansion

which was carried out under the sponsorship and financial
assistance of the Defense Plant Corporation resulted in the
creation of a national aluminum industry ownership that
rivalled, as we have seen, all of the efforts of Alcoa through
the years of the twentieth century*

Expansion of the Defense

Plant Corporation into several lines of aluminum industry
activity intensified the prospects for competition*
The extent to which this competition was a potential
threat to Alcoa1s power in the industry may be illustrated by
the reiteration of the statement that the Defense Plant Cor
poration built two alumina plants, nine aluminum reduction
plants, two rolling mills, and an extrusion and fabricating
plant.

These activities placed this governmental agency in

the entire field of the aluminum industry, with the exception
of the mining of bauxite or other ores*

It was apparent that

the governmental agency was interested in giving aid only in
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those fields of the industry which were inadequate to meet
the wartime demands for the metal*

The actual intention on

the part of the Government to stay in the aluminum production
business was never made an important issue*

It was generally

understood that the plants being erected would either’ be
turned over to private industry at the end of the war, or be
abandoned or, as a safety measure, be placed in a stand-by
status as a precaution against being unprepared in the event
of another war*

However, the idea of turning the plants

over to private industry was the question which was uppermost
in the minds of those connected with the aluminum industry,
because it was not known during the war whether by this means
the Government would seek to cripple Alcoa*
Obviously* many people had felt kindly toward the
Government when aid was extended to Reynolds* Olin and others
for various plants in the aluminum industry*

Then, after the

Defense Plant Corporation had built the two alumina plants
and burned them over to Alcoa for operation, there was a wave
o f skepticism about the Governments intentions.

This feel

ing of anxiety was intensified when it became known that
Alcoa, in addition to operating the two alumina plants, would
be given the opportunity to operate eight of the nine ingot
aluminum reduction plants*

However, these moves on the part

of the Government may be explained by the fact that Alcoa
seemed the only company prepared to operate these facilities*

Since the Government made no commitments to Alcoa, such as
the "option to purchase" which had been given to Reynolds and
the Olin Corporation, it could not have been felt at that
time that Alcoa would take the greatest share of the post
war aluminum capacity developed by the federal Government.
In fact, several later moves on the part of Alcoa and the
Government showed that competition was a more likely prospect
for the postwar aluminum industry than was the extension of
Alcoa9s monopoly with the direct aid of the Government*

Sub

sequent leases of government-owned plants both to Reynolds
Metals Company and to Henry J* Kaiser facilitated the postwar
competition which had been hoped for by many people*

These

latter problems of leases, together with the turning of patent
rights over to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to be
made available to all producers of aluminum in the United

3tates, will be discussed in the next chapter*
Development of Hew Alloys and Processes:
Experimentation with new alloys and new processes for
handling both the ores and the virgin metal has long been an
outstanding, feature of the aluminum Industry.

The wartime

period saw a great extension of these types of experimenta
tion, with the result that many new and significant dis
coveries were made*

While the technical end of the new

developments will not be considered here, the growth of the
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industry through these new alloys and processes is of great
economic importance*

These new alloys have made the extension

of aluminum markets more feasible, and have, added to the use
fulness of the metal in many industrial applications which
were previously impossible*

Both Alcoa and Reynolds developed

outstanding alloys, which have been put into industrial use*
Both companies have been constantly experimenting with the
metal in a variety of ways*

Further refinements of the Bayer

process of alumina reduction have been accomplished, particu
larly with the use of the soda-lime-sinter process*

This

process utilises or saves much more of the alumina content of
the various ores.

One of the important postwar commentaries

on the development of alloys and aluminum processes appeared
in Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering for February, 1946,
19
as follows:
Mot all developments in aluminum have had
to do with the (Bayer) process, since many con
cerned new alloys, finishes and applications*
The past year marked the commercial introduction
of new clad alloys which combine high yield
strength with good resistance to corrosion*
Alcoa’s new high strength 753 alloy and Reynolds
R 303 alloy, both newcomers, have found wide
acceptance; they are the strongest aluminum
alloys of their type ever used* Alloy 633,
which made its debut during the war, is noted
for its ability to take a bright, clean anodic
coating* Significant progress was made during

^"Wartime progress in Alumina and Aluminum," Chemical
and Metallurgical Engineerin£* Vol. LXII, (February, 1946),
p. 1JT.
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the last year in the fields of welding, brazing,
and resin bonding, all of which will have their
impact on the fabrication of postwar aluminum
products.
Developments in the field of aluminum
finishes continued at a rapid pace. Electrolytic
processes have been further perfected and peace
time customers of aluminum will find the metal
finished in practically every color of the rain
bow.
Commercial electroplating of aluminum is
now available for many types of products. Nickel,
copper, silver, chromium and gold plating can be
applied now to aluminum using a zinc immersion
procedure.
A great deal of significance has been attached to
this wartime development of aluminum alloys, mainly on the
basis of their prospective uses in the postwar era.

In

regard to the new Alcoa alloy, 75S, the following has been
20
said:
New high-strength alloys have been reported
in the aluminum field. Alloy 75S contains zinc,
copper, manganese, magnesium, and chromium. Its
Increased strength over older alloys is said to
have saved 400 pounds in an airplane. The con
struction of a New fork skyscraper from this and
other aluminum alloys is proposed by the Aluminum
Company of America.
Other industrial applications of this same new alloy, plus
the Reynolds alloy, $303, have been mentioned in various
21
articles, the following of which is typical:
Aluminum alloys are again being extensively
used by the transportation Industry in trains,
2Qthe Americana Annual. 1947, p. 441*
23»Ibid.. p. 24 . See also "New Alloys, Techniques
Expand Markets for Aluminum Afbtor d'ar,” Iron Age, Vol. CLVII,
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trucks, and buses, and in the marine field. The
use of aluminum in ship superstructures is a
promising development. The building industry has
been a large user of aluminum, and now develop
ments are continuing this trend. The introduction
of aluminum roofing sheet, particularly for use
oa farm buildings, sheds, and the like, has opened
a very large market which should keep the rolling
mills busy for some time. Other important appli
cations in building and home construction are
aluminum spandrels, coping, window frames,
and sills, building hardware, and venetiah blinds,
structural uses of aluminum are increasing, -and
a railroad bridge span with aluminum-plate girders
10 feet in depth and 100 feet long has been in
stalled near Massena, New York.
All of these important uses of aluminum alloys will make the
wartime investments in research and experimentation worth
while in terms of additional consumer usages of the metal.
Integration of Alu m i n u m Processes in One Plant:
Previous reference has been made to one of the greatest
achievements in the aluminum industry of the war, that of inte
gration of all of the processes of aluminum production into
one plant, as achieved by the Reynolds Metals Company, at
Listerhill, Alabama.

While perhaps not on a par with the

great expansion of the entire industry in terms of Its impor
tance, this integration of the essential processes of alumina
reduction, aluminum ingot reduction, and rolling mill fabrication,

(January 10, 1946), pp. 143-44; T,75S, Alcoa1s New high
Aluminum Alloy,” Metals and Alloys. Vol. XX, (October,
pp. 922-25; and Fritzlen andMondolfo, "R301, Reynolds
High Strength Aluminum Alloy,” Metals and Alloys. Vol.
(October, 1944), pp. 926-33.

Strength
1944),
New
XX,
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skows that it is possible, without widespread dispersal of
these functions, to carry out a program of aluminum produc
tion on an economic scale*

Although each of these processes

was carried out at the Listerhill plant on a smaller scale
than was possible at other locations where larger plants had
been erected, the integration did serve to impress upon the
leaders in the aluminum industry the necessity for reduced
postwar costs*

One of the significant features of this in

tegration was its saving of costs of transportation, both
for the alumina after it had been reduced and for the ingot
aluminum after it was ready for fabrication*
E>ach of the steps in this integrated plant is
presented in detailed fashion in the May, 1943« issue of
Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering * together with a
flow sheet which shows graphically how each stage is carried
22
out in the mile-long industrial plant*
The entire project
was unique from the standpoint of industrial engineering,
plant management, and continuous-flow operations*

The

nearest approach to the Reynolds technique of aluminum pro
duction in the war was % the establishment of the new alumina
plant at Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, and the placing of the
aluminum reduction plant near by at Jones Mills, Arkansas,

22

"From Bauxite to Aluminum Sheet; Pictured Flow
Sheet," Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, Vol. L,
(May, 1943), PP- 154-57.
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the bauxite, alumina, and virgin metal all could be produced
in Arkansas within a radius of* a few miles, but this inte
gration was not comparable to that of* Reynolds at Listerhill*
The interest in this type of* integration was .further manifested
by Reynolds in its lease of the Hurricane Greek and Jones Mills
facilities after the war*

23

3 uccess &f Additional Private Companies in Aluminums
Although the major wartime developments in the alumi
n a

industry were achieved by those large companies which have

been mentioned quite frequently thus far, there were some
smaller companies which were able to gain some degree of
recognition for their contributions in the field during the
war*

Mainly with the aid of government funds, these small

companies, like Reynolds and Alcoa, devoted their special
efforts to those phases of the industry which they could
handle best*

In particular, the Olin Corporation should

be given credit both for its operation of the Tacoma, Wash
ington, aluminum reduction plant, and for its purchase of
Kalunite, Inc*

The latter company, as we have seen, operated

the alumina reduction plant it Salt Lake City, Utah, although

^3*Wartime Progress in Alumina and Aluminum," Chemical
and Metallurgical Ln^ineerinig*. Vol* LIII, (February, 1946} ,
p. 157. A further discussion of this postwar leasing program
will be found in the next chapter*

1G4
its success in reducing alumina from alunite did not reach
the full expectations which had been held for it.
Other smaller companies, which attained some degree
o f success in the aluminum field, were Ancor Corporation,
the Columbia Metals Company, and the Monolith Portland Mid
west Company.

The Ancor Corporation and the Columbia Metals

Company both were aided by the Defense Plant Corporation in
the establishment of plants for the reduction of alumina from
clays.

Ancor established a plant at Harleyville, South Caro

lina, at a cost of $2,642 ,OCX), and Columbia established a
plant at Salem, Oregon, costing $4,066,500.

The Monolith

Portland Midwest Company erected a plant at Laramie, Wyoming,
a t a cost of $ 3,965 ,000.

This latter plant was dedicated to

the reduction of alumina from anorthosite, which is a type of
igneous rock found in the Rocky Mountain region and more
abundantly in the "Laurentian* belt in Canada, from the Great
Lakes to Labrador.

A fifth small company to be mentioned in

connection with these experiments with low grade aluminum
ores is Aluminum, Inc., which had been scheduled to operate
a plant at Marysville, Btah.

This plant was of the same

nature as the Kalunite, Inc., project, and was supposed to
produce alumina from alunite.

However, this project, which

would have cost the Defense Plant Corporation a total of
$ 775 ,000, was abandoned.

2J+

^ V a r i o u s discussions of the facts presented here'
are found In Engle and others, op. cit.t pp* 26, 60, and 136.
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These smaller plants, designed to be experimental
plants in the field of alumina reduction, were designated
in the aluminum industry as pilot plants during the war*
They were Important in the wartime years because of the
necessity of finding practical methods of reduction of alumina
from lower grade ores*

Their lasting significance has been

shown in the following statement:

25

Justification for such expenditures lies in
the danger that high-grade ores will be exhausted
and the nation's aluminum industry will be entirely
dependent on foreign sources of supply should the
war drag on for several years. Much the same
Justification exists for the development of a
practical process for the quantity production of
alumina from clays and other raw materials avail
able in the United States, as for the building of
a synthetic rubber industry. So long as aircraft
remain the indispensable armament they are today
and so long as aircraft must be made of aluminum,
the United States should spare no effort to
provide a domestic source of alumina. Even
though alumina-from-clay plants may not be able
to compete with alumina-frora-bauxite plants after
the war, they could be held in reserve as part
of the permanent arsenal of the nation, as stand
by plants to be operated only in time of national
peril. Should they, on the other hand, prove to
be competitive with bauxite refineries their
future contribution to the aluminum industry of
the United States would be great.
Government aid was extended through the Defense
Plant Corporation to a wide variety of companies engaged in
different fabricating activities during the war.

Classifi

cation of these companies into various divisions of fabricating

2?Ibid.. p. 61.
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activities was made by the Truman Committee, in the Third
Annual Report*

This report is condensed and tabulated by

Professors Engle, Gregory and Masse, and appears as nAppen
dix 7" of their book*

A great number of companies were aided

by the Defense Plant Corporation, in the following divisions
of the fabricating business*

extrusion plants; rolled rod

and bar plants; tubing plants; aluminum forging plants;
aluminum sand castings (excluding cylinder heads); aluminum
die eastings; permanent mold castings; and cast cylinder
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heads*

Some of the outstanding companies in the fabrication

field to receive Defense Plant Corporation financial assistance
were:

Alcoa; Reynolds; Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation;

Revere Copper and Brass Company; Aluminum Forging Company,
Inc*; Delco—Remy; Buick Motors; Chevrolet; and Ford Motor
Co^>any*

All of these companies contributed much to the war

effort in their fabrication of the various types of aluminum
products mentioned above*

Most of these companies, it will

be noted, do not fall into the smaller companies group, but
in terms of their efforts at fabrication of aluminum during
the war, they were definitely in that classification as far
as the Defense Plant Corporation loans were concerned*

Only

such companies as Alcoa and Reynolds received loans above the
$20 ,000,000 level for fabricating facilities during the war.

^ I b i d ** Appendix 7# PP* 442-53*

One other company should he mentioned as being of
potential importance in the field of aluminum, although
specific information is lacking about it in many respects*
It is the Independent Aluminum Corporation, which today
controls a one—half interest in a new patented process for
the thermic manufacture of aluminum*

This company is given

little prominence in the book by Professor Engle and his
associates, although Appendix 9 of the volume is entirely
devoted to an exposition of the new process for aluminum
reduction*

This appendix gives extracts from a memorandum

which had been supplied by Mr* Jacques Fondal, who is the
president of the Independent Aluminum Corporation*

The memo

randum shows the new thermic process to be of value in the
reduction of aluminum directly from bauxite or lower grade
ores*

The surprising thing about this process is that it

was patented in France in 193B» by Hirsch Loevenstein, and
was then patented in the United States in 1940*

According

to Mr* Fondal, the new process was covered by United States
Letters Patent ho* 2,19B,673, which was issued on April 30,
1940*

Later information obtained by the writer from the

United States Patent Office indicated that the patent was
vested by the Alien Property Custodian January IB, 1943*
under Vesting Order 666 *

The assignment records also indicate

that prior to the vesting of this patent an interest was trans
ferred to the Independent Aluminum Corporation (61 Broadway,

XOB
Sew York)*

Mr* loevenstein, the inventor, also transferred

an interest to Israel Jacob Foundaminsky, of Paris, France*
Description of the technical chemical processes in
volved in the thermic manufacture of aluminum by this method
is extremely difficult*

The general principle involved Is

the complete reduction of the virgin metal from the raw ore
in one continuous chemical action*

Through the use of iron

or silicon, in the first step, and sine, in the second step,
pure aluminum is produced in a furnace similar to those
which are used in the refining of zinc.

According to

Mr. Fondal1s article, the new process is completely revolu
tionary, both in terms of treatment of aluminum ores and of
secondary aluminum.

In both instances, it is said that the

process results in the production of a purer type of metal.
Summing up the entire article, Mr. Fondal gives the follow
ing statement concerning the economic advantages of the
27
process:
The advantages of this new process based
upon thermic principles lie in the possible use
of raw materials other than bauxite, in economy
i n the use of electric energy, labor, equipment
and maintenance.
Present aluminum manufacture requires.*..*
the preliminary production of pure alumina in
plants specially built for that purpose and from
bauxite having a low silicon content. On the

27Ibld.. p. 457
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other hand, aluminum-containing ores of* all
description and without exception (bauxite,
kaolin, clay, etc*) may be used in the new
thermic process of this invention*
A plant Tor producing aluminum under
present practices, to be economically sound,
must produce at least 6,000 tons of the alumi
num annually* In our process, on the other
hand, production depends merely on th© number
and size of the furnaces* For this reason, a
plant producing even a few hundred tons per
year would be economically practical*
As a consequence of the above enumerated
advantages, it is conservatively estimated that
aluminum may be produced by our thermic process
at a cost of 30 to 40^ lower than the present
cost* In addition, our process permits the
production of silico-aluminum and sinc-aluminum
alloys of any desired proportions at a cost
far below that possible under present practices*
The application of our process to the recovery
o f aluminum scrap, resulting in an aluminum of
even greater purity than th© original and at a
considerable savings in cost, should also be
kept in mind* Naturally, the great reduction
in the net price of aluminum made possible by
our process should open vast new markets for
these metals*
This innovation, if it is as described above, may
even yet become a major step in the advancement of aluminum
production*

Its delayed development may have been caused by

one or more of several causes.

The inability of Loevenstein

and Fondal to convince government officials or industrialists
of the practical nature of the invention may have been one
reason for its lack of success so far.

Both of these men

were in Washington, and are reported to have spent weary
months in vain attempts to convince government official® of
the value of the invention in 1943•

Cutbacks in the aluminum

industry in ths latter part of* 1943 may have been a reason
for the lack of Interest shown by both Government and. in
dustry*

Other possible reasons for the failure to exploit

the patent commercially may have been politics, the power
o f monopoly* or the institutional setup of the industry*
hack of specific information precludes the possibility of
stating a definite answer to the problemf although such an
answer would be valuable to the study*
Economic literature of the twentieth century is filled
with instances of holding out new patented processes because
of their effects upon the institutional structure of Indus-*
trial organisations*

Xt is at present a matter of conjecture

as to whether the thermic process encountered tills difficulty*
If such a far-reaching calamity as World War XJ did not result
in the fullest exploitations of such a patent, then several
ideas may be advanced as reasons for the lack of interest*
The process might have been proved to be impractical from a
chemical or technical standpoint, although it was reported
that the process had been tested in a pilot plant in France*
On the other hand, the process might have Involved some
economic implications which were too great for its adoption.
If old plants would have to be abandoned, power sites left
unused, labor laid off, and the entire cost structure of the
industry revolutionised, then the older manufacturers of
aluminum by the time—tested processes would not have been

Interested in the changeover*

However, it still seems most

surprising that the Government, being interested in such
methods of using lower grade ores during the war, did not
at least set up some sort of pilot plant to aid the Inde
pendent Aluminum Gorporation in exploiting Lo even stein* s
thermie process*
It is not to be denied that the smaller companies,
through their varied efforts, did much to bring the war to a
rapid d o s e *

Their efforts were financed chiefly through

the Defense Plant Corporation*

Expense apparently was no

object, as far as the Government was concerned*

Winning the

war was the prime motive, obviously, although it may be hinted
that in some respects the breaking down of the Alcoa monopoly
in aluminum ingot reduction might have been one of the factors
which were involved in the entire program*

The postwar as

pects of toe industry were to be affected to a great extent
not only by some of the smaller companies, but also by the
government plants*
Extension of the Aluminum Industry in the South and
East to Meet Expanded Needs of World War
Tn addition to the other economic considerations
which were given to the aluminum industry during World War
jLt will be seen that the extension of the facilities for
the production of the metal in both the Southern and. Eastern
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states Is of groat Importance to the whole analysis*

Pre

v i ou s mention has been made of the expansion which occurred

throughout the industry, and of the erection of various new
plants for wartime production by the national government*
dispersal of the aluminum industry was a noted characteristic
of wartime activities, and the entry of additional companies,
b o t h for experimentation and for fabrication of ingot aluzni*Qua, caused the whole situation to be changed immensely*

In

tegration of aluminum processes in one plant was an important
s t e p forward for the entire manufacturing process, as it was
a ccomplished by the Reynolds Metals Company*

All of the foregoing activities were to be found in
t h e s)um1 ^im industry of the South and East during the war*

Even before the entry of the United States into the conflict,
a great deal of expansion had been accomplished for the
South era aluminum industry*

One of the examples of this type

of expansion was the building of the Mobile, Alabama, plant
by Alcoa as part of its own vast program of expanding its
facilities*

But this expansion on the part of Alcoa was not

all that occurred*

Buring the defense period, Reynolds Metals

Company had begun its aluminum production program at Listerhill,
Alabama, with the famous integrated plant development being
its greatest contribution to aluminum technology*

In the

Eastern states, particularly in Hew fork, extension of the
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aluaiQoa Industry was accompli shed during the defense program,
but the wartime activities eclipsed the previous expansion of
Alcoa in that area*
Pressure of the defense and wartime program of ex
pansion during the years from 1940 to 1943 brought about one
c f the most rapid increases in Southern and Eastern facilities
yet known in the Industry*

As a result of such a program,

mew facilities were erected at various points in Mew York,
Mew Jersey, Arkansas, Alabama and Louisiana*

From the prewar

single alumina plant at East St* Louis, Illinois, this phase
of altminum production was extended during this modern era to
Include the additional four alumina plants, all of which were
located in the Southern states*

Alcoa had built the Mobile

plant, Reynolds the Listerhill plant, and the Defense Plant
Corporation built the government-owned alumina plants at
Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana*

With

the single exception of the plant built at Salt Lake City,
Utah, by Kalunite, Inc., for experimentation with alunite,
all of these important defense and wartime plants were erected
i n the areas of the South where access to raw materials,
principally bauxite ores, would be readily available*

The

Alcoa plant at Mobile maed ores from Arkansas and Surinam.
The Reynolds plant at Listerhill used lower grade Alabama ores,
and some from Arkansas.

The two plants erected by the Defense

Plant Corporation at Hurricane Creek and Baton Rouge used vast

a mounts o f Arkansas ores, but the latter also received ores
f r » Surinam*

Although no alumina plants were erected in the Eastern
states, several aluminum ingot reduction plants were expanded
and others established in New York and New Jersey, as well as
in North Carolina and Arkansas*

Facilities Tor reduction of*

the virgin metal were expanded at Alcoa, Tennessee; Badin,
North Carolina; and at Niagara Falls and Massena, New York,
by Alcoa*

Reynolds expanded the facilities for reduction at

its Listerhill, Alabama, plant*

New plants erected by the

Defense Plant Corporation in Eastern and Southern states, and
operated by Alcoa, were located in Maspeth and Massena, New
York; Burlington, New Jersey; and Jones Mills, Arkansas* This
vast program of expansion in the South and East was rivalled
only by the dispersal of a great portion of the aluminum re
duction industry to the Pacific Northwest, where adequate
power facilities were immediately available*

Power for re

duction of the pure aluminum from alumina in the South and
East came mainly from the Tennessee Valley Authority and from
Niagara Falls power developments, while in the Pacific North
west it was obtained from the Bonneville Power Administration,
in charge of Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams*
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D STelo paent of a How Aluminum Industry in the Pacific
Horthwest to Aid in Wartime Production;
Although the Western states region, and particularly
the Pacific Northwest, had received some attention from both
Alcoa and Reynolds prior to the entry of the United States
into World War IX, the real Impetus to aluminum development
in that area came after this country was actually engaged
in the conflict*

This impetus came largely from the Govern

ment, because it was through the Defense Plant Corporation
that some of the best aluminum reduction plants of the country
were located in that

region*

Each ofthe new plants was an

ingot aluminum plant, which processed

alumina produced in one

of the five plants mentioned in the previous section*

The

states of Washington, Oregon and California were selected as
the locations of these new aluminum reduction plants*

Enor

mous capacity was built up at such places as Vancouver, Long
view, Spokane, and Tacoma, Washington;iTroutdale, Oregon; and
Riverbank and Torrance, California*

The plant at Vancouver

was owned by Alcoa, and the plant at Longview was owned by
Reynolds*

The other

by the Defense Plant

plants in theWestern region were owned
Corporation*

In reality, for the period

of the war Alcoa operated all of these government-owned plants,
with the exception of the Tacoma plant, operated by the Olin
Corporation*
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The availability of enormous amounts of* hydroelectric
power was responsible for the concentration of the aluminum
industry in such a large degree in the Pacific Northwest,
ill of the recent writers who have dealt with this new dis
persion of the aluminum industry in that region have empha
sised the use of the famous Bonneville—Coulee system for
electrical energy.

It is not to be doubted that other

factors militated against such selections of locations of
plants, but the power problem in terms of production of the
ingot aluminum was probably the most important.

Not a single

alumina plant was located in the West, unless the unsatis
factory Salt Lake City plant, along with the pilot plants for
dealing with clays and anorthosite are considered.

These

latter plants did not provide the alumina for the functioning
of the Pacific Northwest plants during the war, because their
supplies of alnmina would not have been sufficient even to
supply one of the new plants.

It was necessary to transport

the fliimina from the five alumina plants in the East and
South,

‘nils operation caused the production costs of the

virgin metal in the Pacific Northwest to rise.

Even early In

the ‘war it was pointed out that the mal— location of the
alumina plants created important postwar problems for the
industry in the Western States.

It was suggested by many

writers that if the aluminum industry were to survive in that
region it would be necessary to establish at least one
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alumina plant there*

At the present time this latter

suggestion has not been carried out, though the aluminum
plants there continue to function on the basis of impor
tation of alumina from the East and South*

The develop

ments in the Pacific Northwest will be considered at length
in the next chapter*

In conclusion of this chapter, we turn

briefly to an analysis of the total contributions of the
aluminum industry of the United States to the emergency of
World War II*

To state precisely the exact contribution of

the aluminum industry to the war effort is not our purpose,
but a brief resume of the accomplishments will show what was
t a € in wartime, and what might be expected in the postwar
period*
Summary of the Contribution of the Aluminum Industry
of the United States in World War II:
A resume of the wartime contributions of the aluminum
industry should take into consideration the vast increase in
the productive capacity for alumina, which is necessary for
the reduction of the virgin metal*

Before the war, the entire

aluaiaa capacity of the industry In the United States was
about 700 million pounds per year*

Defense and wartime ex

pansion of this phase of the aluminum industry built up an
annual alumina capacity of almost 5 billion pounds, as shown
by the various figures on the Hurricane Creek, Baton Rouge,

lid
Mobile, East St. Louist and Listerhill reduction plants.
Fran a prewar number of only one plant at East St. Louis,
the four additional plants had been set up to furnish
alumina to the vastly increased number of ingot aluminum
plants.

This increase in alumina production had been made

possible by the increased mining operations of domestic
bauxite ores in Arkansas and Alabama, as well as of the
lesser ores in several states.

Foreign bauxite ores from

Surinam in South America had contributed to this alumina
production, also.

The smaller experimental plants at Salt

Lake City, Salem, Laramie, and Harleyville must be included
to make the analysis complete.
Additional plants for the reduction of alumina to
virgin metal were set up during the defense and wartime years.
Expansion of this phase of the aluminum industry was as
notable as the Increase in alumina production capacity.

Pre

war average production of the various plants engaged in ingot
aluminum production reached only 257 million pounds during
the years from 1935 to 1939*

This production came from five

prewar plants owned by Alcoa, but such a supply was utterly
inadequate to serve the needs of the defense and war programs
of the United States and her allies.

By the end of the war,

this total of only five plants had been supplemented by the
addition of eleven more aluminum reduction plants, widely
scattered over the United States and owned by other Inte
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rests*

Gf these eleven new plants, the Defense Plant

Corporation owned nine, and the Reynolds Metals Company
owned two*

During the war years, the government-owned

plants were operated by Alcoa (eight plants) and the Olin
Corporation (one plant)*

Wartime production of the virgin

metal jumped from the prewar average of 257 million pounds
to a capacity in all of these plants of 2*3 billion pounds
by the end of 1943> although this capacity never had to be
utilised to its maximum extent.

Figures for alumina pro

duction in 1943 have been stated previously as being
3*936,522,000 pounds for that year.

The figure for ingot

aluminum production for 1943* which was 1,640,075*000
pounds, bears out a previous statement that it takes appro
ximately two pounds of alumina to produce one pound of
aluminum*

It also shows the extent of unused capacity in

the sixteen aluminum reduction plants right in the middle
of World War II, at a time when cutbacks in ingot aluminum
production were ordered in December, 1943*

To repeat that

this expansion in the aluminum reduction facilities was
phenomenal is to say the very least about this phase of the
entire aluminum industry*
Increased fabrication facilities made It possible to
process the ingot aluminum into the various shapes necessary
for wartime industrial uses.

The fabrication plants con

tributed greatly to the building of the vast armada of
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Allied airplanes that; swept the skies of the entire world*
Other types of wartime industries received increased
quantities of the metal, to facilitate manufacturing of a
variety of products necessary for the prosecution of the
war*

Improved techniques of various kinds were introduced

during the war, such as the integrated facility established
by Reynolds at Listerhill, Alabama* where alumina, aluminum
ingot, and rolled aluminum were all produced in the same
plant*

New alloys were developed, several of which were

high strength alloys beneficial in war and in peacetime
uses of aluminum*

New processes were evolved to aid the

Bayer process of alumina reduction, among them the sodalime— sinter process that made possible the greater savings
of alumina from the various ores*

A newer, and more

revolutionary, process was described by the Independent
Aluminum Corporation, but thermic manufacture of aluminum
from ores in one continuous operation was not developed,
although the original patent in the United States had been
secured as early as April, 1940•
Excess productive capacity was the greatest problem
that faced the aluminum industry at the close of World War
II.

This problem, along with other postwar aspects of the

industry, will be the subject matter of the following
chapter*

Aluminum in war created enormous problems, which

were solved In various ways both by tho Industry itself and
by the Government* Aluminum in peace constitutes just as
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important a subject.

It is a problem that both the industry

and the Government must solve, if maximum benefits are to be
derived by consumers of aluminum throughout the world.

CHAPTER IV
POSTWAR ASPECTS OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
OF THE UNITED STATES
Surplus productive capacity, government ownership
of important facilities and. wide dispersion of the great
aluminum industry of the United States wore the chief
characteristics of the aluminum situation after World War XI
was concluded in 1945*

These problems gave rise to other

considerations in the immediate postwar period, and the
entire aluminum industry of this country was rapidly and
radically changed from the prewar status*

Discussions in

this chapter will revolve around several of the. postwar
aspects of the aluminum industry, as follows:
1.

Problems of surplus productive capacity}

2*

Problems of disposal of government-built alumi

num facilities, including alumina plants, aluminum reduction
plants, and fabricating facilities;
3.

Analysis of government policies in regard to

plant disposal and the creation of competition in the post
war aluminum industry;
4*

Partial settlement of the problems of plant

disposal, and the entry of other companies Into the aluminum
industry of the United States; and
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5*

Postwar problems of competitive enterprise in

the aluminum Industry, as they evolved from the sale of
government facilities to Reynolds and to the Kaiser inter
ests, instead of Alcoa*
All of the above problems have a direct bearing upon
the aluminum industry of the United States as it exists today*
The partial settlement of these problems has resulted in an
entirely new aluminum industry of such a nature as to make it
incapable of comparison with the prewar ownership and control
as exercised by Alcoa*

The primary aluminum industry, the

production of both alumina and ingot aluminum, underwent such
a radical change in the immediate postwar period that the
monopoly of Alcoa in this respect was broken completely*
Alcoa, in prewar years, had possessed a highly integrated
aluminum industry*

The ownership and operation of its own

mines, reduction plants, ships, and other facilities had made
Alcoa synonymous with power and outright independence in the
aluminum industry*

The company had produced and sold all

aluminum that it had the capacity to make, but no great in
creases had been made in the real capacity of the various
plants until the defense and war programs forced the company
to expand its facilities*

The same processes for reduction

of fllnalmim had been more or less standard with the. company
for a period of fifty years, and had not been subject to
patents for three decades*

But no other company had dared to
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compete with Alcoa for a variety of reasons*

These reasons

have been stated previously as being the advantage of an
early start, the control over essential patents, the control
o f the vast majority of all rich bauxite resources of the
United States, the ownership and operation of the company1s
own waterpower plants to furnish electric energy for aluminum
reduction, the protection of a favorable tariff on imported
aluminum, and friendly international relations with the pro
ducers of aluminum in Canada and Europe*

The maintenance of

a high and rigid price of aluminum ingot through the decades
of the 1920* s and 1930* s kept the price from falling below
20 cents per pound, until after 1939*

Various writers have

shown that the price of 20 cents charged for ingot aluminum
by Alcoa was almost twice the cost of production, and that
the new profit which accrued to the company in the sales of
all its varied products over a period of years was nearly
1
20 per cent on the invested capital*
All of these facts pointed to the need for competition
in the alumimsn industry over a period of many years, but
until the end of the war and the disposal of the governmentbuilt aluminum facilities such a hope was in vain*

It is

true, as we have stated in the previous chapter, that the

^"Aluminum Reborn," Fortune* Voi• XXXIII, (May, 194&)»
pp* 103 ff*
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basis lor competition was laid In the defense and wartime
eras, when the Reynolds Metals Company and the Government
entered the aluminum Industry*

But the facts that have been

pointed out show that the control exercised by Alcoa during
the war Itself was extended over a wide domain, to include
\

the government-owned plants themselves*

At War’s end the

industry bore little relationship at ail to the prewar alumi
num pattern*

The productive capacity had been increased by

seven times, and in the field of fabrication the increase had
been about forty-five times in some stages*

An article in

Fortune magasine for May, 1946, pointed to the significant
difference between the prewar and postwar aluminum industries
2
in the following manner;
That (prewar) industry, however interesting
historically, no longer exists* It has been
absorbed into an entirely new industry, to which
iu bears only an ancestral relationship: the
aluHrfmnn industry of 1946*****the industry is
vastly changed in its contours, its control,
its geography, its technology, its economics of
supply, cost and price, its potential markers,
and its Interesting possibilities for creative
competition* Rot the least part of the aluminum
revolution was a 1945 Circuit Court decision
(final for lack of a Supreme Court quorum) hold
ing Alcoa a monopoly in ingot production as long
as it controlled over 90 per cent of the market*
The Attorney General had finally succeeded in
establishing, beyond appeal, that a monopoly
is a monopoly— even under the Sherraan Act*

2Ibid** pp* 103-04
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During the war itself, Alcoa*s domination
of the industry was undiluted* Besides nearly
trebling its own facilities in a ^ 300-million
construction program, the company built and
operated nearly *>300 million worth of govern
ment capacity* As the sole prewar aluminum
producer— with a monopoly on technical, en
gineering, and management brains in the
business— Alcoa was, of course, the logical
choice to hhndle the urgent government
program* Its assignment included eight of the
nine government smelting plants and nime of the
government fabricating plants— all completely
integrated into the company*s own far-flung
system* At warfs end Alcoa was in control of
more than nine-tenths of U. 3. capacity for
alumina and primary metal, 66 per cent for
sheet and plate, 90 per cent for extruded
shapes* But at this point the Defense Plant
Corporation stepped in to claim its own— on
a somewhat tenuous technicality in the Alcoa
leases— and over half the industry went on
the war-surplus market.
These evidences of control on the part of Alcoa con
stituted basic reasons for disposal of the government-owned
aluminum facilities to producers which might be able to
make competition effective in the industry*

It was definitely

felt that such a move on the part of the Government would be
made, but before such a step could be t$Jken, it was necessary
to determine the extent of the real surplus capacity which
had been built up during World War II*
Problems of Surplus Productive Capacity:
Surplus productive capacity in the aluminum industry
was built up to a great extent during the war#

The exact

extent to wliich any facility could be determined as being
real surplus was not known at that time, but ak least one
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comprehensive postwar market survey had. been made, with
results that need explanation.

This survey, conducted by

Professor Engle and his associates at the University of
Washington during 1942 and 1943* indicated the existence
of excess productive capacity in the aluminum industry, even
3
with aluminum selling at 15 cents per pound.
The figure
of 15 cents per pound had been attained in the industry early
in the war, and remained at that level throughout the period
of hostilities*

The market survey indicated that greater

quantities of aluminum would be taken off the market at
prices below 15 cents per pound, but the significant expla—
nation of this situation given by Professor Engle is as
4
follows2
Total capacity for the United States is
2,300 million pounds of virgin aluminum annually,
far in excess of any immediate postwar demand
now in sight* The most optimistic forecast
Indeed does not envision a market for much over
half the present capacity until five years
after the war, and not then unless the price is
cut to 10 cents per pound* Drastic curtailment,
therefore, seems inevitable*
The curtailment of production envisioned by most
observers during the war years simply amounted to the abandon
ment

of the high cost plants which had been erected during

the war period*

It was well pointed out that several of the

^Engle and others, op* cit*. Chapters XII and XIX

*Tbld.. p. 403.

126
alumintai plants were badly situated and were high cost
producers*

The most obvious method of dealing with such a

situation would be to curtail production of such plants as
those in Massena and Maspeth, New York, and Burlington, New
Mersey*

These three plants, all owned by the Defense Plant

Corporation, and operated by Alcoa, could not be expected to
be maintained in the production field if the price of alumi
num continued at 15 cents per pound, according to Professor
Engle and his associates*

The high cost of electrical

energy, plus the necessity for building new power facilities,
was given as a reason for the stoppage of operations and the
abandonment of the three Eastern aluminum plants, in spite of
the access to raw materials and the nearness to potential
postwar markets.
The same reasons were pointed out by observers for
the discontinuance of aluminum facilities at Jones Mills,
Arkansas*

Despite the excellent location of this new war

time plant, in terms of nearness to bauxite, it was pointed
out that high cost of electric power would be a deterrent
feature*

Another factor for consideration was the necessity

for saving the rapidly diminishing supplies of good bauxite
ores in the state of Arkansas*

One of the interesting con

clusions reached in regard to the Jones Mills plant was the
blanket statement that "Certainly it appears very doubtful
that any private operator familiar with the aluminum industry

would be willing to buy it for operation at tb© present
l o c a t i o n T h i s plant was considered to be a marginal plant
If aluminum prices remained at the level of 15 cents per pound#
The forecasting made by the observers at the University of
Washington apparently was not taken seriously by others in
terested in the aluminum industry, because the Jones Mills
plant was leased by the Reynolds Metals Company early in

1946

6

#

Other outstanding examples of wartime estimates of
surplus capacity may be cited in regard to the California
plants, as well as the facilities in the state of Washington#
Professor Engle and his associates indicated that the elimin
ation of the three Eastern plants, together with the Arkansas
plant, might be accompanied by the abandonment of the aluminum
reduction plant at Riverbank, California#

Such a move, it

was pointed out, would reduce the aluminum reduction capacity
of the country down to 1,629 million pounds, which would still
be far in excess of any foreseeable postwar demand for the
metal at a price of 15 cents#

It was further stated that

the Torrance, California, plant would be eliminated if alumi
num prices dropped to a level of 13 cents, because at that

5Ibld.. P- 410.
^Later discussions will show the extern to vMich
Reynolds Metals Company took over existia--; government-owned
facilities#
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price the plant would b© unable to compete with the reduction
plants of the Pacific Northwest*

In regard to the Torrance,

plant, the following statement was made:

7

The elimination of this plant would reduce
national capacity to less than l,f>00 million
pounds, still far above the estimated maximum
demand for virgin aluminum of slightly over one
billion pounds at 13 cents, five years after
the war* bine© Pacific Northwest plants can
deliver virgin pig aluminum to California for
less than it can be produced in the California
plants the latter appear doomed to the status
of stand-by plants, if they are not completely
dismantled*
It was further indicated that the aluminum reduction
plants in the Pacific Northwest would be competitive with a
postwar price of 13 cents for aluminum, but it appeared
doubtful from the survey that they could be profitably opera
ted at a lower level of 10 cents per pound*
plants were concerned in this statement.

Three government

The plants at

Tacoma and Spokane, Washington, and at Troutdale, Oregon,
were considered to be potentially outstanding bargains for
a postwar competitor to Alcoa, provided the market situation
were favorable to such a new entry into the field.

The entry

of the Xaiser interests into the field of aluminum production,
as we shall see, aided in the disposal of these governmentbuilt aluminum facilities in the Pacific Northwest*
Predictions concerning future activities sometimes
appear to be wrong in the field of economics*

^Engle and others, o p . cIt *, p. 410*

In the treatment
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of the industry during the war, forecasts of disposal of the
government built facilities ran a bit contrary to later de
velopments*

It is interesting to note how the estimates of

Professor Engle and his associates differed from the immediate
postwar disposition of alumina plants*

The alumina plants

constructed by the Government during the war at Hurricane
Creekt Arkansas, and at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had added
enormous alumina reduction capacity in the industry*

It was

conceded by the above-mentioned observers that the two Alcoa
plants at East St* Louis and Mobile would continue in opera
tion, and that the Reynolds plant at Listerhill would be
sufficient to meet the needs of the new competitor’s aluminum
reduction plant at the same location*

But it was stated that

the Hurricane Creek and the Baton Rouge plants constituted
quite different problems*

The analysis of the problems con

fronting the Arkansas and Louisiana alumina producers was
a s follows:
There are two remaining alumina plants,
both owned by the Defense Plant Corporation,
one located at Hurricane Greek, Arkansas,
with a yearly capacity of 1,555 million pounds,
and the other at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with
annual capacity of one billion pounds* The
Hurricane Creek plant will undoubtedly be
rendered obsolete by reason of the need to
conserve remaining Arkansas bauxite and because
it is too far inland to justify economical
operations with imported bauxite. The plant

Ibid.. pp. 413-14.

1>2
might be retained by the government as a stand
by plant, for utilisation only in an emergency
great enough to justify the further use of
bauxite reserves in Arkansas*
The Baton Rouge plant, while well located
with respect to tidewater, transportation appears,
nevertheless, to be excess baggage in postwar
alumina production* A better location for this
plant would have been the new center of aluminum
production, in the Pacific Northwest**•.Strategic
military requirements must have determined the
location of the Baton Rouge plant, but it appears
now that the difficulties of getting bauxite
through the Canal and to a West Coast point
were exaggerated in the minds of policy makers.
The criteria for locating Industrial plants for
modern warfare should be the soundest economic
basis for both war and peace, with protective
military devices to safeguard plants located
at oritical points*
The Baton Rouge plant, because of its un
economic location, will probably, have to be
dismantled. Otherwise, it might be operated
only at a fraction of its capacity to t ill out
the demand from industries, other than aluminum,
in the postwar period, or to supplement the
Alcoa and Reynolds plants should an unexpected
demand arise......
In conclusion, over-all postwar capacity
of aluminum is apparently excessive to the extent
of about 2,750 million pounds annually. The
location of plants is such that successful opera
tions after the war seems doubtful for either
of the D. P. C. plants. On the other hand, now
alumina capacity of approximately a billion
pounds annually will have to be added for the
aluminum refining industry of the Pacific
Northwest.
It would appear that such an analysis of postwar
prospects for the Baton Rouge and Hurricane Greek plants
was slightly in error, particularly if the immediate post
war picture Is reviewed.

Both of these plants are operating

I n 1947*

Reynolds M e ta l s Company operates the Hurricane

Greek establishment, a n d the Permanent© Metals Corporation*
{ a subsidiary of Kaiser* Inc*)* operates the plant in Baton
>

Rouge*

This is only the short-run picture* however, and

analysis is possible at the present time only on the basis
o f their operation for, a little more than a year by these

two competitors*

It is known that neither plant is operating

at full capacity in 1 9 4 7 » but both Reynolds and Permanents
apparently are planning big things for the future*

In the

long run, the analysis which was made during the war might
pos si b ly prove to be correct, in spite of the immediate post

war operation of both plants in their "uneconomic locations*n
The period intervening between the end of the war and the
midd l e o f 1947 is not a sufficient time in which to judge

the full effects of operation of the two plants*

It is the

transition period of which Professor Engle spoke, and both
Reynolds and Kaiser are operating the plants on the basis of
the huge backlogs of ddmand for altminum products that was
built up in the United dtates during the past five years* The
extent to which both the Hurricane Greek and the Baton Rouge
plants will be operated in the future will depend upon numerous
factors in the long run* such as the expansion and contraction
o f the uses of aluminum* the use of substitutes, the price

situation* the availability of bauxite or lower grade ores*
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advances In aluminum technology, and the possibility of
expansion and contraction or American aluminum exports into
the world markets*
Aluminum rolling mill capacity, like aluminum and
a l w i n a capacity, was greatly expanded during the war, and
a surplus in this phase of the industry was noted early in

1944*

The total capacity of aluminum rolling mills in that

year was about 1,600 million pounds, most of which was re
quired in the aircraft industry*

During the war it was

estimated that about 30 percent of the pig aluminum produced
in the United States was used by the aircraft Indus try, and
that most of the metal was used in the form of sheet alumi
nums for sheathing airplanes*

In regard to the amount of

excess capacity in the rolling mills in the postwar era, the
9
following statement is significant:
In the years before the war the average
consumption of aluminum rolling mills was only
about 35 per cent* What the demand will be
after the war is difficult to forecast, but it
will undoubtedly fall substantially below the
war ratio of 50 to 60 percent. A very liberal
assumption is that 40 per cent of the postwar
production of virgin aluminum will be required
for sheet* Thus if total demand for aluminum
reaches 1,500 million pounds, the production
of virgin aluminum will be about 900 million
pounds* On this basis it may be estimated that
postwar demand for sheet will be 360 million
pounds, and the excess sheet capacity will be

9IhjUU, pp. 414-15

1*250 million pounds* In other words, the
rolling mill capacity of the nation is over
4 times the probable postwar requirements*
These dats concerning alumina, aluminum, and rolling
mill capacities prove that excess productive capacity was
envisioned by the experts in all of these three stages of the
aluminum industry in the postwar era*

It must be admitted

that in the period intervening between the end of the war and
the time this study was made the estimates of excess capacities
proved correct in many instances*

All of the predictions of

the experts did not come true at once* however, as we have noted
particularly in the case of the alumina plants*

Disposal of

the plants erected by the Government presented a special prob
lem* which had to be solved both by industry and government
officials in a variety of ways*
Problems of Disposal of Goverament-BuiIt Aluminum Facilities £
A brief analysis of the aluminum industry given by
Alderfer and Michi in 1942 presented a view which was widely
accepted as being typical of the pessimism prevalent in this
country*

Few people In the early years of the defense program

suspected that the aluminum Industry would be expanded to the
great extent that was necessary in order to win the war, and
♦
most of the observers of the industry would have agreed with

Alderfer and Michl when they made the statement which la

10
quoted below:
Current developments in the industry seem
to indicate that this field, heretofore domi
nated by one company, will be opened to compe
tition* Some competitors already have a
foothold, and if national defense demand for
the metal continues to expand, others may be
encouraged to enter, especially in view of the
hydroelectric power available in the West and
the not-too-friendly attitude of the government
toward the leading company* However, we cannot
be too optimistic about the future growth of
competition because the Aluminum Company of
America is likewise expanding capacity and re
ducing prices to meet the present emergency,
and after the emergency has passed, this
company may have an effective monopoly despite
the existence of several comparatively small
competitors*
Officials of the government had cooperated with
private enterprise to the extent of building up a huge alumi
num industry during the war, however, and the result was that
by 1943 many writers were speaking of the cutbacks in the
aluminum production and the consequent necessity of solving
the problem of disposal of surplus capacity after the war
ended*

A wide variety of proposals were made at different

times, but all of them hoped for some degree of competition
in the postwar aluminum industry*

Generally speaking, the

various types of proposals for postwar handling of the

B* Alderfer and H* E. Michl, Economics of
American Industry* (New York: McGraw-Hill BookCompany, Inc*},
p V 165 •

surplus plant facilities grouped themselves under at least
six different plans, as follows:
1*

Dismantling of the aluminum plants by the

Government, to whom they belonged under the Defense Plant
G orporation 5
2*

Retention of the plants as a permanent addition

to the national defense network, to be used as stand-by
plants for operation in times of actual war;
>•

Disposition of the plants through sale to the

highest bidder in the industrial field!
4*

Leasing of the various plants to responsible

and reliable operators in the postwar era;
5*

Retention and operation of the various plants

in competition with private business enterprise; and

6*

Employment of a combination of the above solutions

in an effort to work out a permanent policy in the aluminum
industry satisfactory to the Government and to the American
people*
It was felt from the very beginning that the Govern
ment would never solve the problem by using the method noted
as number five above.

No intention on the part of the Govern

ment to engage in postwar competition with private industry
in the aluminum field had ever been voiced by any official
in any responsible position.

Quite tne contrary was the case,

because most officials whovorked on the problems connected

with the aluminum industry felt that the Government would
have many reasons for moving out of the industry as soon as
the war was ended*

At least one official, Secretary of

Commerce Jesse Jones, openly voiced the opinion that he "had
no idea of Government operation of any of these plants.n

11

Such a program would have been inimical to the best interests
of the Government and the aluminum industry, because it would
have been another step in the socialization of industry in
this country.

Since the Government did not intend to use

the proposal to operate the plants itself the other plans
were given much consideration before actual disposal of the
plants was' affected.

Actually* a combination of plans

was

used* since most industrial concerns interested in the aluiainum industry favored a leas e-purchase plan, which would give
the purchasing companies a chance to determine whether or not
entry into the aluminum industry would be profitable to them*
This type of plan had been pointed out by Professor Engle and

12
his associates when they stated:
In view of the risks and uncertainties of
entering such a field,; however, the government
may find it necessary to provide very liberal
terms for the sale of alund.num plants to private
interests. It may be advisable to offer these
plants on a lease-purchase plan, the value of

Jones Pavors Leasing U. 3.-Owned Plants*" The
Wall Street Journal. (December 3, 1943)> P* 2*
Engle and others, o p a clt«* p# 417•

139
the properties to be determined after 10 or
more years of operation, the purchaser meantime
dividing net profits after taxes with the
government as annual payments to be credited
against the purchase price*** ••Whether or not
the existing companies in the industry would be
adversely affected cannot b© predicted* If the
new plants can be operated successfully, however,
the government would ultimately receive a higher
price than would likely be bid in advance* On
the other hand, the buyer would be enabled to
face competition without an excessive burden of
overhead costs*
Disposal of all three types of plants*— alumina, alusdb
nuza, and fabricating facilities— faced this problem, and it
was for this reason that certain writers felt that very few
of the Defense Plant Corporation activities were scheduled
for postwar operation*

Mr* J. R, Hight, in an article in

Iron Age as late as June 23, 1945* stated this conviction in
13
these words:
Aluminum reduction plant disposal, in the
opinion of informed government officials here
(Washington, i). C.}, will probably result in the
postwar operation of not more than two or three
of the major government-owned reduction units.
The over-expanded productive capacity of
the industry, plus the present anti-monopoly
position of the Federal Government will combine
to limit the interest of Alcoa, Reynolds, and
other possible producers in leasing or pur
chasing DPC plants*
Mot even the most optimistic of industry
or government officials feel that there is
reasonable hope of operating war-expanded

Hight, "Few D P C Aluminum Plants Scheduled
for Postwar Operation," Iron Age« Vol. GLV, (June 23, 1945)*
pp* 105-06*
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facilities at near 100 per cent of capacity in
the near future, but the general feeling ex
pressed here is that the overall aluminum
consumption figure would be improved if an
additional aluminum producer, or possibly two
additional companies were to enter the field*
Patent problems, ©specially in regard to the reduction
of alumina from the lower grade ores, constituted a handicap
in the immediate postwar disposal of the various plants*

A

description of these problems as they were handled by Surplus
Property Administrator W • Stuart Symington will follow. Coupled
with the other problems of disposal already mentioned, th©
question of patents made the task extremely difficult until
early in 1946*

Altogether, the Government and the private

industrial concerns which had hopes of engaging in aluminum
production faced, at the end of the war, the problems of
(1) an entrenched Alcoa, which had expanded rapidly during
the war; (2) extensive aluminum capacities in alumina,
aluminum, and fabrication stages; (3) high cost and marginal
firms in the expanded industry, especially with the possi
bility of aluminum prices either being held down to 1$ cents
per pound, or even going to a lower level under competition;
u>

lack of immediate funds on the part of would-b© aluminum

producers, with the necessity for governmental lease-purchase
plans to tide the new entries over the first few years after
the war; and

patent problems, which primarily concerned

the alumina reduction plants*

These problems loomed large

at first, but in view of tue governmental policy as aired In
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Congressional circles, the solutions to them were worked out
much better than many people had hoped they would be.
Analysis of Government Policies in Regard to Plant Disposal
and the Creation of Postwar Competition in Aluminums
One of the most significant features of the wartime
expansion of the aluminum industry was the administration
policy of expanding the facilities to meet the emergency
needs, and the avowed declaration On the part of government
officials that competition would be an objective in the post
war world*

Congress itself had gdne on record as being

definitely dedicated to the discouragement of ”monopolistic
practices™ in the aluminum industry, and as favoring a long

ran program to "foster the development of new independent
enterprise19 as the solid rock upon which to build the postwar
14
structure of competition.
More than this, the Congress had
passed the Surplus Property Act, which required that the
Surplus Board make known to Congress its specific policies
in regard to the disposal of surplus plants and facilities*
The report required by Congress from the Surplus Board was
necessary for all properties in which the Government had in
vested more than £5f000,000,

the aluminum industry was

^"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune. (May, 1946), o p » pit.«
p* 103 ff.
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affected in all of the three stages beyond the mining of
bauxite or other ores for aluminum production*

15

The actual policy of the administration in regard to
the aluminoa industry was not officially known until Septem**
b er 26, 1945, when a report was submitted to Congress*

This

report, submitted by Surplus Property Administrator W* Stuart
Symington on that date^ stated unequivocally that competitors
o f Alcoa would have the very first choice in obtaining govern-

16
ment—owned surplus aluminum plants and equipment*

'While It

is Impossible to present the full context of this report here,
a brief resume of the proposed solutions given by Mr* Symington
will prove helpful to an understanding of administration policy,
not only for aluminum but also for other light metals*

Presi

dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, before his death, had Inspired
the inauguration of provisions in contracts with Alcoa that
the company would not be allowed “purchase options" on plants
operated by it during the war*

The report of the Surplus

Property Administrator carried the attack on Alcoa several
steps further by rejecting several of the company*s proposal®
in regard to the surplus aluminum plants*

^ J * R. Eight, JSJm * j&Jknil* i PP • 105—06 •
Alcoa Competition First in Aluminum Plant Disposal,"
Iron Age* Vol* CLVI, (October 4* 1945), pp* 116-19*
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Alcoa had staged its willingness in 1945 to lease or
purchase the alumina plant at Hurricane Greek, Arkansas* Pur
chase

of the alumina plant at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had

also been suggested, because the company wanted to remove
the plant to the Pacific Northwest, as part of its proposal
to set up a fully integrated aluminum industry ,in that region.
R eduction plants at Jones Mills, Arkansas, Trout dale, Oregon,
and Massena, New York, also would have been bought by Alcoa,
according to the report.

All of these moves on the part of

Alcoa were made not out of necessity, but as a means of
eliminating the Government entirely from the aluminum industry.
Alcoa apparently did not need the government-built facilities
for postwar production of alroainum, but the company saw the
opportunity, according to the report, of ridding itself of a
most serious competitor in the form of governmental enterprise,
which might be able to produce the metal at extremely low costs
because of its peculiar advantages in tax-free operations, low
power costs from government—owned electrical energy facilities
such as TV A and Bonneville, and low bauxite costs from the
government stockpiles 6f the ore.
Other companies had exhibited Interest in the postwar
disposal of the aluminum facilities, the most important among
them being Reynolds Metals Gompany, the American Smelting and
Refining Company, Kaiser Company, Inc., the Columbia Metals
Company, the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, and Olin
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Industrie©* Inc•

Host of those companies were concerned

either with the alumina plants or the aluminum reduction
plants, and had not given much attention to the larger fabri
cating plants*

Reynolds Metals Company had been interested

in taking over all of the facilities which Alcoa mentioned,
botk for alumina and aluminum production*

The broad program

which was envisioned by the Kaiser Company, Inc., was of
particular import especially since the Government had been
anxious to get another producer into the aluminum field. The
other companies wanted specific plants, and would not have
become important in the industry as integrated companies. Olin
Industries, Inc., had expressed a desire for aluminum reduction
facilities, but this company removed itself entirely from
aluminum production during the year of 1945*

The fear of

being unable to obtain adequate bauxite supplies on a com
petitive basis probably was the chief reason for the company’s
departure from the aluminum industry*

•*

All of the companies, with the exception of Alcoa,
indicated before the end of the war that they would be
Interested in a type of lease-purchase arrangement with
the government in regard to the alumina plants and the alumi
num reduction facilities.

One of the chief factors for con

sideration of all the companies was the governmental assurance
that an a1w l n a supply would be available on a competitive
price level comparable to that ^hich Alcoa enjoyed.

Minimi

zation of various risks of loss through liberal rental terms
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was also stressed*

Some of* the companies indicated a

preference for governmental handling of stockpiles in such a
way that the companies could sell directly to the government
until commercial markets opened up after the war*
Although the Government did not take cognizance of
all of the different desires of these companies, one fact
concerning disposal was made most apparent*
proposals were rejected by the Government*

Alcoa1s many
The report

declared that these proposals were turned down because the
acceptance of themnwould have increased Alcoa’s monopoly in
the primary metal*

In acquiring three of the four best re

duction plants and controlling the Hurricane Creek alumina
plant, Alcoa would take government plants off the market
and discourage employment opportunities which is the primary
17
concept of the Surplus Property Act itself.”
Additional important points presented in the report

ia

of Mr* Symington were as follows:
Alcoa would be given the opportunity to
take over certain facilities, subject to
approval of the Department of Justice, but
only on terms of lease or sale that would
preclude competitive advantage;
The government will maintain in standby
condition plants needed for the national
defense;

^?Iron Age. (December 4, 1945) op- cjt*. pp. 11&-19.

iaibid.

Plants and equipment not otherwise needed
will be exported to members of the United Nations
subject to approval of the State, War and Navy
D epartments;
These priorities may be disregarded, the
report points out, where research can be fostered
by selling, lending or donating equipment that
otherwise has no industrial use, provided the
fruits of such research become public property;
Where key plants are involved, the report
states, it is essential that they be disposed
of to bidders who have the organization, ex
perience and financial resources affording best
prospects for continuing operations and maximum
production in the industry* Preference will be
accordingly given*
In addition to these general provisions which were
set forth in the report, certain specific policies in regard
to the disposal of individual plants were also stated* These
specific plans for each of the major plants show the special
intent of the Government to eliminate the monopolistic power
o f Alcoa, particularly in the field of primary aluminum*
19
These provisions for the individual plants were as follows:
The Hurricane Creek aluminum plant will be
offered to an Alcoa competitor under terms that
guarantee sale of alumina on a competitive basis;
The Baton Rouge plant will go to an Alcoa
competitor but, if none can be found who is
willing to operate it at the present location,
consideration will be given to removing it
entirely or in part to the Pacific Northwest
for sale to a competitor* Finally, if the
foregoing conditions cannot be complied with,
the plant will be offered to Alcoa for removal
to the Northwest subject of Department of
Justice approval*

19Ibld.

Reduction plants at Jones Mills, Trautdale,
Spokane and Tacoma will be offered to Alcoa com—
petiters* Undisposed—of plants will be retained
in standby condition until the aluminum market
permits economical operation*
The M&ssena plant will be offered to Alcoa
subject to Department of Justice approval, on
terms conferring no competitive advantage* It
will be retained by the government pending
determination of possible disposal to others
when low—cost power supply becomes available*
The Maspeth, Burlington, Los Angeles and
Riverbank reduction plants, if unacceptable to
any bidders, will either be held in standby
condition or disposed of according to the
recommended priorities, the report says*
Scrambled facilities in private plants will
be disposed of by giving plant owners first
choice* Those in excess will be disposed of
according to the priority pattern*
Lime-soda-sinter facilities which are adjuncts
to Alcoa-owned plants locatdd at Mobile, Ala*, and
E* St* Louis, 111*, will be offered to Alcoa sub
ject to Department of Justice approval*
In disposals of fabricating plants, the re
port states, holders of valid options or rights
of first purchase will have first choice in exer
cising their rights* Operators of government
reduction plants will be granted first choice
o n plants subject to prior rights of others in
order to enable them to integrate more favorably*
Third choices will go according to the priority
pattern*
Rental terms and sales prices, the report
points out, will be fixed with due regard to
earning ability of the plant and not necessarily
with regard to original cost or replacement
value* On alumina and reduction plants, leasing
terms may be offered, if necessary, as favorable
as those received by Alcoa under its original
lease*

All of the above plans for the disposal of surplus
aluminum facilities were designed to aid competitors of
Alcoa*

It was suggested in the report that the terms for

leasing of the aluminum properties might contain provisions
for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to stand losses
for an initial period of operation by these competitors.
Profits* if any* accruing to the new companies operating
the facilities would be divided, with

$5% going to the

government and 15£» to the operators*

The additional pro

visions suggested were that the Reconstruction Finance Cor
poration might (1) review and approve the price at which
virgin aluminum was to be sold; (2) review the top salaries
offered in the new companies; and (3) look over the extra
ordinary expenses of the new operators*

It was felt that

this type of control exercised by a governmental agency
much as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would place
the new operating companies in the position of having to
assume reasonable risks of working capital.

It would be

possible under such an arrangement for the government to
withdraw its assumption of other risks after some reasonable
period of time had elapsed.
Two additional general provisions of this report
by Mr* Symington assume a great deal of importance to th©
historian of the industry.

Success of the new aluminum pro

ducers was a goal toward which the government report was
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striving*

The success of* competitors of Alcoa could be
20
further assured through the following provisions:
The government stockpile of bauxite at
Hurricane Creek will be available to the plant
operator* In addition* the board will ask the
help of the appropriate federal agencies in
exploring uhe possibilities of securing foreign
ore by means of international agreements*
Engineering investigations will be made to
determine changes necessary to place plants in
the most advantageous position to compete, and
the government will finance such changes where
costs appear to be recoverable.
Many of the provisions of the report were most
acceptable to the various government officials and to the
members of Congress who had direct interest in the aluminum
industry.

It was generally felt that most of the actions

taken would be justified on the basis that disposal of the
aluminum facilities was preferable to the dismantling of
the plants built up during the wartime emergency.

Leasing

plans appeared to be the best solution to the general prob
lems* because most of the potential private competitors
favored such governmental policies* and government officials
were interested in preventing losses or excessive maintenance
costs while the plants remained idle.

Outright subsidy

payments of any type were generally opposed, however, and
government policymakers were in harmony with this opposition*
Rent-free leasing arrangements were opposed, also, because
it was felt that they constituted a type of subsidy*

Pro

ponents of such rent-free leasing of plants were quick to

20Ibid.

point out that wartime producers had the same benefit, be
cause of the fact that their investments for war built
facilities would be completely amortized by the end of the

21
war*
It is not surprising to find that Alcoa officials
were in opposition to the administration policy in the dis
posal of surplus aluminum plants*

This opposition was

expressed in a statement made on October 17, 1945> by
Mr. I. ¥. Wilson, vice-president of Alcoa*

Mr. Wilson, in

his statement to the Joint Senate Committee on Aluminum,
challenged the government* s so-called subsidy program which
had been advocated by Mr. Symington.

Stating that the pro

gram was *wholly unnecessary," Mr. Wilson went on to say that
his company* s position was "incorrectly stated and charged
that the program is an invitation to reckless, extravagant
22
and calculated mismanagement*"
He characterized the program
proposed by the Surplus Property Administrator as being a
"cradle to the grave program which, once started, can never
23
be terminated*"
The whole program, as described by
Mr. Wilson, consisted of many inimical policies, among them

R* Might, o p * cit.. pp. 105-06*
Alcoa Charges S P A*s Program for Plant Disposal
Seeks to Destroy It," Iron Age. Vol CLVI, (October 25, 1945),
p. 105*

23ikM-

belzig such items as the .following:
a ga in s t losses;
earnings

(1) government guarantee

(2j purchase options based on the record of

under subsidized leases;

o f bauxite or other ores;

(3) government procurement

(4) subsidized manufacture of alumi

n u m for sale at prices equal to or lower than Alcoa1s cost of
m a n u f a c t u r e | (3) reduced power rates on government-owned
po w er to operators of government plants; and (6) government
stockpiling of aluminum ingot purchased from operators of the
government plants.

A final blast at the administration policy

of aluminum plant disposal was taken by Mr. Wilson when he
24
made the following statement:
We are compelled to conclude that the ulti
mate objective of the plan is the destruction
o f Alcoa p by subsidising competition in the
industry that it created or its dissolution by
government-induced court decree, or governmental
entry into private business in the form of
federal operation of government-owned aluminum
plants.
Mr. Symington’s reply to the above conclusions of Mr. Wilson
w a s a disavowal of any intention on the part of the Adminis

tration to atomize Alcoa, although it was more or less
apparent that the dominating position of the company would
be destroyed if effective competition would be arranged
through governmental disposal of the plants to other operators.
Congressional action was taken on October 18, 3-945* to extend
for thirty days the whole problem of aluminum pl:int disposal*
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Senator 0* Mahoney had taken the lead in sponsoring the plan
to frees© the disposal of the government-owned facilities
until the whole question could be studied again by the vari
ous military, small business, and postwar planning committees
which were interested in the entire question of plant dis
posal through governmental agencies*
A great deal of discussion was carried on in the
remaining months of 1945 concerning the disposal of surplus
aluminum plants, but very little was accomplished until
early in 1946*

In January of 1946 the settlement of patent

rights was made between Alcoa and the Government, with the
result that disposal of the government-owned plants was made
possible*

Details of the patent settlement and the actual

disposal of the various aluminum facilities will be given in
the next section*
Partial Settlement of the Problems of Patent Control
and A^irarSman Plant Disposal;
Previous discussions have hinted that the disposal
of government-built aluminum facilities hinged upon the
question of Alcoa7s control of essential patents in the
production of alumina*

Many companies feared the eventual

squeese which Alcoa might put upon them in regard to the
purchases of alumina or ingot aluminum, and did not even
respond readily to the governmental attempts to attract new
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competitors into the field.

Immediately following the

victory over Japan in September, 1945 $ the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation had sent out telegraphic messages to a
total of 224 eompanies— leaders in the metal and metalworking
industries— to determine the extent of the interest of these
companies in aluminum production facilities*

Only two com

panies responded favorably to the messages, but even these
t w o made **jittery leasing offers that involved, along with

other propping, a government guarantee to buy all the alumi25
num produced that couldnft be sold elsewhere.”
The offers
w er e made b y the Reynolds Metals Company and the Columbia

Metals Company*

Other Interested companies, such as American

Smelting and Refining Company, the Kennecott Copper Corpora

tion, and the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, made brief
investigations, but did not think entrance into the aluminum
fi e ld under the conditions existing at that time to be a

wise move*

The key to the whole situation is stated by

26
Fortune (May, 1946), as follows:
This reluctance was Induced not so much by
faintness of heart for a fair competitive fight

as by Alcoafs control of most of the available
high-grade bauxite deposits in the U* 5* and of

critical patents on the processing of lowergrade bauxites in the government1s alumina
plants* Without a source of alumina independent
of Alcoa, nobody who felt any concern about his
o w n independence was likely to barge into the
aluminum business* Alcoa had been fairly good
for a long time, but the company was a past
master of the price squeeze*

26Ibid
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This situation made It appear early in 1946 that the
governmental program Tor disposing of about #700 million
worth of surplus aluminum facilities was at a standstill.
Matters appeared even worse to many observers who felt that
the domination of Alcoa before and during the war was being
perpetuated in the postwar era.

But the situation came

rapidly to a sudden conclusion in early January, after an
explosive outburst by Mr. Symington and retaliatory moves
on the part of Alcoa officials.

Mr. Symington’s part in the

initial stages of the controversy has been described in the
27
following manner:
Then, on January 6, former Surplus Property
Administrator W. Stuart Symington fired the shot
heard round the aluminum world. Symington accused
the Aluminum Co. of using its patents to obstruct
disposal of government-owned aluminum plants, and
of an attempt nto distract the members of Congress
and the public from the fact that Alcoa was seek
ing to obtain the more desirable government plants
and thus to increase and solidify its own monopo
listic position." He also suggested that Alcoa
officials were bargaining with the patents for
settlement or dismissal of the antitrust suit.
"The time has come,” declared Symington, wto say
frankly to Congress that it may well be that no
disposal of any of the plants to competitors will
be possible unless Alcoa changes its attitude,
or unless the courts, acting under the Sherman
Act, reorganize Alcoa so that its monopolistic
power is broken.w
The next four days following Mr. Symington’s pugnacious
tirade against Alcoa have been characterized by Fortune

27ibid i

magazine as a period that shook aluminum into a 5Jraucous new
Industry**

That period— -from January 6 to 10, 1946— will

remain as one of the greatest and most significant periods
in the entire history of the aluminum industry of the United
States*

One magnificent gesture on the part of Alcoa changed

the whole outlook in regard to surplus plant disposal and
eoatpehihiom in the aluminum industry of the peacetime world*
This gesture, simple as it was, merely consisted of Alcoa’s
presentation to the United States Government, license-free
for life, the patents for the reduction of aluminum from
low—grade bauxite*
appears

It was much more far-reaching than it

on the surface, however*

The patents themselves

covered three important phases of the process of alumina
reduction, as follows:

(1) the use of the lime-soda-sinter

p rocess in combination with the Bayer process;

(2) continuous

digestion: and (3) the use of starch as a settling and filter28
lag aid*
The use of all of these patents was essential to
the proper operation of the Hurricane Creek alumina plant,
because all of the features had been built into the plant

when it was constructed during the war*
It had been felt for many months that no aluminum
plant facilities would be sold until Hurricane Creek property
was disposed of, because of the necessity of adequate alumina

James A* Lee, o p * cit* * p* 157*

supplies at a cost competitive with. Alcoa alumina, which was
produced .from high-grade ores resulted in a saving estimated
at between ten and twelve dollars a ton, and it was this
saving that would make the future cost of alumina competitive*
It was this feature of the patents that had caused the impor
tant Alcoa officials— Arthur V. Davis, I* W* Wilson, and Leon
Hickman— to make a hurried trip to Washington, D* C., in
order to bargain with governmental officials*

Loss of the

patents would mean a loss of income to Alcoa, and it was felt
by the Alcoa officials that some type of bargaining was
necessary*
The whole story of these conferences between Alcoa
officials and representatives of the Surplus Property Ad
ministration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and congressional
committees constitutes a unique chapter In Alcoa-Governraent
relations*

The determination of the various government

officials to break the Alcoa stranglehold was seen in the
answers given to three propositions which Alcoa officials
advanced during the conferences*
29
is stated briefly as follows i

The account of this clash

The Alcoa people were there to bargain*
They were interested particularly in getting
out from under the Circuit Court decision, which
had suspended sentence until the effect of

^"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune. (May, 1946), op* cit.,
pp. 103

M.
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surplua-plant disposal could be determined.
After complaining about the "pugnacious"
quality of the Symington blast, therefore, they
advanced Proposition No* 1: If they made a
reasonable deal on the patents, would the anti
trust case against Alcoa be closed? No, said
Attorney General Tom Clark* Proposition No* 2
followed; If they made a good patent settle
ment, would Alcoa b© given equal rights to buy
o r lease the government plants along with
everybody else? No, said S* P* A* Administrator
Symington* Proposition No* 3s would they be
permitted to finance their own expansion with
their own risk; it would be up to the court
and the Justice Department to decide whether the
expansion gave Alcoa a monopoly-sized share of
the market*
These repeated rebuffs to Alcoa officials constituted
a real setback to the hopes of the company.

It appeared un

believable to Alcoa that it would not even be able to finance
its own expansion without governmental surveillance*
governmental officials were adamant*
moved by Alcoa*s arguments.

But

They refused to be

Mr. Symington went so far as to

state that a lease with Reynolds should be consummated,
regardless of Alcoa's patent holdings*

He even cited the fact

that a patent is nothing but a right to sue, and that if Alcoa
wanted another lawsuit on its hands it could bring proceedings
against th© agencies that gave the lease to Reynolds*

Other

government officials agreed with Mr* Symington, leaving the
Alcoa officials in a predicament.

The meeting of Januafy g

was adjourned with th© situation at an impasse, but the Alcoa
officials promised to make an offer the next day®

15 $
On January 9* 1946, Alcoa made an offer to grant the
use of patents to competing companies on the basis of free
licensing of the patents for the Hurricane Creek plant up to

25$ of capacity (400 million pounds of alumina), plus a
royalty of one dollar per ton on all alumina produced above
that figure*

This offer met with objections from some govern

ment officials, and the deal was not settled*

On the same

afternoon, however, Alcoa officials, after a long conference
with Mr* Symington, gave in to the suggestion that the patents
should be granted entirely free*

Thus, the final settlement

was one which gave prestige to Alcoa for its "public-spirited
cooperation” and to Mr. Symington for his diligent efforts at
•busting a trust.”

Testimonial letters were arranged, a press

conference was called to give the news to cynical Washington
newpaper men, and Mr. Symington took the trouble to take back
all the things that lie had said about Alcoa*

In the words of

Fortune magazine, "the only question was whose tongue was in

50

whose cheek*”
In spite of any temporary misgivings which observers
might have had concerning the events as outlined above, it
must be readily admitted that the granting of the alumina
patents to the United States Government aided greatly in the
disposal of the surplus aluminum plants.

3°Ibld.

The officials in
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'the Surplus Property Administration had predicted that when
the Hurricane Creek plant problem had been settled it would
be much easier to dispose of the aluminum plants*
exactly what happened*

This is

A general clamor for the government**

owned plants was begun by representatives of several companies*
Reynolds Metals Company, still unsatisfied with its vast
holdings built up during the defense and wartime periods,
was anxious to get the properties which would aid in the
further integration of its far-flung organisation. The Kaiser
Interests, the American Smelting and Refining Company, and
even Alcoa itself were particularly interested in some of the
major facilities, "tumbling all over one another in a race to
get at the choicest government properties."

31

Hurricane Creek facilities for reduction of alumina
were leased immediately by Reynolds Metals Company, which
obtained the right to use the government stockpile of
bauxite located at that plant.

According to the terms of the

lease, Reynolds received the property on a lease-purchase
plan, the lease itself being for the period of five years*
Reynolds agreed to sell alumina to all Industrial enter
prises at cost plus six per cent, with the stipulation that
the maximum price would be $40 a ton.

This was considered

to be a fair price for the alumina, since the wartime price
had been as high as $50 per ton.

31Ibld

It was felt that the lower
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f igure wou l d permit more industrial operators to be demanders
of alumina, and the ingot aluminum which was produced from the

alumina*

Reynolds also leased the Jones Mills reduction

plant which was near the Hurricane Creek facilities*

These

two outstanding plants— Hurricane Creek and Jones Mills—
were sufficient to make the Reynolds Metals Company the
first fully integrated competitor which Alcoa had had to
face in its long history in aluminum production in the United

States*

The plants made it possible for Reynolds to produce

a l l o f the alumina needed for its reduction plants, and to
produce all the virgin metal needed for its fabricating
facilities*

The prospect for real competition in the alumi

n u m industry was at hand, and the further developments within
the next few weeks were sufficient to make the situation
even brighter to the American public*

Further disposal of Defense Plant Corporation aluminum
plants had resulted in the addition of the ^aiser interests
by the end of March, 1946*

The Kaiser company entered the

field as a producer of ingot aluminum and sheet aluminum in

the Pacific Northwest.

A five-year lease was granted to

Kalser-Cargo, Inc±, on the aluminum reduction plant at Spokane,
Washington*

This plant was valued at $22,000,000*

The Kaiser—

Frazer Corporation leased the sheet rolling mill, also located
at Spokane andvrlueci at ^4^*000,000*

This initial entry of

Kaiser into the industry was further expanded at a later date

to Include the alumina plant at Baton Rougef Louisiana , and
the aluminum reduction plant at Tacoma, Washington.

It had

been rumored in the automobile industry that the Kaiser
interests were interested in aluminum, because difficulties
in obtaining steel had left the Kaiser-Fraxer Corporation in
a bad predicament in the production of the new* Frazer and
Kaiser automobiles*

This problem of procuring steel was

elesared up, however, and the Kaiser-Fraxer Corporation was
not forced to use sheet aluminum for the bodies of their cars*
The Fermanente Metals Corporation, a subsidiary of Kaiser
interests, took over the operation of the aluminum facilities
from the original leasing companies, and at the present time
this company operates the plants at Baton Rouge, Tacoma, and
Spokane*
The Reynolds Metals Company extended its operations
in the field of aluminum rolling mills through the leasing
of the Chicago sheet mill which had been built by the
Defense Plant Corporation.
at £44,000,000.

The Chicago plant was valued

In addition, the Reynolds company leased

an extrusion plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, and bought
a sheet, rod and bar mill at Listerhill, Alabama.

The latter

plant had been operated by Reynolds during the war, and was
valued at £20,000,000, but the sales price to Reynolds was

£7,000,000.
All of these moves on the part of Reynolds and the
Kaiser interests served to place the aluminum Industry of

16 2
the United States on an entirely new basis*

In the amazingly

short space of only a few weeks, the entire industry was
placed on a competitive basis, in such a manner as to evoke
the consent that "never before had a one—company industry
been cracked open so fast, so wide, and so handsome for
32
competition **
The results over the period of the next
year in the aluminum industry were amazing*

The structure

of the industry from April 1, 1946, to April 1, 1947* showed
a decided trend toward the making of a great triumvirate of
aluminum competitors*

The following table will show the

breakdown of aluminum production facilities in the United
States*

Percentages for the “Big Three11 in the aluminum
TABLE IV

ALUMINUM PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
AS OF APRIL 1, 1947*
Company

Alumina

BT PERCENTAGES
Aluminum
Reduction

Sheet
Aluminum

Alcoa

43*7

50*6

46 *4

Reynolds

35.9

29.4

29.9

kaiser

20*4

20*0

16.5

Source:

The Permanent© News* (May, 1947), p. 16 O'

industry, for alumina, aluminum reduction, and sheet aluminum
production are given for April 1, 1947•

32Ibid.

The breakdown is
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unique in one respect., at least*

It shows that Alcoa* in the

postwar year of 194?, has a majority of plant facilities In
o n l y one field of aluminum production* that of Ingot alumi
n u m reduction* where the percentage gives that company 50*6$
o f the production capacity*

producer in a U

Alcoa continues as the leading

three lines of activity* of course* but its

d ominance is by no means as complete as It was in prewar

years o r even during the wartime era*

By way of contrast*

i t is interesting to recall that in 1939 the picture of the
aluminum industry* as shown by Alderfer and Mlchl* listed

Alcoa as the producer of 10Q$ of bauxite for aluminum, alumina*
33
a n d of virgin aluminum*

The people of the United States

m a y marvel at the breakdown of the aluminum monopoly* but it

should be recalled that toe task was accomplished only as a
result of purposeful actions on the, part of governmental
officials and private producers after this country had begum
its defense program*

The elimination of Alcoa*s dominance

wa s not an overnight proposition*

It proceeded from the

first decisions to refuse options to purchase to the company
in connection with the new facilities which it helped to
build and which it operated during the war*

The task was

completed in the refusal of officials of the various govern
mental agencies to sell the surplus plants to Alcoa after

^Alderfer and Mlchl* op * cit *» p* 103*

the war had ended, and by the process of obtaining the
patents from Alcoa for use by competing companies•
Postwar Problems of Competitive Knternrise in the Aluminum
Industry of the United States;
In concluding this chapter on the postwar aspects
of the aluminum industry, it is interesting to note the
most recent article entitled "Lots of Aluminum," in Business
Week for May 31, 1947*

The significance of increased capacity

and of competition in the aluminum industry is well illus
trated in the statement that it is necessary to "chalk up
*
aluminum as the first major metal to enter a buyer* s market"
34
after World War IX was ended*
The reasons given are obvious,
35
as shown in the following statement:
For two years primary aluminum producers and
rolling mills have been operating at full speed*
Pent-up wartime demand, substitution of aluminum
for other metals in even tighter supply, gave
suppliers all the business they could nandle*****
Now the pipelines are filled up* Current buying
is on the basis of current consumption* The
result;
Reynolds Metals Co* is "temporarily suspend
ing" production at the Longview (Wash*) aluminum
plant, which has a capacity of 60 million lb* of
ingot a year* Smallest of Reynolds* ingot plants
and the company*s highest-cost producer, it will
be bebuilt to improve efficiency and productivity*
Operations may be resumed in about a year*

34»Lots of Aluminum, " Business Week* Number 926,
(May 31, 1947), P* 17*

3hbid.

Aluminum Go* of* America has curtailed
production at its Alcoa (Tenn.) rolling
mills*
Kaiser Go*, the nation’s third aluminum
producer, found time to slow down a couple of
departments in its Trentvtfood {Wash*} rolling
mill for year-end inventory purposes* Full
production is scheduled after the Memorial Day
holiday*
Reynolds also has decided it doesn’t want
the government-built rod and bar mill near
Newark, Ohio. It has signed a letter of intent
to lease the plant from W A A. Not it finds its
KcCook (111*) plant can meet the demand* Rey
nolds also has cut back on rolled products*
Sheet is the one type of aluminum now in
easy supply* Output of extrusions is close to
meeting demand* Castings are still short*
One of the chief reasons for the surplus of sheet
aluminum in 1947 has been the reduced demand for aluminum
for housing and building construction*

Both siding and

roofing of aluminum sheet had been in big demand, but the
rapid building up of stocks of this type of fabricated
aluminum products has acted as a deterrent to further
expansion in that field*
No immediate reductions in primary aluminum prices
is envisioned in this latest article by Business Week*
although it is pointed out that secondary aluminum prices
had shown a tendency to turn down in the first half of 1947*
The steady price of 15 cents per pound for ingot aluminum

^ I b i d * * p* 9
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had been maintained since 1941 » and it appears doubtful
that under present circumstances the price will be decreased
as rapidly as some industrial users might hope#

Demand for

aluminum has held up much better than wartime predictions
indicated that it might, with the result that more optimism
i s being shown in the industry*

The long-run viewpoint is

that a stable market will evolve from the present situation*
and that the demand for aluminum will show continued steadi
ness and growth through the coming years*

Several items are

m entioned specifically to snow the causes for optimism, as

37
follows:
1*

Continuing demand for foundry items;

2* The expanded market for aluminum foil
as a packaging material;
3* The large growth in use of aluminum wire
as a substitute for copper;
4# The increased call for aluminum pigment
for paints; and
5* As a clincher, the fact that .ilcoa is
spending # 30,000,000 on a new rolling mill at
Davenport, Iowa* Alcoa hopes to start opera**
tions there before the end of the year*
It is not to be doubted that the immediate postwar
aspects of the aluminum industry point to a brighter future
of the industry both in terms of its usefulness to the economic
system and in terms of competitive enterprise* Government

37J&Uk-, p-

plans bore fruit in the establishment of a degree of com-*
petition that appears to have the possibilities of permanence
In the field of aluminum production*

The changes of the last

seven years have resulted in significant changes in the
economics of the industry, which will be the subject matter
of the final chapter of this study•

CHAPTER V
POSTWAR ECONOMICS OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
The aluminum Industry of the United States affords an
excellent opportunity for one to analyze some Important data
in the light of economic theory and practice*

The postwar

economics of this industry is so different in many ways from
the prewar conditions that many new problems have arisen*
The enormous growth of the industry over such a short period,
plus the entry of potential long-run competitors to Alcoa
changed the institutional and technological structure of the
entire industry*
The economic problems to receive special attention
in this ehapter constitute an array of seven, all of which
are connected with the economics of the aluminum industry*
The postwar economics of aluminum will be treated in terms
of these seven problems, as follows:
1*

Competition of producers and fabricators;

2*

Production problems after the war;

3*

Postwar cost problems in the aluminum industry;

4*

Postwar aluminum markets;

5*

Labor and labor relations in the aluminum industry

6*

Problems of monopolistic competition; and

7*

Problems of international competition and cartels
in the postwar aluminum industry*
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Analysis of the post-war aluminum industry in terms
of the above problems constitutes an attempt to show the
Industry as it exists in 1947*

In some cases, particularly

with reference to the determination of the degree of effective
competition existing in the industry in the postwar era, the
answers cannot be entirely definitive*

In order to analyse

production problems one must be concerned with such phases
of the industry as bauxite resource depletion; alumina and
aluminum processes, both old and new; fabrication and finish**
lag problems; the decline in production as a result of the
eutSiag off of the i*artime demands for aluminum Ingot
products; and the differences in production problems of
older plants and the newer government-built aluminum facili
ties*

Important postwar cost problems used for explanation

are those connected with the various aluminum ores, aluminum
reduction, shipping and transportation, and the fabrication
or railing mill costs*

Aluminum markets will be analyzed

on the basis of demand and supply data, which are connected
with the expansion and contraction of aluminum markets in
the fields of transportation, industry, and finished consumer
goods*

Marketing centers in the aluminum industry are used

in explaining the economics problems which have to do with
the distributive end of the aluminum industry*

Problems of

labor and labor relations are helpful, particularly In the
light of the labor troubles existent in the industry during

the war*

The postwar features surrounding the presence of

great numbers of additional trained personnel in the in
dustry are useful in throwing light on a new labor problem*
Monopolistic competition in aluminum has always been
a fertile field for analysis, particularly in terms of dif
ferentiation of products, substitution, and competitive
materials which take the place of aluminum in industrial
usage*

Added to the prewar features of the monopolistic

competition in the industry is the wartime development of
additional producers in the field of aluminum production,
making the postwar analysis revolve around the conditions
of oligopoly*

Three producers in the field of primary

aluminum production after the war change the picture from
a 100* monopoly to a competitive one*

No extended analysis

is contemplated in the field of the international cartel®
in aluminum, primarily because of the fact that it has been
repeatedly stated that Alcoa was never a member of the
cartel movement*

However, the possibilities of international

competition, especially with Canadian aluminum, will be
discussed*

The tariff situation, since it now is positive

protection for domestic producers against Canadian competi
tion in United States markets, will be given some considera
tion in the latter part of the chapter*

Competition of Producers and Fabricators:
Prewar lack of effective competition in the aluminum
industry of the United States, especially in the field of
primary aluminum production, was perhaps its most noted
characteristic•

Figures which have been cited before in

dicated that in the field of aluminum ores, alumina, and
ingot aluminum reduction, the position of Alcoa was one of
quite complete monopoly*

Only in the case of fabricating

facilities was it possible before the war to discover any
degree of competition, but even that was limited by the
necessity of fabricators to purchase Alcoa ingot aluminum
for fabrication*

The 100/9 monopoly in the three primary

stages of aluminum production resulted in Alcoa control of
the aluminum industry of the United States, with the result
that no other producer dared to enter the field*

Wartime

changes effected by the governmental agencies and private
industry created the opening wedge for competition in the
industry, and the postwar disposal of surplus plants set up
the Reynolds Hetals Company and the Kaiser interests as
competitors*
It must be stated at this point, however, that the
real degree of effective or classical competition in the
aluminum industry of the United States in 1947 cannot be
measured with exact scientific accuracy*

A variety of

reasons may be given for tnis lack of definitive evidence,

but the most important ones ares

(1) the fact that the

surplus plants leased by the government to Reynolds and to
falser were leased for a period of five years, beginning in
1946, and they have been in operation for only a relatively
short period of time under postwar conditions; (2) the
oonditions of demand, which were such at the end of World
War IX that a great backlog of demand for a variety of alumi

num goods had sprung up, enabling new producers to sell
their goods mostly in a seller*s market; (3) the possibility
that the leasing companies may, at the end of five years,
find it advisable not to exercise the option to purchase the
plants, especially if they are faced with a declining demand
for aloainua and an unsatisfactory price situation; and
(4) the continued operating existence of the uneconomical
plants, such as the ones at Baton Rouge, Hurricane Creek, and
Tacoma, at least under present conditions as they exist in 1947*
It is obviously a matter of conjecture as to the
degree of genuine competition existing in an industry where
the competing firms are operating on different bases#

The

situation in the aluminum industry in 1947, with Alcoa opera
ting on the basis of private industry assuming its own risks,
both present and future, is quite comiJlicated*

The leases

held by both Reynolds and Kaiser were designed to provide
a modicum of competition, chiefly by limiting profits and
prices which were possible under the leases granted*

For
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6xanple} it has been stated before that Reynolds book over
the Hurricane Greek plant with the stipulation that he could
sell alumina at cost plus six per cent* provided that the
price could not be more than a maximum of $40 per ton o f
alumina*

The granting of the patent rights by Alcoa to the

Government had been given as a reason for keeping alumina
prices down that low* as against the wartime price of $50
per ton*

The patent rights granted license free made it

possible for Reynolds to produce alumina from ten to twelve
dollars a ton cheaper* as we have seen*

Such conditions as

these make it evident that competition* free and unrestrained*
does not exist in the aluminum industry of the United States
i n 1947*

This conclusion is in opposition to the following

1
statement* which appeared in Fortune magazine in May* 1946:
Under monopoly conditions in an industry*
It Is more or less worth while to reduce costs-—
with the aim of either lower prices and greater
sales* or simply of increased profits on the old
volume of business* Under competitive conditions
it is often a matter of life and death* The
latter is quite desperately the case of the 1946
aim t n u B industry* No longer can the industry
develop its markets in a leisurely way and expand
its capacity just enough to meet the demands it
can clearly see ahead* No longer can it play
merry tunes with prices all up and down the scale
for aluminum— even with demands pent up by the

^"Aluminum Reborn*" Fortune * (May* 1946), q p » cit * *
pp* 103 f f *
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war— occupies merely a corner of the enormous
war—expanded capacity. The present price of
vifgin aluminum ingot is 15 cents a pound
(14 cents for pig) and it had better not go
any higher if the industry wants to sell more
aluminum*
The chief reason for disagreement with the above
statement is the fact that toe writer does not feel the
degree of satisfaction concerning effective competition
that is exhibited in the line which states that ”the latter
is quite desperately the case of the 1946 aluminum industry.”
Although the disposal of government facilities did result
in the placement of means of competition into the hands of
two large competitors of Alcoa, the time is too short to
say that competition is at hand in the aluminum industry
of the present era*

The statement even in the year 1947

would be subject to careful scrutiny, because the very
nature of the government lease-purchase agreements with
Reynolds and Kaiser interests indicates the possibility of
their retirement from the field if conditions become worse
than they anticipate*
The writer is more inclined to accept the viewpoint
expressed by the War Assets Administration in the most
recent report to Congress concerning aluminum plants
facilities*

and

Conservatism is shown in the statements con

cerning tne possible competition arising out of the govern
ment plans for disposal to competitors of Alcoa*

It becomes

apparent that the officials of the War Assets Administration

do oot JTeel that, completely effective competition exists
2
in the aluminum industry of 1947* The report states:
The distribution of productive capacity
in surplus plants to now independent producers
represents a major step toward the establishment
of a competitive aluminum industry* particularly
in the very important lower stages of manufac
ture. Mere possession of such productive capacity
will not, of itself, give rise to competition»
Other Prerequisites must be met before genuine
eeatpetition can be achieved. (Italics mine.)
One of these is keeping the newly acquired
facilities in substantial production, for it is
output and the ability to sell that output that
will ultimately be a deciding factor. Another
factor is the extent to which existing noninte
grated fabricators and the purchasers or lessees
of Government-owned fabricating plants will have
available for their operations adequate supplies
o f Ingot, sheet and other forms of aluminum,
whether from the present integrated producers
or from other sources. The smaller firms and
independent fabricators who presently look to
the ingot and fabricated aluminum producers as
their prime source of supply will be able to
withstand competition from the large firms only
if they are able to obtain supplies at a
sufficiently low price. In the fabricating
field it is possible that under some conditions
competition may be diminished, rather than
promoted. This circumstance, as well as the
general market outlook for aluminum and its
products, will affect the efforts of WAA to
broaden the base of disposals so as to bring
additional Independent operators for the
remaining surplus plants into the field*
It is of extreme importance in making any analysis
of present-day competition in the aluminum industry to

2
Aluminum Plants and Facilities, First Supplementary
Report of tBg W£? Afl’
SSTg 35ffliTftgtr tidft to the Congress,
(February 12, 1947)> PP* 4-5*

remember the exact statue of the disposal program for the
government-built plants*

The latest report available in

this connection is the War Assets Administration summary
3
of disposals, excerpts of which are given below:
.....the wartime investment of the Government
In the aluminum industry was $716.1 million, of
which $34*2 million represented loans to private
enterprise by the &FG, and #661;. 9 million went
i n t o DPC and Wavy plants and scrambled facilities
cost #66$»4 million, of which the bulk, or $629*4
million, were plants costing $5 million or more
eafh.»***•
As of November 30, 1946, #651*6 millions in
Government plants and facilities had been de
clared surplus, and #367*3 millions disposed of
(including one plant withdrawn from surplus),
leaving approximately #276.1 millions in aluminum
plants still awaiting disposal. These disposals
comprise chiefly leases, the leased plants cost
ing #295 million. Plants costing #79*6 million
have been sold for a total of #26.5 million. In
addition, sales and transfers (includes transfer
to Veterans Administration of Navy plant with
drawn from surplus) of equipment in Governmentowned plants were made amounting to #11.7 million.
Thus, plants representing over half of the original
Government dollar investment in the aluminum
industry have been disposed of to date.
.....The total number of Government-owned
plants was 56 (Including the lime-soda-sinter
facilities adjacent to Alcoa-owned plants, which
are treated as complete plants) of which 35 cost
more than $5 million. Of the 56 Government
plants, 53 were originally declared surplus and
one later withdrawn by Navy Department; 14 have
been sold and 14 leased. Of the 26 disposed
plants, 16 will continue operation in the alumi
num industry.

> p p * >-4*

177
The basic or key plants in the program are
those Tor production of alumina from bauxite,
valued at $65*7 million, and foi1 the reduction
of alumina plants at Hurricane Creek, Ark *, and
Baton Bouge, La* , are fundamental to the program*
Both plants are now in operation under letters of
intent, and leases are being drawn* Four of the
nine reduction plants have been disposed of, and
negotiations for one of the others are under way*
The disposal of the fabricating plants which
comprise the balance of the Government investment
is less advanced, since it not only depends to
some extent upon the prior disposal of the basic
plants, but may involve problems of conversion*
However, 20 out of 3$ such plants have been
disposed of, representing all types of fabrication*
Ideas in the above statement are further clarified by
the report in the declaration that *surplus aluminum plants,
and segments of plants, originally costing the Government

%2$2

million, remain to be disposed of*****In many cases, disposals
have covered land and buildings only, and disposition of the.
plant equipment will be made at some future time through the
4
WAA Office of General Disposal*"
The conclusion reached in the War Assets Administration
report of February 12, 1947, is pertinent to an understanding
o f the competitive features of the aluminum industry at the
present time*

Leonomie theory will be of importance in this

statement of the general idea, and further analysis of the
other problems of production, costs, and markets, will aid

1A the final conclusions which will be drawn In this chapter*

P* 5
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The successes attained in the program of disposal are out5
lined in the report as follows!
The accomplishments of the past year in
the disposal of aluminum plants and facilities
represent substantial progress toward the
attainment of most of the major economic objec
tives of the program presented to Congress in
the report of the Surplus Property Board, of
September 21, 1945* The distribution of
productive capacity in surplus plants to new
independent producers represents a major step
toward the establishment of a competitive
aluminum industry, but production in these
plants and the marketing of their output will
eventually determine this issue*
The plants remaining to be disposed of
are chiefly those in the fabricating group*
Future prospects for these plants will depend
upon the extent to which the present large
demand for aluminum is sustained* The War
Assets Administration will, within the frame
work of the policy and program set forth in
the first report to Congress, continue to
follow a course of endeavoring to establish
competition in the aluminum industry and to
achieve the pertinent objectives of the
ourplus Property Act*
If the postwar policy of disposal of the Governmental
aluminum facilities continues to work out as planned, and if
the companies whose entry into the industry has been so widely
heralded are able to stay in the field beyond the periods of
the leases, it will be a successful step in the inauguration
of competition in aluminum*

In concluding this section on

postwar competition, however, it will be well to remember

^lbid.. pp. 38-39.
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the following statement; which appeared during the war in a
6
study on corporate concentration and public policy 2
The economic characteristics of the alumi
num industry show, on the one hand, that monopoly
is not a necessary condition and, on the other
hand, that classical competition is not feasible,
Present demand conditions would support between
five and ten large firms at optimum size and
optimum scale in the refining, reduction, and
power stages. In mining and in the finishing
stages a large number of independents would
be economically justified* The observed merits
o f integration and the advantages of large-scale
production suggest that five to ten integrated
firms of medium size would create a technically
efficient industry*
The industry has not progressed to this ideal, and
probably will not reach such optimum potentialities within
the next few years, but the conditions of oligopoly existent
in the aluminum field today offer more hope for the future
in this respect*

It is a far cry from the monopolistic

nature of the prewar industry, and is a harbinger of more
competitive economics in the aluminum industry of the future*
Production Problems After the Wart
Several problems in the field of aluminum production
assume major importance for consideration in the industry in
the postwar period*

x

Bauxite resource depletion is one problem

H* L* Purdy, M. L« Lindahl, and W* A. Garter, Corpor
ate Goneentration and Public Policy. (New York: Prentice-HaTl,
I nc * , 1942 J, p . 218 .
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that has claimed the attention of various experts during the
past few years*

’
the presence of possible new methods of pro

ducing aluminum through the newly invented processes has
called for deeper consideration of the postwar technological
phases of the industry*

Mew fabrication and finishing tech

niques have added to the marketing potentialities of the
metal*

Declines in aluminum production in the period after

cessation of hostilities, with their consequent declines in
quantities of aluminum available for the postwar market,
gave rise to economic problems of significance*

Various

differences in production problems of the older aluminum
plants as contrasted with the newer wartime facilities have
caused a wide variety of comments on this phase of the
Industry since the end of World War II*
Depletion of bauxite resources of the United.States
has been feared in both governmental and private industrial
circles for a number of years.

This fear was noted in the

early discussions concerning the postwar aluminum industry,
and it is of importance to consider just what is meant by
most writers when they refer to such bauxite resource de
pletion*

Several writers, among whom we may mention Profes

sor Engle and his associates, have stated that the rapid
use of our high-grade bauxite ores during the war might
place the United 3tates in the position of a have not nation,
and might make this country dependent qpon outside or foreign
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help 1** case of another war*

This argument, is carried to

its logical conclusion in Chapter XVIII of their book* which
is descriptive of *a program for allocation of world bauxite
7
reserves*0
Pointing to the necessity of arranging for
international agreements concerning bauxite resources, the
writers refer specifically to implementing one of the pro
visions of the Atlantic Charter* which contains the following
3
statement in Article IV:
They (the United States and Great Britain)
will endeavor, with due respect for their exist
ing obligations* to further the enjoyment by
all States, great or small, victor or vanquished,
o£ access* on equal terms* to trade and to the
raw materials of the world which are needed for
their economic prosperity*
little doubt exists that this country would be
interested in some sort of international agreements which
would assure adequate supplies of bauxite in the future*
Repletion of resources in Arkansas has occurred during the
years since 1940* with the result that the industry must rely
upon imported bauxite ores from Surinam to supplement the
domestic output in the postwar period*

Use of lower-grade

ores which are to be found in this country would be possible
in the event of another world conflict, but might delay the
successful rearmament of the United States to a great extent*
International control, assuring adequate allocation of the

6Ibld.. p. 3«9.
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bauxite resources to various consuming nations, had been
suggested, even before the end of the war.

Two types of

international settlement of the bauxite problem were suggested,
each of which was quite different from the other*

The first

plan called for reliance upon the general machinery of the
international government of the United Hat ions to set up a
free world market with effective competition.

This system

would permit the highest bidder in the free world market to
obtain supplies of bauxite.

However, in spite of its element

of laisses~faire economics, it was not felt that it would be
successful in actual postwar practice.

In other words, ”a

free market, therefore, might easily result in a few rich
nations, individuals, or corporations, getting control of the
9
lionfs share of the world*s choicest bauxite resources•”
The second type of international control which was
advocated had to do with the establishment of a permanent
international bauxite allocation board or commission with
adequate power to enforce its decisions.

This power of en-~

forcemeat would be granted by the United Nations, with appeals
possible to a type of international court.

Elaborate pro

visions for this entire program were outlined by the experts
at the University of Washington, but no efforts to implement
these plans for actual practice have been forthcoming in

9Xbld«. p. 390.

Halted Nations circles up to the present time.

Perhaps such

suggestions lor international control of raw materials have
been too far advanced for acceptance by the United Nations
under present day conditions#

If such a program were adopted

the likelihood of another war might be postponed indefinitely,
*

but one must admit that it is merely a matter of conjecture
in 1947*

Such schemes of international cooperation in

economic matters too often become involved with political
issues to become practical realities, although they may still
be desired by a great many nations.

If such a plan for

bauxite could actually be worked out, then international
cooperation in many other raw materials problems might be
easier#

The conclusions reached by the group in Washington

prove to be of interest, particularly the following state-

meats

10
The allocation of bauxite reserves to
consuming nations on the basis of equalizing
the duration of reserves for each country
should not only be considered desirable but
should be looked upon as entirely feasible*#..
Admittedly any program set up for a long period
would have to be kept flexible* An arbitrary
allocation of reserves to uses, however care
fully thought out in advance, would be certain
to need modification from time to tirae*.#*In
conclusion, the authors feel that some such
program as that envisaged##**is an indespensable
prerequisite, not only to a permanent aluminum
Industry in the United States, but to a peace
ful world# A program must be developed which
will not only allow us to preserve and expand

pp. 401-04

our aircraft industry but will also permit the
fulfillment of the rights of other nations.
Through our President we have gone on record
with Britain for free access to the raw materials
and markets of the world as a keystone for inter
national peace policy* It' is only as every
natural resource is brought under scrutiny and
control such as indicated above that the promise
o f the Atlantic Charter can be fulfilled. Bauxite*
as one of the basic materials In the postwar
world* might well be the first to be tackled*
To the extent that such a plan for bauxite resources
indulges in the positive program of suggesting what ought to
be done in the field, it becomes **artrt in the realm of economic
considerations•

Descriptive analysis of the entire problem

of resource depletion was made on a scientific basis, and must
be accepted as indicative of "science* in the field of economics
The issue here, as in other instances of the conflict between
art and science in economics, resolves itself Into a consider
ation of the net result to be accomplished in pointing out
what might be achieved through such a positive program.

The

writer feels that if the cause of world peace can be served
by turning artist at this point, then it is well to suggest
what ought to be done in regard to bauxite, as well as other
essential mineral raw materials*

Cooperation among the nations

of the world is desirable in this respect, and should be en
couraged by all economists and statesmen.
Technological progress In the aluminum industry from
1940 to 1947, coupled with the changing institutional pattern
o f the industry, has called for a different economic evaluation

l&S
of production problems than was possible in prewar years * The
changes in technology have been mentioned in this study be—
fore* mainly in terms of the new processes that have been
employed * or tested in pilot plants*

One of the greatest of

the wartime improvements on the Bayer process of alumina re
duction was the soda—lime—sinter process that made x>ossible
the greater utilisation of low grade ores*

Other processes

for reduction of aluminum from alunite or from various types
o f clays were employed in the pilot plants at Salt Lake City*
Laramie* Salem* and Harleyville*

Even the new process for

thermic manufacture of aluminum* as yet untried in the United
States* may change the production problems of the industry
to an extent am yet unpredictable*

The newer wartime alloys*

with greater strength and durability than any of the prewar
varieties* add to the production potentialities of.the indus
try in terms of satisfying an expanding market*

All of these

developments, in the light of economic theory* are to be
considered as being instrumental in changing the technology
of the industry to provide for both extensive and intensive
use of raw materials in the aluminum industry and to provide
for better types of aluminum products for the consuming public.
This changing technology in the aluminum industry has given
a wider variety of products in the postwar period, and the
hopes for future utilization of the processes appear bright*
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New fabrication and finishing techniques in the
production of aluminum goods have enhanced the position of
the metal in many industrial uses*

Markets for aluminum

products have been expanded in the housing field, where sheet
aluminum has been used in prefabricated houses, both for
aiding and for roofing*

Aluminum foil for wall insulation,

to reduce heat loss and to lessen fire hazard and vermin
infestation, finds a ready market in the postwar world*

A

great variety of reconversion activities after the war re
sulted in the extension of potential markets, as shown in

U
the following statement:
Reconversion of the aluminum industry to
meet the demands of the peace time world is
progressing swiftly* The huge mills that turned
out block and a half long sections of aluminum
sheet during the war for fighter planes and
bombers are now rolling aluminum sheet destined
for farm roofs, truck bodies, and a hundred
other peacetime products* The foil mills that
rolled aluminum foil which played so vital a
role combatting enemy radar, now roll foil for
the packaging of cigarettes, candy bars, and
chewing gum* The giant hammers which forged
aluminum propellor blades, are now turning out
pistons for automotive engines and other
peacetime products*•***An attractive market
for aluminum at the present time is the build
ing industry**•*.Another promising field for
aluminum finishes*.•*.Important progress has
likewise been made in electro-plating alumi
num. ... .Manufacturers of aluminum cooking
utensils promise several innovations in post
war aluminum pots and pans.....Transportation

^"Aluminum Industry Makes heady for feace Demands,*
p.tiirer*s Record, Vol. CIV, (April, 1946), pp* 44^46*
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continues to be one of the principal users of
aluminum with bright prospects for increased
consumption in all fields*
The list of applications of these newly fabricated and
.finished aluminum products is tremendously long*

The fact that

fabrication is one phase of the Indus try with a relatively
large number of producers makes the outlook for the future
more promising.

Fabricators in the past history of the

aluminum industry had to depend on Alcoa for their ingot
aluminum, but with Reynolds and Kaiser interests in com
petition in the field of primary aluminum production, the
field of fabrication should have a greater supply of the
metal for peacetime civilian needs, and should have an even
wider market than it has enjoyed in the past for its products*
It was to be expected that aluminum production would
be curtailed to some extent immediately after the cessation
of hostilities in World War II, mainly because the postwar
prospects for sales of aluminum products could not compare
with the wartime needs for the metal In the aircraft and
other types of industries*

The original cutbacks came as

early as 1943, and the immediate postwar period has seen
further declines In production of certain types of aluminum
products, such as sheet aluminum*

Present* operation of many

of the plants is conducted on a basis of less—than-capacity
production, but this condition has been brought about by
several factors*

The presence of a large amount of secondary

l$$
aXminuii salvaged from a variety of wartime applications,
has affected the market for ingot aluminum to some extentf
and has made the production of virgin metal unnecessary in
the large amounts that were produced during the war, when no
secondary metal was available«

The backlog of civilian de

mand was not as large as the wartime demand of the various
industries which employed the use of aluminum, and this
situation has meant a decline from wartime volume of pro
duction, at least until the market situation clears up*

Post

war markets, in contrast with wartime conditions, actually
needed to be extended through salesmanship and advertising,
and these activities have taken some time and effort on the
part of alumlnnm producers*
The markets for aluminum products are being rapidly
expanded at the present time, and it is reasonable to expect
greater production of the metal in the years to come*

Wider

applications of the metal in a greater variety of industrial,
coronercial and consumer activities will make this possible*
Most observers of the aluminum industry feel, however, that
the peacetime production of the various phases of the industry
will not reach the wartime level, at least for several years*
It may be possible in the long run, provided the potential
markets are thoroughly exploited, both in the domestic and
international spheres*
Differences between the production problems of the
newer wartime plants and those of the older, established

1&9
facilities have been Indicated*

Emphasis has been

placed on the differences arising out of such changed con
ditions as location of plants, transportation problems, and
cost problems brought about by the improved and new pro
cesses and technological structure of the industry*

The

geography of the industry, as it expanded into new and widelydispersed sections of the United States, has given rise to
various comparisons of the newer plants for primary pro
duction of aluminum*

Location of new alumina plants at

Hurricane Creek and Baton Rouge, for example, caused their
production problems to be different from those of the older
plants at Last 3t.Louis, Mobile, and even Listerhill*

The

plant at Hurricane Creek was adjacent to the bauxite areas
of Arkansas, while the plant at Baton Rouge was not as close
to ocean transportation facilities as the plant at Mobile,
but was better situated than the East 3t* Louis facility to
receive foreign ores*

The Baton Rouge plant made use of the

bauxite froa Surinam, which came by ore ship to New Orleans
and was then transshipped by rail up the Mississippi River
Valley to its final destination* Lack of dock facilities at
Baton Rouge prevented ships from proceeding directly to the
alumina plant there*

The various transportation problems

involved represented a change from the institutional structure
of the industry, and in some cases the newer plants were
recognized as the better plants, except for the Baton Rouge
plant, which still is referred to as being uneconomical,

although its continued operation by the Kaiser interests is
expect ed*
Some of the newer aluminum reduction plants were

beneficiaries of the extended governmental power development
program, and were able to get lower power rates for the
electrolytic process of reduction of the virgin metal*

The

plants in the Pacific Northwest have been pointed out as be

ing more economical than some of the older facilities, be
cause they received hydroelectric power from the Bonneville
Power Administration, which channeled power from Bonneville

and Grand Coulee dams into the aluminum industry in that
Plants at Tacoma, Spokane, Longview, and Vancouver

region*

were more advantageously located with respect to power than
the Eastern plants, or even those in California*

Total costs

of the various regions per pound of aluminum produced were
shown by Professor hngle and his associates to be as follows:

Pacific Northwest (private plants).•..**10.63^
Pacific Northwest (DPC plants)•••••••••*10.7##
N ew York State -..•.........*...--*.....10.97^
Alcoa, Tennessee ••••»•*••*••«**»•*•••*.11*57$
Listerliiil, Alabama •*»••••••«•••••**«•*12*15$
Torrance, California *•••••***•*••.*.***12*63$
These figures are indicative of the fact that the
newer facilities built by the Government and private industry
incorporated some of the modern technology that the older
plants did not possess*

More than this, however, was the

12
Engle and others, op. cit*. p. 229*
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combination of* factors of raw material, power, and trans
portation facilities In such a ’way that lower costs result
ed in some of the newer plants.

It will be noted that the

Torrance, California, plant, regardless of its newness,
could be operated only under wartime conditions which covered
its uneconomical operations.

It was one of the very first

plants to be put out of opex^ation when ample aupplies of the
metal were made available, and it has never been placed back
in operation*

The long run analysis of the newer facilities

will have to be made at some future date, because operations
in qll of the plants have been curtailed to some degree up
to the present time in the postwar period.
Postwar Cost Problems in the Aluminum Industry:
Extended statistical analysis of costs in the aluminum
industry is not contemplated here, but a careful consideration
of cost problems is necessary for an interpretation of the
postwar economics of aluminum.

These problems of costs, in

their general nature, are somewhat different from the prewar
considerations, and it is in this respect that they will be
discussed.

The important problems are those connected with

the costs of aluminum ores, aluminum reduction, shipping and
transportation, and fabrication or rolling mill activities.
Wartime studies In all of these specific fields of aluminum
production were conducted at the University of Washington, by
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Professor Engle and his associates, and their conclusions are
to be f o w l in Chapters X and XI of their book*

These studies,

however, were limited in scope, for a variety of reasons which
were mentioned by the authors*

Excerpts from their conclusions

are valuable for consideration here, because they show the
difficulty facing the analyst in the field of aluminum*
of their most pertinent statements are as follows:

borne

13

despite the unsettling effect upon accounting
procedures and summary statements of war-wrought
industrial change within plants, such as new con
struction and the gradual occupation of completed
portions uf plants, changes in sources of supplies
and the accompanying alteration in transportation;
accommodations of o|>erations to new government rules
and to trade union practices; breaking in of new
workers; shortages of materials and supplies; changing
prices and qualities of materials— despite these
dynamic factors, the aluminum industry today is
accounting for production In familiar categories
and in some instances in terms of budgets and standard
costs* The authors found complete costs systems In
privately operated plants throughout the country*
Access to records, however, was not possible, hence
alternative methods had to be followed*
heither are adequate published data available
on separate operations in the industry* Contrary to
the policy of producers of other basic commodities,
more particularly, iron and copper, which publish
cost data on internal operating processes, the
principal aluminum producers have followed the plan
of retaining such information for strictly company
use.*.*.•For the aluminum industry, annual financial
statements have appeared in the published financial
journals for a number of years* Data, however, have
been restricted to the usual condensed balance sheet
**ui brief profit and loss items with such explanatory
notes as were deemed necessary to clear questions of

Ibid.. pp. 206-0>

accounting procedures****.*Sporadic analysis of
alumina and pig aluminum costs have been made from
the very earliest history of the industry by various
writers in professional journals* Mostly theoretical
or blueprint analyses, none of these studies purport
to bear the hallmark of authoritative cost accounting,
which naturally could come from the industry alone.
Various brief analysis of cost conditions in the
aluminum industry have been published since the end of the
war, and they are helpful in the understanding of the general
problem*

It has been generally recognized that the wartime

conditions in the industry were such that many high-cost
factors were Involved, but hope has been expressed that some
of the high—cost factors of production would be reduced in
peacetime operations*

The Defense Plant Corporation plants

erected during the war are the nucleus of effective com
petition In the present day aluminum industry, and a com
parative analysis of their costs is significant*

A brief

statement of the cost situation involved was given in Fortune
magazine (May, 1946} as follows:

14

The major cost items in aluminum smelting are:
alumina, electric power, labor, and carbon electrodes*
Alumina and electric power together make up approxi
mately 60 per cent of the mill cost of pig aluminum,
and are also the most variable cost factors between
one point and another* The whitish-gray powder,
alumina, is produced In separate plants by the standard
Bayer process, using bauxite, soda ash, lime, and fuel
as its chief raw materials* Actually, transportation
is the principal element in the cost of alumina*
Bauxite, at the mine in Surinam, Arkansas, or wherever,
14
pp* 103

"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune* (May, 1946} op * cit*»

ft*
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Is dirt-cheap, but it has to be hauled to the alumina
plant; so, or course, do the other raw materials#
Then the alumina must be transported to the reduction
plant, which in the case of the northwest aluminum
plants during the war, was several thousand miles away*
The cost of alumina in the V/est Coast plants was over
5 cents per pound of ingot# This contrasts with
Alcoa*s prewar (1937) cost of 3*2 cents, which is be
lieved to be about the same today#
Electric power, the second major factor in
aluminum reduction, is required in enormous quantities,
in order to tear the aluminum loos© from the oxygen in
alumina.•*.....The aluminum industry, largest single
user of electrical energy in the U. b., consumed an
estimated 22 billion kilowatt-hours at the 1943 peak*
Cheap power— which usually means hydroelectric power—
is an essential for economical aluminum smelting* In
practically every case, the uneconomical DPC plants
have been made so by excessive power costs..****
The only wartime power costs approximately
competitive with those in Alcoa’s private plants were
attained by the three northwest DPC plants and the
Reynolds Smelter at Longview. These plants— buying
from the Bonneville Power Administration— produced at
an average electricity cost of 2 cents per pound of
aluminum* The other seven plants in the industry paid
from 3*2 to 7-1 cents* To be sure, the government
built several of its plants with the full knowledge
that power costs would make them uneconomical for
postwar operation*
These statements reflect the general economic con
ditions of costs within the aluminum industry, and form a
basis for consideration of a few points of economic theory*
Costs to the aluminum industry are unique In one respect, as
seen in the statement that nthe fortunate thing about aluminum

13
costs is that they are subject to change withoxit notice*"
This statement appears startling on the surface, and probably

15

Ibid
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should not be taken literally without some sort of explana
tion*

An example of the line of reasoning productive of such

16
a statement is the further explanation which stated:
One important change, of course, is represented
by the terms of the Hurricane Greek lease, which
assures new competitors a price of no more than $1*0
a ton for alumina* This knocks off 1 cent a pound
from the wartime? cost of aluminum* If Reynolds can
do as well at Hurricane Greek as Alcoa— which pro
duced at a cost of
during the war— the saving
will be even more. The construction of one or more
alumina plants in the Northwest— using bauxite from
the Dutch East Indies or native aluminous clays—
would mean another 1-ceixt saving on freight costs
to the northwest ingot plants* Alcoa has already
announced plans for an alumina plant in Washington
to supply its Vancouver pot lines, and both Reynolds
and Kaiser are toying with similar ideas*
Plans as outlined above for Alcoa, Reynolds, and
Kaiser have not materialized up to the present time, but
savings in costs may be the impetus that moves these companies
in the future to establish such alumina plants in the Pacific
Northwest*

Complete integration of the aluminum industry of

that region would indicate that an alumina plant, or perhaps
more than one, is necessary to supply the ingot aluminum
reduction facilities that have been operating there since the
war.

If costs can be reduced to the extent indicated, then

postwar competition may force this move, particularly when
such competition becomes more effective in the long run*
Cost conditions in the aluminum industry can change

16

Ibid

r a p i d l y , as shown by the preceding statements, but iaother
point or economic theory should be emphasized at this point*

Ttie typical cost conditions round in the aluminum industry,
according to most writers in the field, are those of de
creasing costs, at least to an extent equal to that found
i n other types of manufacturing enterprises*

This feature

of decreasing costs is chiefly a result of the fact that the
aluminum industry is characterized by relatively large over

head costs*

This does not mean that the industry is topheavy

w i t h overhead costs, however, as illustrated by the following

examples of direct and overhead costs by regions:
Region

Direct Costs
Overhead Costs
(Percentage of total costs)

Pacific Sorthwest (private plants)
Pacific Morthwest (DPC plants)
Torrance, California
H e w York (old plants)
Alcoa, Tennessee
Listerhill, Alabama

(Source:

$2*4

17*6

32*7
#5*2
63*2

17*3
14•&

14*6

66*0
66*3

14*0
13*7

ingle and others, op* cit., p* 230*)

Increases in production of aluminum under the conditons
represented here would cause the per unit cost of aluminum to
be reduced, according to most observers*

At the time of the

great wartime expansion of the aluminum industry, testimony
given by Mr* Reynolds concerning the production of the metal
by his company Indicated the possibilities of lowering the
costs through a greater volume of production#

Although the

subsequent events in the history of the industry did not

produce the result envisioned by Mr. Reynolds, his state
ments in 1941 still are of great interest in our postwar
As recorded in Time (May 26 , 1941)
17
the significant quotation is as follows:
economic considerations.

Richard Samuel Reynolds........told a Senate
Committee that he will produce aluminum for 12 cents
maybe 10 cents— when his Alabama and West Coast
plants get in production. At 10 cents a pound, the
ho. 1 light metal of World War II would cost only
half what it did last year
........
Increases in capacity, reinforced by compe
tition, may some day make even 10 cents per pound
for aluminum look expensive.
This ideal price situation for aluminum did not be
come a reality during World War II, but the postwar scene
is such that it is within the realm of possibility in the
years to come*

ho adequate explanation is forthcoming as

to the reason why aluminum did not go below 15 cents per
pound during the war, other than the fact that many high
cost plants were operating in the country during those years
If postwar economic conditions in the industry in terms of
competition among three producers of primary aluminum result
in vast production programs in the lower cost plants, the
propheey of Mr. Reynolds may become a reality.

The rate

of profits accruing to Alcoa as it carried through three
successive reductions of aluminum early in the defense
period did not decline, and there is no reason to feel that
17

"Maybe 10 Cents; Maybe Less," Time. Vol. XXXVII,
(May 26, 1941), P* 91.
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prodiKSticui in great volume in the postwar world would make

Id
the situation any different*

Both Alcoa and Reynolds made

substantial profits during the war with costs of production

at a high level and the price of aluminum at 15 cents per
pound*

Reynolds Metals Company is reported to have lost

money in the production of ingot aluminum, but apparently
m o r e than made up for such losses in other lines, as shown

by the following statements

19

In spite of Its losses on ingot production,
Reynolds, too, did all right for itself during
toe war* In the six years, 1940 through 1945,
the company* s net earnings after taxes were nearly
$1& million, and its earned surplus grew from
$3 million to #21 million* But Reynolds is in
nothing like Alcoa9s financial clover. The company
still owes $34 million on its RFC loans, while
Alcoa has a #155 million earned surplus against
a debt of $&5 million. In fact, Alcoa financed
its #300 million war expansion with a net increase
of only $50 million in debt.
It should be noted that Alcoa itself conducted profit
able operations during the war, because "the company9s net
20
for 1940-1945 was $199 million."
If such profits can be
attained by these companies during a wartime period, when
prices of labor, materials and transportation are higher than
in normal times, and when the price of aluminum is at the
-g
"Aluminum and the i & i e r g e n c y Fortune. Vol. XXIII,
(May, 1941) * P» 1^4 b*
19
"Aluminum Reborn," Fort tine. (toy, 1946), op. cit.,
pp* 103 ff.
20

Ibid*

15—cent level, it is reasonable to assume that the peace
time prospects for lower costs and lower prices are good
and potentially realisable*
Postwar Aluminum Markets:
Aluminum markets traditionally have been extremely
dependent upon the price situation of the metal, probably
to a greater extent than some of the other metals*

This

fact has been clearly demonstrated by several writers, and
It becomes of paramount Importance in discussing the eco
nomics of the industry to show the potential postwar aluminum
markets available to all of the producers*

One of the most

significant statements concerning this relationship of
alumlmmi markets and aluminum prices Is the following para21
graph from Fortune. (May, 1946):
Price is a weightier factor in aluminum than
in any of the older, established metals. While
aluminum has properties that make it the best
metal available for certain applications (such as
automobile pistons and deoxidizing agent for
steel production), in most cases it competes with
such materials as steel, wood, plastics, magnesium,
and copper solely on a price basis. At any given
time there are millions of pounds of potential
aluminum consumption hanging in the balance between
the comparative prices of aluminum and some other
material, ready to jump one way or the other as
the 3pread increases or diminishes* Other con
siderations, of course-such as economics in main
tenance and the values contributed by aluminum's

21

Ibid

200
light weight— are taken into these computations*
but in the long run, price is the deciding factor.
A number of wartime events contributed to the ex
tension of market potentialities of aluminum.

Xhe 25^

reduction in the price of aluminum after the state of the
defense program (from 20 cents to 15 cents per pound) open
ed up new marketing fields, and if the price goes any lower

a greater expansion of the markets can be expected.

Con

ditions of demand were not the same during the war as they
characteristically are in peacetime, however, and allowances
must be made for the changed nature of the postwar marketing
situations*

Xt was possible during the early stages of the

war to utilise full productive capacities of the various
plants to satisfy the demands of a single market— the United
States Government.

It is easy to imagine that the demand for

aluminum for airplanes and other war material probably would
have been as great even at a slightly higher price than 15
cents*

Winning the war was the prime consideration during

those years, and necessity rather than costs set the pro
duction pattern.

Production of adequate amounts of aluminum

to satisfy the immediate wartime needs resulted in cutbacks
In the industry, and the transition to normal peacetime
pursuits was begun.
Elasticity of demand for aluminum becomes one of the
chief aspects of the postwar aluminum markets.

It is the

determining factor In the extension of the market for the
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metal} and assumes great importance both In the realm of
theory and practice.

Economic theory approaches marketing

situations from two standpoints:

first, changes in demand

arising out of conditions that result in greater amounts of
commodities being taken off the market at the same or higher
prices, and, second, elasticity of demand, which reflects
the extent to which the quantities taken will vary with
22
changes la the prices of coimnodities.
Changes in demand,
of course, can be either increases or decreases of demand,
according to existing economic conditions surrounding the
market.

If, as in the case of aluminum during the war, in

creasing amounts of the metal are absorbed into the market
regardless of the relative stability of the price at 15
cents per pound, a definite shift in the demand curve has
taken place,

budden increases in the need for a commodity

like aluminum can r e m i t in such increases in demand, and
greater production will be needed to satisfy the market*
Such changes can occur in any type of industry, especially in
times of war, extreme prosperity, or institutional and techno
logical changes in an economic society.

Periods of depression,

on the other hand, may result in decreases in demand for such
products, and the markets will suffer.
22
Changes in demand and elasticity of demand are given
adequate treatment in various textbooks on principles of
economics. The discussion here is given in an effort to show
the importance of these economic theories to the aluminum
industry in the study of postwar economics of the metal.
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Mormal peacetime pursuits in an economic system,
however * usually will not result in such rapid changes in
demand*

Kxcept in those Instances where a product can

invade an entirely new market (as aluminum did in the
automobile and the aircraft industries), the short-run
analysis will run more in terms of elasticity of demand
than in terms of rapid changes in demand for any given
industrial product.

Plans may be made by the aluminum

producers to exploit the marketing potentialities of the
metal in new fields, such as streamlined trains, truck
bodies, boxcars, refrigerator cars, skyscrapers, bridges,
or a multitude of other uses, with the result that more
metal will be used in these different ways*

The typical

result of such entry may be dependent upon reductions in
price, however, and will reflect the elasticity of demand
for aluminum by industrial consumers*

If the Industrial

users are convinced of the necessity of using more aluminum
at the same price, the result is a change in demand*

But if

the increased use of aluminum is dependent upon price re
duction, the producers must Investigate the slope of their
demand curve for aluminum in order to determine whether or
not such decreases will be profitable in the long run*
It is reasonable to assume that the demand curve for
aluminum is elastic, the elasticity being greater than unity*
Such an assumption may be based upon a prewar analysis of
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dtaa&d for tho metal as given by Mr* James Wechsler*

Tbs

eonelusion reached by Mr. Wechsler was that the demand curve
for aluaiaua was highly elastic*

He had based his statement

upon a previous conclusion by Robert J* Anderson, a technical
expert in the aluminum industry, who had indicated that a
five—cent decline in the prices of aluminum would result in
23
a five-fold expansion of the demand for the metal*
More
recent studies in the field of aluminum consumption have
indicated that there might have been an error in this prewar
statement, but there is little doubt that the general con
clusion concerning the elasticity of the demand curve for
aluminum is correct*

The demand curve for aluminum may not

approach the horizontal position which is indicated in the
statement by Mr* Anderson, but it is safe to say that the
market for aIraninum will absorb increasingly larger quantities
at lower prices than were charged for the metal in the prewar
years*

The failure by Alcoa to investigate the slope of its

prewar demand curve for aluminum became apparent, because the
company was dedicated in those years to a policy of high and
rigid prices and low volume of production*

23

This fact has

James Wechsler, "United States vs. Alcoa," Hation*
Tel* CXLVII, (October 8-15, 1938), pp. 346-47.
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been adequately shown by prewar studies, such as those con
ducted by the Department of Justice*
24
substantiates the conclusion:

The following statement

•*****the Department of Justice has produced
an immense amount of evidence, some extracted
from the company *s own books, in a n ‘attempt to
prove that Alcoa and twenty one other affiliated
and subsidiary companies have amounted to a
monopoly of the U. S. aluminum business effective
enough to maintain prices and profits inordinately
high and volume unnecessarily low*
More specific conclusions concerning the elasticity
of the demand curve for aluminum have been reached in the
wartime studies made at the University of Washington*

These

studies indicate a high degree of elasticity of demand for
the metal*

The results of the industrial survey conducted

by Professor Engle and his associates during the war pointed
to a great demand for aluminum and the products of aluminum,
and prlc e was indicated to be a deciding factor in much
demand*

Two approaches were pointed out as defining the

market limits for aluminum——technological factors and costs*
The statement is made that the first rule of the aluminum
2-5
market is* "ask the technician*”
If aluminum satisfies
the technical requirements of lightness, strength, dura
bility, or other physical and chemical qualities, the

Aluminum and the Emergency,ft Eortune, Vol* XXIII,
(May, 1941)* P* 67*
2^Engle and others, op. cit*, p. 249*
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problem then becomes one of costs and prices of the metal*
Competitive materials have been mentioned In the study, with
steel, magnesium, copper, and plastics in the role of chief
economic competitors to aluminum, both in technical and cost
aspects.

Ho single product, whether it be steel, aluminum

or any other octal, can enjoy complete monopoly in a market
If there are reasonable and obtainable substitutes.

A great

future awaits all of the Industrials mentioned above, accord
ing to the statement made by Mr. T. 0. Richards, of General

26
Motors Research Laboratories, who said:
The United States will need twice its
steel capacity by I960 and a great deal more
aluminum than the war. peak capacity. If full
employment and high level consumption can be
achieved by the people of the world, in the
years ahead, the big problem will be where
to find enough materials of all kinds, not
where to look for markets.
Results of the University of Washington survey in the
field of aluminum consumption were published in Chapter XII
27
of the book, Aluminum.
Several facts of importance are to
be noted concerning the nature of the survey and the results
of the study from the standpoint of elasticity of demand.
The survey was conducted in the years 1942-1943 with the
purpose in mind of determining the approximate postwar
consumption of aluminum.

A total of 200 companies, widely

^ I b i d .. p. 251.
27Ibld.. pp. 249-69

dispersed both in an industrial and a geographical sense*
constituted the sample taken for the survey*

Questionnaires*

Interviews* letters* and conferences in the field were all
used as means of obtaining the information* with the result
that usable reports were obtained from 135 different com
panies*

The summary of the data obtained bias been given
2d
as follows:
Out of a total of 200 interviews 135 usable
reports were obtained* Of course, 96 companies
reported a prewar annual consumption (1940) of
51 million pounds of aluminum; 75 reported an
expected annual postwar consumption of 65 million
pounds at 15 cents per pound for the virgin metal;
while 61 companies expected to use 104 million
pounds if aluminum were 10 cents per pound* The
sise of the sample is further illustrated by the
data on employment and volume of business reported
by 62 of the companies* These companies gave
employment to a total of 266*300 workers or an
average per firm of 4*600* the range being from
6 employees to 93*000* Volume of business for
these 62 firms totaled #1*600 million in 1940*
an average of $2'6 million per firm, ranging from
#45*000 to #650 million* Of the 62 firms, 27
expeeted an increase of business after the war*
7 expected a decrease and the others no change*
The average increase expected by the 27 was 40
per cent while the decrease anticipated $26
million per firm for the 62 companies reporting
holds for the 135 which supplied usable reports*
the total volume of business in 1940 represented
by the sample was #3*510 million or 30 per cent
o f the total value of expenditures for durable
consumers9 and producers9 goods in which aluminum
was used in 1940*

Ibid*, p. 254
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Fifeures obtained in the course of the survey indicated
an interesting comparison in probable postwar consumption of
almainna in all industries when two prices Tor the metal
were quoted*

At a price of 15 cents per pound, it was in

dicated that demand Tor aluminum by all industries might
reqeh the Figure of 1,428,629*000 pounds*

At the lower

price of 10 cents per pound, it was estimated that the total
29
consumption might approximate 1,890,300,000 pounds*
Other
. estimates were made in the survey, but all of them indicated
a potentially great expansion in the aluminum industry in
the long run if costs were kept low and prices were quoted
with some relationship to the costs involved.

Some partic

ular Industrial fields, according to the survey, indicated
that differences in prices of aluminum would have little or
no effect at all upon their consumption of the metal*

Some

of these industrial categories showing definite inelastic
demands for aluminum are as follows:

railroads, blast-furnaces

and steel mills, aircraft, aluminum foil, busses, radios,
engines——gasoline, diesel, and steam— and hardware*

Con

sumption by these eight Industry groups was estimated for the
postwar period to be relatively stable, regardless of a
price of 15 cents or a price of 10 cents*

29Ibid.. p. 256

Price assumes

ZtJd
much less Importance in such industries, it was stated, be
cause lightness is essential and relatively small quantities
are consumed*
Industries placed into the category of having elastic
demands Tor aluminum constituted a total of 21 in number.
Price was indicated to be of great importance in these in
dustries, where a price of 15 cents per pound would call
forth between 711 and 733 million pounds of aluminum, while
a price of 10 cents would result in a potential demand
between 1,178 and 1,200 million pounds of the metal. 3 0

The

industrial users which indicated the greatest potential
expansion in the demand for postwar aluminum products were
the automobile industry, the architectural and building
Industry, truck trailer manufacturing, and electrical regu
lators and switches production.

Competition with other

materials was pointed out as being a decisive factor in
the price—demand relationships in these industries.
All of these facts from the survey constitute im
portant food for thought in the economic theory of postwar
economics of the aluminum industry.

Events that have taken

place in the field of aluminum fabrication since the war
ended bear directly on the whole problem.

Ibid.. p. 258.

Assuming that
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certain industrial groups did Indicate that their demand
lor aluminum was relatively inelastic, the situation does
not preclude the possibility of changes in the demand curves
lor these users of aluminum*

The railroad industry may be

taken as Illustrative of the situation*

It was indicated

as an important demander of aluminum* but demand was regarded
as relatively inelastic*

Potential postwar demand was pre

dicated upon the assumption that- the railroad industry would
use as much aluminum at 15 cents as it would at 10 cents per
pound*

This could be true* but the situation does not

preclude the possibility of an entire change in the demand
curve for aluminum in the railroad Industry, as it might
occur when streamlined trains* refrigerator cars, and
boxcars can be made of aluminum in competition with steel*
This is an important consideration to Alcoa and to Reynolds
both* because each company already has made a bid for mar
kets in the railroad industry*

The race for additional

marketing outlets became so torrid at one time that both of
these companies made claims of having built the first
31
aluminum boxcar*
Such competitive enterprise as this
could result in gaining many new markets and changing the
so-called inelastic demand areas into profitable outlets
by changing their demand curves*

Aluminum Reborn,H Fortune * (May, 1946),

pp. 103 ff.

op
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Areas of elastic demand in the aluminum industry ©an
he cultivated by aluminum producers through the processes of
cost reductions accompanied by price reductions*

This would

be in direct contrast with the situation in prewar years, when
monopoly power maintained a wide gap between costs and prices
in the aluminum industry.

An economic philosophy of abundance,

with constant close relationships between costs and prices,
and with profits being earned on the basis of large volume
of output and low unit profits, could result in greater con
sumption of aluminum products throughout the country and
substantial returns to all three producers in the field of
aluminum production as of 1947*
The philosophy of scarcity practiced by Alcoa from
its Inception, restricted production and high prices (with
low voltoae of output and high returns per unit) could be
the future bane of the aluminum industry of the United States.
It could hurt consumers and producers alike, and would result
in the curtailment of aluminum consumption and the lowering
of the standard of living for the people as a whole.

Both

elasticity of demand and changes in demand can be carefully
watched by the producers, with the possibility that greater
and wider markets for the metal can be cultivated and main
tained.

These new market possibilities will not open up

automatically^ but they can be ncultivated sedulously, not
only through cost and price reductions but also by developing
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m e w alloys, sow fabrication methods, and other adaptations

32
o f the versatile n e w metal to new uses*"
Regional markets for aluminum in the postwar period
a r e o f interest in economic analysis of the industry, mainly
b ecau s e o f the geographical differences between producing
a re a s and eventual marketing areas for the metal*

No exact

d a ta are available for a full consideration of this problem,
b u t the statement has been made that "only about 37 to

k>6

p er cent o f the probable total market for aluminum lies in
t he geographical regions in which the reduction plants are
found*

In other words, over half the market lies in in

dustrial centers chiefly in the vicinity of the Great takes

33
i n whi c h no reduction plants exist*”

This market situation

i s shown in a general w a y in the following table of estimates
m a d e In the University of Washington survey*

The percentages

g i v e n represent estimates made during the war, but this general
a n a l y s i s fits the postwar situation adequately enough to be
o f economic significance*
Xt will be seen from these data that the reduction
plants in the Northeastern region of the United States have
a n adequate

market close to the production facilities*

32I b i d .
Engle and others, o p . clt., p. 34#•

The
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market la that gaographleaX region is even greater than the
local capacity to furnish aluminums ingot*

Other regions in

the United States are in the position of having to obtain
markets outside of their oiaa territory of production*

The

Southeastern region and the Pacific Northwest, in particular
offer scant marketing potentialities in comparison with the
m O f t a t ! hut their aluminum reduction facilities ar© great*
TABLE V
REGIONAL MARKET l FOR ALUMINUM

Geographic Region

Mertheast
Southeast
Pacific Sorthwest
Southwest
Midwest
Bourses

Protable Percentage
of U* 3* Postwar
Market for Aluminum

Probable Percentage
of U, 3* Aluminum
Reduction Capacity
after the War
15-20
35-40
30-35
10-15
0

30-35
1-3
1-3
5-7
53-62

Engle and others, o u » cit*. p* 346#

The Midwest region has no aluminum plants within its borders,
yet constitutes potentially more than one-half of the market
fear a l u d s m i in the peacetime years*

Consumer costs of the

metal must include transportation costs, and for this reason
the marketing problem In the Industry Is intensified*

The

smmary analysis made In the University of Washington survey
Indicated that the various producing regions would ship to
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those Biarkets which would yield the highest net profits
over costs 9 with both rail and water transportation fticill**
tie® being considered in the various cost analyses*

Careful

and extensive studies would be necessary to determine the
exact potentially best market for each producing facility,
both in terms of ingot aluminum and sheet aluminum*

There

are possibilities of more aluminum consumption in the South-*
east* Pacific Northwest, and Southwest, but the producer®
of aluminum probably will have to consider the necessity of
i

carrying out adequate sales and advertising program® in order
to cultivate the markets*
Labor and Labor Relations in

the Aluminum Industry:

Many facts of economic significance present themselves
to the historian of labor and labor relations in the aluminum
industry, of the United States*

The Industry itself long has

been noted as one which demands an intelligent and highly
trained labor force, because the nature of the operations in
the various type© of plants is such that skilled laborers
are in constant demand*

The character of the Industry in

prewar years was such that little more than 30,000 workers
were employed, even as late as 1939, and the industry ranked
about fiftieth among the nation* s industries in terms of the
number of employee®•

iimployment increased rapidly, however,

during the defense and wartime periods, and it has been
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estimated that by 1943 a total of 140,000 persons were at
work throughout the aluminum industry*

This enlarged labor

fore# placed the aluminum industry among the ten leading
industries of the United States, judging by the number of
workers employed*

Postwar operations have not demanded the

l a r g e labor force that was employed during the height of

wartime activities, but employment in the aluminum industry
remains at a high figure*

Mo exact data are available on

total employment for the industry at the present time, but
it is to be assumed that with all three producers in the
field of primary production operating steadily (although
not at full capacity) the wage-earning group is large*
34
the words of the University of Washington observers:

In

The evidence is conclusive, however, that
the aluminum industry is rapidly coming of age,
and may even be.classed among the dozen indus
tries in the United States which employ 100,000
workers or more* Effective use of man power is
also indicated by the fact that the number of
workers did not increase as greatly as did
output *
Wages and earnings'in the aluminum industry have shown
steady advances in recent years, In the same manner that pay
ments to all employees have Increased*

During the war the

Labor Department classified the aluminum industry as being in
the group of industries which pay the highest wages in the
United States*

Hourly wage rates advanced rapidly in aluminum

^ I b i d ** pp. 103-04
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manufacturing after 1940* ao that by the middle of 1943 they
were 40$ higher than in the former year#

Variation in wage

rates has been noticeable among the different geographical
regions* but explanations have been made that such variation
is due to differences in skill, the nature of the work* and
the prevailing wage rate structure of the regions involved.
A trend toward greater uniformity of wages throughout the
industry has been noted* but some questions have been raised
as to the advisability of making a sudden change that would
give the same wage rates in every section of the country# The
issue was raised by the Aluminum Workers of America as early
as 1942* on the assertion that labor should receive equal pay
for equal work regardless of the section of the country in
volved#
The War Labor Board, taking cognizance of the issue
presented in regard to uniform wage rates, granted increases
during the war to Southern laborers in the aluminum industry#
The increases were based upon such factors as ability of the
companies to pay the higher wages, costs of living in the
geographical regions involved, and the iw^odiate effects on
war production to be encountered as a result of higher wages#
Wo general principle of standardization was ever affirmed by
the War Labor Board, however, that wage rates throughout the
country should be standardized immediately.

The general
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philosophy of the Board in this respect is given in the
>5
following statement:
The majority is satisfied that complete
elimination of the differential would have
an undesirable disrupting effect at this time
on the general economy of the areas involved*
Since Southern industries generally are adjusted
to prevailing differentials, a sudden elimina
tion of the differential in a major industry,
such as aluminum, is bound to disrupt directly
and Indirectly the wage and labor policies of
many other industries*
Eventual standardisation of wage rates on a nationwide basis
was envisioned by the Board, but the process was looked upon
as one which would be gradual over a period of years*

A

general trend in all types of industries toward elimination
of regional differences is a recent characteristic of the
economy of the United States, apparently, and if the trend
continues in the future some of the regions with lower wage
rates will have noncompetitive advantage over other regions
in the production of aluminum*

Other considerations will

occupy more attention than costs of labor if such a move
takes place*

Power resources and technological improvements

may, under such conditions, claim more and more attention
than the wage situation in the aluminum industry*
/

One of the most pertinent facts that bear on friendly
relations between labor and management in the industry is the

35Ibld.. P. 106
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relatively m a l l size of* the cost or labor as compared with
the final selling price of the finished aluminum product*
This relationship is of importance, as seen in the following

36
analysis:

Before the war, labor costs, in the reducing
stage alone, were less than 5 per cent of the
selling price of aluminum* Although the share
of labor cost has increased tremendously since}
the wax, by 1943 it was still under 10 per cent
o f the price of the product* Therefore, the
operators can afford to be fair or even generous
with their personnel* Furthermore, up to a
recent period, there being only one aluminum
producer in the industry made it easier to pass
on to the consumer increases in labor cost* In
a monopolistic situation, management and labor
are frequently allied against consumers*
Strangely enough the most delicate situations
have not arisen between labor and management
but have come from jurisdictional conflicts
between unions*
A high degree of unionism has characterised the

aluminum industry for many years*

Onion organisation in all

the plants except Niagara Falls has become complete in the
various phases of mining of ores, alumina reduction, and ingot'
reduction*

Unionization exists in rolling, extruding and

forging plaints, but not to the great extent that it is found
in the three phases given above*

The familiar union device

o f the closed shop is very rare,, although collective agree

ments between unions and the management of a majority of

Ibid.■ p. 113.

plants are In operation*
exist*

Two types of union organisation

Reynolds plants, and some independent .firms 9 are

characterised by the union shop*

Facilities operated by

Alcoa have been known for their maintenance of membership
37
provisions*
Both the American Federation of Labor and the

Congress of Industrial Organisation have gained footholds in
the aluminum industry, and each organization has a great deal
ef strength*

Neither organisation, however, has any claim

to outstanding superiority, although the C* I. 0. unions have
slightly greater strength than those of the A* F* of L»

The

plants of the Reynolds Metals Company are under the union
domination of the A* F. of L*, while other companies (Alcoa
and Raiser interests) are chiefly controlled by C. 1* G.

^ " I n a maintenance of membership, shop employees

who were members on a specified date must remain in good
standing as a condition of employment, but old employees
who have not joined the union can retain tneir jobs with
out belonging* New or old employees who join che union
subsequent to the agreement must maintain good standing
or lose their jobs*

"Under the union shop all employees must be
members of the union in good standing as a condition of
employment* The employer makes his own selection for
hiring, but the new employee must join the union within
a specified time* The union collects dues and each new
employee, after the specified time, must be a member of
the union•*
See 4* E* Walters, Personnel Relations*
(Sew York: The Ronald Press Company, 1945), pp • 48-49*
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official®, such as the Aluminum Workers Unions the Mine,
Mill anti Smelter Workers Union, and the 01© Casting Worker®

Union*
Jurisdictional strife arising out Qf the conditions
in the aluminum industry caused trouble during the war, when
various union groups competed for recognition in some of
the plants*

A great amount of squabbling took place at the

Cleveland, Ohio, plant of Alcoa, in 1942#

This conflict was

a battle between four different union factions, as follows:
(1) the American Federation of Labor; (2) the Aluminum
Workers of America (C#I*0#); (3) the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers (C#I*0#}; and (4) the United Mine Workers, district
50 (under John L# Lewi®)#

32

Another crippling strike occurred

in Alcoa*8 plant at Edgewater, New Jersey, early in March,
1941# nb a time when the defense program was in full swing
39
and aluminum product® were needed«
Fortunately for the

^ T w o articles appearing in Business Week at the time
are of interest: (a) "Alcoa Feud; FB± and Army Investigate
Work Stoppages at Cleveland," Business Week. (June 13, 1942),
pp# $5-26; (b) "Alcoa*s Headache; Jurisdictional Strife Growl
ing in Cleveland Plant," Business Week# (August 1, 1942),p#56«
^" S trike Cripples Aluminum Company Plant in Edg©water,
New Jersey," Commercial and Financial Chronicle# (March 14,
1941)9 P- 1 6 2 2 7 and "Siployees of the Aluminum Co# of America
Plant Return to Work Fending a Settlement of Uispute," Com
mercial and Fipapojpj Chronicle* (March 29, 1941), P- 2000.
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defense and war efforts* 'these strikes were settled in such
a manner as to assure continued production of the plants* and
the Industry was not plagued with other big strikes during
the period of hostilities*

Amicable relations apparently

hare continued thus far since the war* because no additional
X&bor troubles have threatened on a large scale during the
past two years*
Many additional women secured jobs in the aluminum
Industry during the war*

This situation arose as a result of

the manpower shortage* but the employment of great numbers
o f women resulted not only in the alleviation of the tem-

porary shortage* but also in the determination of the fact
tha t women were suitable for a wider variety of jobs in the

industry*

An account of the employment of women by Alcoa

was given by Mr* R. C. Turner* who stated that women
40
employees of his company were "doing an excellent job*”
He recalled that the employment of women in the aluminum
Industry dated back before World War I* but indicated that
jobs given to female employees in those days were specialised
tasks such as packing* inspecting, and sorting*

In dis

cussing the World War II situation, Mr* Turner stated that

C. Turner, "Manpower Crisis; Putting Women to
Work on More and More Jobs— —Alcoa," Factory Management *
. Vol. Cl, (Bovember, 1943), PP* 39-94*
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^occupations are varied, ranging from crane operators to

41

inspection supervisors.11

Pictorial displays accompanying

bis article gave ample p r o d of* the wide range of* aluminum
Industry operations handled by women during the war, with
a sample of sixteen pictures showing as many different tasks
performed by women*

It is not possible to determine the

exact number of women in the aluminum industry today, but
it is reasonable to as some that many lost their jobs when the
%

wartime emergency was over*

The number remaining in the

industry would be greater than prewar years, presumably,
because o f the greater productive facilities and operations
la the field of aluminum at the present time*
P r o b l « f* of Monopolistic Competition in the
A l m d m a Industry of the United States;
Studies in economic theory during the past two decades
have brought forth several works of importance in the field
42
of monopolistic competition*
These treatises have dealt
with the middle ground between strict monopoly and effective

^Ibid*
^Significant in the field have been such books as
the following: Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic
Competition- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933);
Joan Robinson, Tfte Economics o£ top erf e,qt Competition,
(London: The Macmillan Company, 1933)»
Robert friffin,
Mono poll stic Competition £&d General Kquijibtii^
(Caaihridge: Harvard University Press, 1940)*

222
competition as they traditionally have appeared in principles
o f economics*

The applicability of the ideas concerned with

imperfect competition to the aluminum Industry may be readily
seen in a variety of ways.

They will be treated in this

section from the standpoints of product differentiation,
substitution, and competitive materials in the industrial
and commercial world*
Product differentiation in the field of monopolistic
competition was one of the basic ideas presented by Professor
Chamberlin,

Differentiation is one of the means of making

c o m o d i ties appear to be different*

lack of homogeneity is

one of the chief elements in such differentiation*

Goods

under perfect competition would be homogeneous 9 but under
a system of product differentiation each producer attempts
to make his own product appear superior in some way*

Vari

ations in products may take a variety of forms, as shown
by Professor Chamberlin*s statement:

43

A general class of product is differentiated
if any significant basis exists for distinguish
ing the goods (or services) of one seller from
those of another* Such a basis may be real or
fancied, so long as It is of any importance what
ever to buyers, and leads to a preference for
one variety of the product over another* Where
such differentiation exists, even though it be
slight, buyers will be paired with sellers, not
by chance and at random, (as under pure competi
tion), but according to their preferences.

^^Edward Chamberlin, o p . cit* * p. 56
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Differentiation may be based upon certain
characteristics of the product itself, such as
exclusive patented features; trade-m&rics; trade
names; peculiarities of the package or container*
if any; or singularity in quality* design* color*
or style* It may also exist with respect to the
conditions surrounding its sale*
Postwar economic analysis of the aluminum industry
of the United States shows certain aspects of product
differentiation similar to those mentioned above*

The patent

situation* which appears quite different today from what it
was before the war* has brought about a significant change*
Previous treatment has been given to the fact that certain
basic patents were turned over to the Government* license
free* by Alcoa early in 1946*

This action established the

possibility for a more adequate type of competition in the
industry*

tee of the recent comments made on aluminum
44
mwmT

patents by the War Assets Administration is as follows:
There are no subsisting product patents
o n either alumina or aluminum as such* The
majority of the alloys made from aluminum are
likewise free of patents* However, Alcoa has
~a few patents covering special alloys of alumi
num with other metals* These alloys are said
to amount to only about 10 per cent of the
total sales of aluminum alloys* Alcoa had in
dicated a willingness to grant licenses to
postwar operators* in most cases at a royalty
of one—quarter of 1 cent per pound• In certain
other cases the royalty aspect remains as yet
undetermined *

44

Aluminum Plants and Facilities* &£•

, PP- 10-11,
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Original patents In the aluminum industry did give
mono poll stic power to Alcoa, but such power has been greatly
dim inished as a result or recent events in the industry*. Some
o f the patents had run out, of course, even before the begin**
ning of the defense program, but the history of* the Industry
has shown that no other company had dared to compete with
Alcoa until Reynolds established entry into the Industry*
Professor Chamberlin mentions the fact that occasionally
patents will stimulate competition in an industry through
the development of rival processes*

This possibility did

not hntwime a reality in the aluminum industry during prewar
years, since the electrolytic process continued to be used*
Sven today no rival process has been proved to be of enough
significance to take the place of electrolysis in aluminum *
reduction*

But both Reynolds Metals Company and the Kaiser

Interests are in the field substantially at the present time,
and the result may be great exploitation of potential new
processes*

It may be possible for such a process as the

Loevenstein thermic manufacturing process to be proved
i
economically practicable, although nothing definite can be
«ald of it at present*

In any event, it is reasonable to

state that the postwar economics of the industry insofar
as patents are concerned shows a trend away from the
strictly monopolistic elements of prewar years*

Certain

process patents still have an aura of uncertainty about
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them* particularly (1) the direct--"chill"--casting of
ingot prior to fabrication* (2) the synthetic cryolite
and aluminum fluoride process* and (3) some miscellaneous
processes pertaining to heat treating* fluxing and de-

45
gassing the metal.

The extent of licensing of these

patents* or of permitting them to be used on a royalty
basis* may be the determining factor in monopolistic com
petition in terms of patents and product differentiation in
the future*
Trade names* as indicated by Professor Chamberlin
and other writers* have great influence in most fields of
marketing of products* and aluminum is no exception in
this respect*

Prewar sales o f a variety of aluminum

products were made under the trademark^ of Alcoa and others
in the field of altxminisa fabrication.

"Bohnalite" pistons

were sold by the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation,
"lynite" pistons were sold by Alcoa* and in some Instances
enjoyed the greater advantage of reputation established for
them by the company.

Aluminum ware* particularly kitchen

utensils* was sold under a great variety of trade names*
such as "Mirro," "Pure Aluminum^" "Wear-Ever*" "Princess*"
"Eureka," and "American Maid*"

Some of these products

^ I b i d A p. 10.

Hendershot, o p » cit.. p. 166. Alcoa exercised
control over some of the companies producing aluminum ware,
and gave them the advantage of its reputation*

enjoyed an advantage of reputation established by Alcoa,

also*
To the extent that both Reynolds and Kaiser products
are on the market today, and will compete with the prewar
trademarks In the H e l d of aluminum, this type of product
differentiation will assume importance.

The element of

monopolistic competition will continue to exist, inasmuch
as any trademark at all adds the monopolistic character in
the markets*

"Kaiser Aluminum," distributed by Permanents

Products Company, may assume an important role in the
aluminum industry, and the Reynolds Metals Company*s trade
mark (a representation of St* George and the dragon) may be
just as important in the postwar scramble for markets.

Both

Kaiser and Reynolds have made great strides in gaining
recognition for their aluminum products, and if both stay
in the field this element of product differentiation will

become increasingly important*
Specific qualities of lightness, conductivity, high
strength (in alloy aluminum), and resistance to corrosion

add a phase of monopolistic competition to aluminum*

This

was true in the prewar markets, and is carried over to the
postwar marketing situation*

Such qualities give aluminum

an advantageous position in certain industrial and commercial
applications, and may serve to aid in the extension of the
metal into many new fields*

Greater use of aluminum already

has been noted in connection with the automobile, railroad

and building trades industries, and the trend probably will
b e continued»

Aluminum, which was an essential and even

®critical® metal during the war, will continue to have
Sjpecific applications in many phases ©f industry and com**
m e r e e through the years to come*

Conditions or sale in the aluminum industry were
I m p or t an t features prior to World War II*

It was charged

many times that prices were determined for the market, and
met in it, and that the degree of control exercised by Alcoa
i n regard to sales of its products was almost absolute* Even

la the field o f aluminum ingots this charge had validity be~
f e r e t he war, a n d in the sales of various fabricated aluminum
products it was more apparent*

The entry of other producers

int o the field has changed this condition in the industry to
& great extent, and aluminum consumers at least have a better
t

c ha n ce o f evading undue pressure from any one company when
purchases are made*

Scarcity economics, as a philosophy

acceptable to the aluminum industry, may be supplemented by
a philosophy of abundance, but in all probability such a
g r e a t change will be
m a n y years*

Selling

accomplished only over a period of
costs will continue to be an important

element in the aluminum Industry, because all of the companies

will be called upon to do more advertising of their products,
A great deal of ninstitutional advertising” was done by Alcoa
and others throughout the war, in spite of the fact that no
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great amounts of* aluminum products for civilian consumption
were being put upon the market*

Specific advertising of

specific products will be more characteristic of the peace
time advertising program of all companies concerned with
aluminum and products derived from the metal*
Discussions of competition of aluminum with other
metals, wood, and plastics have been prevalent in the
literature of recent years*

The possible substitution of

the other materials for aluminum has been given a great
amount of attention, particularly from the angle of prices
f o r the metal in comparison with prices for other reasonably

good substitutes•

Goods of all types face this eventuality,

however, because it is characteristic of the modern economic
society to seek substitutes if any one material becomes too
highly monopolised or too high in price*

Even patented

products are "subject to the competitionoof more or less
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imperfect substitutes,"

and alis&inum must face the com

petition from several directions*

Metallic substitutes

are at hand in the form of steel, copper, tin, lead,
magnesium, etc*, all of which can compete in most fields
on a basis of price

many fields on a basis of technical

and chemical properties*

Magnesium, in particular, as it

^Chamberlin, o p * clt *,

p9 £$*
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has been developed during the last few years, looms as one
o f the greatest competitors of aluminum in the field of light
metals#

A most illuminating chapter on magnesium is con—

tained in the book by Professor Engle and his associates#
The postwar position of magnesium is secure, and it may
become one of the greatest threats of aluminum in a variety
o f ways*

Plastic materials, together with wood, will

continue to play important roles as effective competitors
to both aluminum and magnesium*
Problems of International Competition and Cartels
In the Postwar Aluminum Industry:
Conditions of domestic monopoly in the production of
primary

have been alleviated considerably in the

alvBBinum Industry of the United States during the years from
1940 to 1947*

Disposal of government plants to two competi

tors of Alcoa resulted in prospects for peacetime competition
in this country*

Plans as announced by both Reynolds and

Kaiser Indicate the

coi tinuance of these two companies in

various phases of the industry.

But the big problem of

international competition 'must yet be faced.

It Is this

probability of International competition, or the lack of
it through Influences brought to bear by cartels, that
concerns us briefly at this point.

^ E n g l e and others, <j£. eit.. Chapter XVII.

Ciscussions of possible international competitive
conditions in the industry since the end of the war have
revolved chiefly around the possibility of Canadian competi49
tlon in the field of primary production*
Genuine concern
has been shown by domestic producers, to the extent that
fear has been expressed that Canadian aluminum may invade the
American market in large quantities*

The fear is based upon

the fact that costs of production admittedly are lower in
Canada, and that it might be possible to invade the markets
of the United States in spite of the tariff on aluminum*
Costs of production are based to a great extent on costs of
hydroelectric power, and power costs at the world famous
Shipshaw development are lower than those in the United
States*

As unusual feature connected with waterpower

development in that area is the fact that financial assis
tance of the United States was instrumental in the wartime
expansion of the Canadian aluminum and power industries*
This cost phase has been described in a most interesting

^ T y p i c a l of such discussions are the following
articles which show the trend of thought on Canadian
aluminums
(a) "Aluminum Reborn," Fortune. (May, 1946), oja.cit.
(b) "Canadian Aluminum Price Cut May Capture World
Market," Iron Age. Voli CLVII, (May 9, 1946), p. 119*
(c) "Kingdom of the Saguenay— Canada," Iron jVge,
Vol. CLV, (April 5, 1945), pp* 113~14*

231
and convincing manner by Fortune (May, 1946), and Is quoted
here In full, as follows:
From the power-cost angle, however, the
chief threat to the new aluminum competition
is not Alcoa but its dear friend and relation,
the Aluminum Co* of Canada, ltd* Alcan, a minor
subsidiary of Alcoa until 1923, is now bigger
than its putative parent* From? a 1939 ingot
capacity of 175 million pounds, Alcan shot up
to a capacity of over one billion pounds—
making the company the largest producer in the
world* More important from the standpoint of
competitors, its capacity is geared to the
world9s largest private hydroelectric power
developaent——the fabulous Shipshaw project on
the Saguenay River in Quebec* Alcan, using
Shipshaw power {peak capacity: over a million
kilowatts#, can produce aluminum at an energy
cost of half a cent per pound* Other factors
make it possible for Canadian aluminum to be
delivered at a cost of 7 to £ cents, while the
best II* 3* cost prospects are 10 to 11 cents*
The reason is simple if slightly amazing*
A lean9s war expansion--which Included the $70million Shipshaw development and a $12 3-million
investment in aluminum production facilities—
was financed by advances and loans from the b*S«,
British, and Australian governments* A total
o f $63,500,000— or almost enough to build
Shipshaw— was advanced interest free by the
0* S. Metals Reserve Company in 1941 and 1942,
on contracts providing for the eventual delivery
of 1*4 billion pounds of Canadian aluminum*
(Three per cent interest was applied retro
actively after a mighty squawk by the Truman
Committee in 1943*) The Canadian Government—
public—power—conscious as it is supposed to
be— also contributed its bit by allowing
"accelerated amortization0 from Alcan9s war
profits of $164 million out of the total $193
million investment* The British Government
too, chipped in by providing abatement of its

^"Aluminum Reborn,* Fortune* (May, 1946),
pp* 103 fT*

cit»f
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#55*600,000 loans to the extent# that no postwar
use was made of the facilities built by the loans*
But the U* S*——laying aside the argument
that Alcan was able to fill this country* s
aluminum needs at a critical time for all the
Allies— paid the Canadian piper through the
nose* Escalator clauses in the contracts brought
the average price to l£*6 cents a pound* The
difference between that and the American price
resulted in payment of over #40 million more
for Canadian aluminum than would have been paid
to U* S* producers* Because of the rigid contract
terms* Canadian aluminum was pouring in when U*S*
production was being cut back, and today the
entire government-surplus stockpile of 371 million
pounds of primary aluminum has the Made-in-Canada
sign on it* Furthermore, U* S* power projects—
which would have made earlier production in this
country possible— were curtailed while Shipshaw
got double-A priorities for generator shafts and
other critical materials*
Alcan, dismissing the conclusions of the
Truman Committee* the Senate Small Business
Committee, and other U* S. investigating agencies,
says it got nothing out of the deal but a white
elephant that is now generating "more taxes than
electricity*** But looking further into the future,
It is noteworthy that Aluminium, Ltd*— the holding
company that was established by Alcoa to take over
most of its foreign properties in 192B— owns not
only Alcan but a worldwide system of bauxite mines,
transportation facilities* power projects, and
alumina* reduction, and fabricating plants In
Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Italy*
Switzerland* Sweden, Norway, Spain, India, and
China* The majority of stockholders of Aluminium,
Ltd*, and Alcoa are identical, and the formerfs
President, Edward K* Davis, is the brother of
the latter*s Chairman, Arthur V* Davis* Whether
o r not Alcoa encourages Alcan to jump the 3~C€snt
U* 3* tariff wall with a certain amount of lowcost Canadian aluminum remains to be seen* But
it could*
The role of the United States in various dealings
with the Canadian aluminum Industry has

b en the subject of

rather caustic analysis by Charlotte Muller, who as early a©

1945 pointed out the economic Implications of Canadian
competition with United States aluminum producers,*

Excerpts

from her article, "Aluminum and Power C o n t r o l s h o w the
51
reactions of many observers, as follows:
Broader implications of the way in which
Shipshaw was built and paid for are of public
interest# The source of the Shipshaw funds is
the advances and loans of the United States
supplied to a private enterprise for power
construction under unprecedented conditions*
Ro control over the project is retained by the
United States*....The Government of the United
States retains no title to the plant it has
taught into being through financial contribu
tions* This nans counter to the practice of the
Defense Plant Corporation, instrument of federal
financing of wartime industrial investment with
in our borders*
(The Metals Reserve Company,
which negotiated the Canadian contracts for
the United States is, like the DFC, a subsidiary
o f the Reconstruction Finance Corporation*}

Meanwhile, construction of public projects
and transmission lines in the United States was
curtailed by the Office of Production Management
and by the War Production Board on grounds that
a shortage of essential materials and generators
prevented their completion* Four million kilo
watts scheduled for utilisation in 1944 or later
were cancelled, about half of this amount being
public construction at Grand Coulee, TYA, Shasta
and Keswick Dams in California, etc*****
Advocates of public power fear the postwar
consequences of the grant of financial resources
to Shipshaw* * * *.Because of low power and labor

^Charlotte Muller, "Aluminum and Power Control,”
Public Utility Sfi2Q2jBaiaa> Vol* KXX,
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coats, Shipshaw will be in an advantageous
position to moot competition from any DPC
aluminum plants in the United States which
might Tall into independent hands after the
war* Alcan will indeed be able to lead the
world in aluminum production. With the aid
o f cheap Saguenay power Alcan, it is pre
dicted, will cut aluminum prices below those
of copper, and aluminum will replace gold as
the chief Item in the Canadian balance of
payments. While this potential development
would be a boon to aluminum users the world
over, it might remain merely potential, or at
least might not be brought to full realisation
for some time, if Alcan should be able to take
a leading part in forming a new world cartel*
The Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd., did cut prices
ob

ingot aluminum to a level of 13*25 cents per pound about

the middle o f 19M>»

This represented a price in the United

States equivalent to 12*04 cents per pound, when converted
Into U. S. currency*

The low price was still not competitive

with American aluminum, however, because the tariff of three
cents per pound tended to equalise the Canadian and American
prise situations.

It was pointed out at the time that the

lowering of the price was not made in contemplation of pro
motional activities in the United States.

The new low price

did give the Aluminum Company of Canada an opportunity to
dominate the market for ingot aluminum in other countries.
The potential productive capacity of the company’s plants—
at Arvlda, Beauharnois, Isle Malign©, La Tuque, and Shawinigan
Falls— could be used effectively in world-wide competition for
alumlmmi markets.

Comment in Pittsburgh, Alcoa headquarters,

was significant, since it was indicated that "additional labor
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costs and operating costa have narrowed down the margin of
profit on aluminum so that price cutting at this time is
52
unwarranted in the American market•”
This was the reaction
In 1946, at the time aluminum was selling at 15 cents per
pound in the American markets, and apparently still Is the
philosophy of all three producers of aluminum in the United
States*

The price of almnlnum made in the United States

probably can be held at 15 cents for several years, especially
i f prosperity continues*

Alcoa would not start such a price

reduction campaign, because the company might face charges
of a price war with the new competitors*

The Reynolds Metals

Company and the Kaiser interests would not want to cut prices,
because they are both relatively new in the aluminum Industry
and might be classified as infant industries desiring the
high prices in order to continue profitable operations*

Low

ering of the tariff barrier might be the economic solution
to the problem, but such a move would find much political
opposition In Congress*
The question of a postwar international cartel in the
aluminum industry is one which involves a special study,
which Is not within the scope of the present survey of the
wnwq industry*

Some pertinent facts may be presented,

^"Canadian Aluminum Price Cut May Capture ttforld
Market,” Iron Agfi, (May 9, 1946),
sit.
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however, to show the possibilities inherent in the situation*
Much has been written about the prewar international aluminum

53
cartels*

Two distinct and widely divergent streams or

thought have arisen in regard to prewar participation of
Alcoa in the international aluminum cartel activities* One
stems from the writing of Dr* Louis Marlio, prewar chairman
o f the International Aluminum Cartel from 1926 to 1939, and
for twenty years managing director of the French Aluminum
Company*

Dr* Marlio, according to Dr* Harold G. Moulton,

of the Brookings Institution, was in a position to write
with authority about the aluminum cartel*

The statement

made by Dr* Marlio concerning Alcoa is of significance, and
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it is quoted as follows;
It should be stated here that the Aluminum
Company of America did not participate in any of
the aluminum cartels with which the author was
associated* While shareholders of the Aluminum
Company of America own a majority of the shares
of stock of the Aluminium Company, Ltd*, of
Canada, the latter is not a subsidiary corpora
tion* Moreover, officials of Alcoa did not
participate in the negotiations between the
European groups and the Aluminium Company, Ltd*
Hone of the agreements contained restrictions of

53Tw o outstanding books bearing directly on the
subject are; Louis Marlio, The. Aluminum Cartel* (Washingtons
The Brookings Institution, 1947); and George W. Stocking and
Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action* (New xorks The Twentieth
Centruy Fund, 1946)•
^ L o u i s Marlio, o p * qjt*. pp. 30-31.
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M y sorb pertaining to sales to or exports from
the United States# Nor were there any secret
understandings between Alcoa and the Alliance
with respect to markets or otherwise#
Another viewpoint concerning the relationships
existing between Alcoa and Aluminium, Ltd., (Alted), has
h e m well presented by George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins,
who have stated that wAlcoa and Alted have common control” and
that "the two companies have operated precisely as though
they were, in law, the single business enterprise which they
55
obviously are in fact."
Furthermore, referring specifically
to the rold of Alcoa in the field of international aluminum
56
cartels, these writers have stated:
The production controls directly affected
the trading prospects of cartel members in the
United States and in all other markets, domestic
and export. The cartel managers were all prac
tical businessmen, and they most certainly were
not leaving the door "wide open" for Alcoa, their
most formidable potential rival, to expand its
business at their expense* They had ample ground
for assurance on this vital point from (1) Alcoa9s
kinship with Alted, <2) Alcoa*s record not only as
a cartel cooperator but as a cartel leader for
more than three decades, and (3) Arthur V# Davis9
personal participation in the initiation and
detailed elaboration of the Alliance scheme.
The actual operation of the Alliance bears
out this interpretation of Alcoa’s relationship
to it as a "silent partner.19 Through the associa
tion of the brothers Davis, Alcoa frequently, if

^ G e o r g e W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, o p # cit.,
pp. 256—57*

56ibld..

p. 265.

mot regularly, obtained information regarding
Alliance stocks and price policy, and even re—
ports on its financial condition* Moreover* as
in the cartels before World War X, Alcoa through
Alted apparently exercised a predominant in—
fluence in the conduct of the Alliance*
Precise judgment of the degree of "authority11 to
be attached to the divergent statements of Dr* Marlio and
those of Dr* Stocking and Dr* Watkins is difficult, and
perhaps is unnecessary here*

The writer would subscribe

more readily to the viewpoints of the latter writers, and
would agree with a recent book review of Dr* Marlio1s book,
57
In which the following statements were madej
As former Chairman of the International
Aluminum Cartel, M* Marlio is frankly defending
his cartel against all comers* To the American
reader* it will appear curious that the blood
relationship of the Aluminum Co* of America and
its Canadian sister concern is given so little
emphasis* While M* Marlio enumerates only four
aluminum cartels, Stocking and Watkins*****
list at least eight* He is unconvincing when
he argues that cartel price policy has not
discouraged civilian consumption; the use of
a 1\iminma in the automobile industry, for example,
appears to have declined because cartel arrange
ments pegged its price*
«****For the future, M* Marlio recommends
full publicity and compulsory registration of
eartels*
Dr* Marlio9s conclusions are in direct contrast to
the commonly accepted ideas on cartelization*

He defends

the cartel idea energetically, declaring that international

57«Yhe Aluminum Cartel," (Book Review), Fortune.
Vol. XXXVI, (July, 1947), p* 10.
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trade was not# impeded by artificial restrictions on the
market by the cartel, at least after 190g.

He stated with

emphasis that aluminum usage was not restricted by the
policy or artificially maintaining high prices*

Stabilisation

of price in periods of depression was defended on the ground
that such a policy advances, rather than retards, the entire
process of recovery*

Retardation of technological progress

was vigorously denied by Dr* Marlio, and he stated that
»oste of the primary purposes of the aluminum cartel was to
promote technical research and discover new uses for the
5*
metal*11
He goes further to add that "such an association
(cartel) has neither the power nor the wish to suppress com
petition but only to limit it for a fixed period of time*
6 ompetlt Ion. direct or indirect survives*"

59

Denials of

promotion of inefficiency through the protection of high cost
producers were given a prominent place in Dr* Marllo’s con
clusions, and he stated that leadership in the cartel "passed

60
more and more into the hands of the lowest-cost producers*"
H e was critical of efforts of government cartels as such,
particularly in the matter of price reductions through
government cartel action*

Pear of control of such a government

5®Louis Marlio, o p * clt*. p# 109*
59 l b i d * . pp. 109-10.

60ibid.. P. in.
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cartel by high—cost producers was one of the chief critic
cisms given.

Political considerations, rather than economic

reasoning, might be the guiding and controlling factors in
such government cartels, according to Dr. Marlio.
All of these ideas as expressed by Dr* Marlio have
been given brief treatment here, because the writer believes
that they may be indicative of the type of writing that is
apt to catch the public eye in the postwar world*

The worst

danger lies in complacent acceptance of such attempts to
delude the general public by such 11whitewash” methods*

All

the evidence given by such men as Stocking, Watkins, and
Wendell Berge (for many years a great public servant in the
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Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice)

shows a

preponderance of opinion against such ideas of the great
public service of cartels In general and the aluminum cartel
in particular*

A special study of cartels was made by the

Temporary national Economic Committee in 1941*

It gives

ample evidence that the outstanding characteristics of cartels
are restriction of production, high prices, restriction of
technological progress, division of markets, and the main-
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tenance of high and rigid prices.

The whole purpose of

51

Wendell Berge, Cartels; Challenge to a Free World.
(Washington: Public Affairs P r e s s , 1944)•

62

Cartels* Eeport of the Hearings Before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, Part 25, (Washington: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1941)•

cartels Is to foster control over markets and to eliminate
competition*

The danger to the aluminum industry in the

postwar era is this type of activity on an international
scale*

Vigilance on the part of the United States may be

necessary tp maintain the degree of competition now existent
in the aluminum industry, and to foster even more effective
competition than is now apparent in the industry*

Canadian

competition may be feared by the aluminum producers of the
United States, but it is more to be desired, from the stand-*
point of the consuming public, than international cartel!zatlen of the aluminum industry*
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